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Abstract
Scholars of judicial politics have long recognised that courts reviewing the constitu-
tionality of legislative and executive acts lack the power of the purse and sword and
cannot coerce lawmakers into compliance with their jurisprudence. In this thesis, I
offer a novel perspective on how courts solve the tension that comes with their re-
liance on the executive and legislative branches for the efficacy of their judgements.
The thesis is motivated by an empirical puzzle: Existing scholarship suggests that
censure through a court is electorally costly for lawmakers, yet at times we can ob-
serve lawmakers’ pursuit of policies provoking confrontation with courts. I present
a formal model demonstrating that lawmakers dismissing advice that their policies
are at odds with constitutional jurisprudence and hence risking the political fallout
from a court’s veto signal a credible non-compliance threat. Upon observing such
signals, courts face incentives to show self-restraint in their judgements and ease
the constitutional limits to lawmakers’ policy-making. I bring both quantitative
and qualitative evidence from the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (GFCC)
review of federal law to bear on the theoretical model’s claims. A statistical analysis
of original data on the GFCC’s review of federal law between 1983 and 2017 shows
that the court is more likely to exercise self-restraint when lawmakers in govern-
ment had previously dismissed constitutional concerns voiced by members of the
governing coalition caucus. Complementing the statistical analysis, I evaluate the
assumptions underlying the formal model drawing on evidence from interviews with
justices at the GFCC, the German federal government and the Bundestag, while a
case study on the GFCC’s review of the 2008 Federal Criminal Police Office Act
offers an analytic narrative of the model’s main argument. The thesis shows that
lawmakers’ risk-taking in the shadow of courts’ constitutional review provides an
impetus for the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence.
4Impact statement
The academic impact of this doctoral thesis comes through (1) a scholarly article
targeted at a top-ranked political science journal, introducing the thesis’s main the-
oretical argument and evidence from its statistical analysis to a wider audience of
scholars, and (2) an original dataset of federal laws reviewed by the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court (GFCC) for their constitutional compatibility over more
than three decades (1983–2017) made available for replication analysis and future
research. At the time of subsmission of the thesis, the scholarly article “Signaling
political constraints on constitutional review” was under review at the American
Political Science Review. The article presents the formal analysis of the theoretical
model, which provides a novel insight into how courts lacking the power to en-
force their rulings foster compliance with their jurisprudence and how the external
constraints on courts’ exercise of constitutional review reflect in the behaviour of
lawmakers. The scholarly article and thesis offer evidence consistent with the the-
oretical model’s expectations from the GFCC’s exercise of constitutional review of
federal law. In a recent contribution published in the German scholarly journal Poli-
tische Vierteljahresschrift, leading German judicial politics scholars acknowledged
that while the GFCC is often regarded as one of the most consequential constitu-
tional courts in Europe, shaping the decision-making of lawmakers in the German
legislature and federal government, scholars have provided little empirical evidence
supporting these claims. The thesis’s empirical analysis addresses this gap. The
data collected for the empirical analysis will be made publicly available, facilitating
replication studies and future research on the GFCC’s review of federal law and
lawmakers’ choices in Germany’s system of limited government.
Beyond academia, questions surrounding the optimal design of systems of limited
government have long occupied delegates of constitutional conventions and commit-
tees tasked with reforming political institutions. Challenges facing members of these
fora involve identifying institutional designs ensuring that public officials in the leg-
islative and executive branches respect constitutional norms, while avoiding the
delegation of policy-making to courts lacking direct accountability to the electorate.
The theoretical analysis presented in this thesis allows officials to understand how
variation in features of courts’ institutional design (i.e. the presence/lack of cer-
tain formal institutions ensuring courts’ independence from the elected branches, or
provisions allowing the elected branches to overrule courts’ decisions) and varying
scope conditions in political environments translate into courts’ constitutional ju-
risprudence and the constraints they can place on lawmakers in the elected branches.
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Chapter 1
Constrained constitutional review
Courts reviewing the constitutionality of the actions of the elected branches of gov-
ernment have become a near universal feature of democratic polities. Ginsburg and
Versteeg (2014, 587) observe that “what Alexis de Tocqueville once described as an
American peculiarity is now a basic feature of almost every state.” Courts are at
the heart of systems of limited government, where constitutional limits are imposed
on the actions of the legislative and executive branches.
Albeit differing in their composition, the type of cases they hear, the legal system
they operate in and so forth, courts exercising constitutional review of legislative
and executive acts fulfil the same fundamental functions in systems of limited gov-
ernment: They serve as a check on those controlling the levers of political power
to protect constitutional norms against the transgressions of the elected branches.
In the process, courts breathe life into constitutions. Constitutions are incomplete
contracts harbouring the fundamental principles of politics, but lack specific in-
structions for every eventuality. Interpreting the constitution, courts’ jurisprudence
establishes the constitutional guardrails for the actions of the elected branches.
We may expect that the authority transferred to courts to set aside legislative
and executive acts for their constitutional incompatibility serves as a deterrent for
lawmakers intent on pursuing actions that would infringe on their constituents’
constitutional rights. In the The Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton asserts that
lawmakers “perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be
expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very
motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts” (Hamilton, 1961,
495). In other words, knowing that courts stand ready to censor acts transgressing
the boundaries of the constitution, prudent lawmakers would be well-advised to
draft their policies carefully and avoid conflict with the judiciary (see Stone, 1992).
12 Risking confrontation with courts
In this thesis, I will show that the reality of lawmakers’ decision-making in the
face of constitutional review looks different, however. Despite the shadow of con-
stitutional review looming, lawmakers do not always shy away from provoking con-
frontation with the judiciary over the constitutionality of their policies. More so, I
will show that lawmakers’ choice to pursue acts that conflict with courts’ jurispru-
dence has a profound effect on the constitutional limits courts subsequently impose
on the actions of the elected branches. Before I define the fundamental questions
regarding the relationship between the judiciary and the elected branches as well
as the functioning of systems of limited government this thesis seeks to answer, I
briefly sketch two examples of the empirical phenomenon at the centre of my work:
Lawmakers’ choice to provoke confrontation with the courts.
1.1 Risking confrontation with courts
This thesis is motivated by a puzzle: Existing scholarship suggests that lawmak-
ers in the elected branches anticipate that the constitutional compatibility of their
policies may be scrutinised by courts (see for example Stone Sweet, 2000; Vanberg,
1998; Wasserfallen, 2010). Yet, once in a while lawmakers appear undeterred in
their pursuit of policies that set the stage for confrontations with courts capable
of striking these policies. In the following, I introduce two illustrative examples of
lawmakers ignoring warning signs that their plans would fail to respect constitu-
tional boundaries to policy: the German federal parliament’s adoption of the 2008
Federal Criminal Police Office Act and the Trump administration’s implementation
of a travel ban targeting individuals from predominantly Muslim states in 2017.
On December 25 of 2008, a governing majority in the German Bundestag com-
prising the Christian-conservative CDU/CSU and the centre-left SPD adopted the
Federal Criminal Police Office Act (in German, the Bundeskriminalamtgesetz, in
the following BKAG). The act extended the law enforcement duties of the Federal
Criminal Police Office (in the following, BKA) to include the domain of the protec-
tion against threats from international terrorism and allowed the BKA to conduct
surveillance in private residences, allowed remote searches of information technol-
ogy systems, and regulated how the BKA would share information with other law
enforcement agencies.
During the legislative process, concerns were raised that the BKAG mandated
an impermissible encroachment upon the core area of an individual’s private life.
Gisela Piltz of the liberal-conservative FDP labelled the act as “poorly thought out
and constitutionally dubious”, claiming that it failed to live up to restrictions on
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state surveillance defined in the German Federal Constitutional Court’s recent ju-
risprudence.1 Announcing that his party would immediately refer the act to the
German Federal Constitutional Court, Wolfgang Wieland of the left-wing Green
party predicted that the BKAG would not survive the court’s review. In a rare turn
of events, several members of the coalition caucus joined the parliamentary oppo-
sition parties in their criticism of the BKAG. Ten members of the SPD, including
former Justice Minister Herta Da¨ubler-Gmelin, signed a statement denouncing the
BKAG for infringing on citizens’ constitutional rights. Despite a number of law-
makers of the SPD breaking party ranks and voting against the government, the act
eventually passed parliament and entered into force on January 1 of 2009.
Arguably to no surprise, the BKAG indeed ended up at the German Federal
Constitutional Court. Plaintiffs including a former federal minister, lawyers and
journalists alleged that the act’s provisions infringed upon several constitutional
norms enshrined in the German Basic Law. The German Federal Constitutional
Court issued its decision in 1 BvR 966/09 on April 20 of 2016, stating that “[t]he
authorisation of the Federal Criminal Police Office to carry out covert surveillance
measures (surveillance of private homes, remote searches of information technology
systems, telecommunications surveillance, collection of telecommunications traffic
data and surveillance outside of private homes using special means of data collection)
is, for the purpose of protecting against threats from international terrorism, in
principle compatible with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law” (see
preamble of 1 BvR 966/09 ).2 While the court’s judgement addressed the legal pre-
requirements of carrying out covert surveillance measures and data transfers, reining
in a number of provisions of the BKAG it perceived as too broad and unspecific,
it also consolidated existing case law. In doing so, the court’s judgement delimited
the restrictions its jurisprudence had previously placed on law enforcement.
In an unusual show of dissent on the bench of the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court, Justice Eichberger and Justice Schluckebier nonetheless penned sep-
arate opinions, criticising the court for placing excessive constraints on lawmakers’
scope for effective action to combat a tangible security threat. Justice Eichberger
wrote that “[t]he judgment, despite its welcome steps toward consolidation, never-
theless leads to a problematic entrenchment of the excessive constitutional require-
ments in this field.” In a similar vein, Justice Schluckebier noted that “[u]ltimately,
by means of numerous detailed requirements of a technical legislative nature the
1Translated from German, excerpt from the second reading of the Act on Prevention by the
Federal Criminal Police Office of Threats from International Terrorism, November 12, 2008, 2.
Beratung : BT-PlPr 16/186, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16186.pdf.
2The full text of the GFCC’s ruling in 1 BvR 966/09 including dissenting opinions (in English)
is available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160420_1bvr096609en.html
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Senate [of the German Federal Constitutional Court] puts its own notions of a reg-
ulatory framework before those of the democratically legitimised legislature.”
h
On January 27 of 2017, U.S. President Trump signed an executive order titled
“Protection Of The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States”
into effect. The order barred citizens of seven predominantly Muslim states—Iraq,
Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen—from entering the United States for
a 90-day period and suspended Syrian refugees’ entry into the United States indef-
initely. The immediate implementation of the order caught travellers on incoming
flights from these countries by surprise. Upon arrival, citizens of Iraq, Syria, Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen holding previously valid visas to enter and remain
in the U.S. faced detention by U.S. law enforcement officials and subsequent depor-
tation. Democratic lawmakers were quick to rush to the defense of those affected
by the policy. House Representative Nydia Velazquez and New York Mayor Bill de
Blasio labelled the Trump administration’s actions “shameful” and it did not take
long before those opposing the executive order pointed out that the White House
had delivered on an infamous campaign pledge.3
On the campaign trail in late 2015, citing polling data allegedly showing that a
sizeable proportion of the Muslim population in the United States harboured ha-
tred towards Americans, then-Presidential candidate Trump had called “for a total
and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s
representatives can figure out what the hell is going on.”4 At the time, the consti-
tutionality of an immigration policy discriminating along the lines of religion had
been widely questioned, including criticism from senior Republicans, with House
speaker Paul Ryan distancing himself from the Trump campaign for its anti-Muslim
rhetoric.5 Unsurprisingly, given the 90-day entry ban applied only to citizens from
predominantly Muslim states, the executive order was quickly linked to Trump’s
campaign pledge and coined as the ‘Muslim ban’. Civil rights groups and several
state governments controlled by Democrats challenged the order in the lower courts,
arguing that the policy amounted to religious discrimination under the pretext of
3CNN, January 29, 2017. Protesters mass at airports to decry Trump’s immigration
policies, accessed February 13, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/
us-immigration-protests/index.html
4Washington Post, December 7, 2015. Trump calls for ‘total and com-
plete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States’, accessed February 13,
2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/
donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims/
5Politico, June 14, 2016. Ryan breaks with Trump on Muslim immigrant ban, accessed February
19, 2019. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/ryan-trump-muslim-ban-224312
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national security and was thus unconstitutional. On February 3, 2017, a U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Seattle, Washington, issued a restraining order in State of Washington
v. Trump, temporarily blocking the nationwide application of the executive order.
The District Court’s judgement was among the first of a series of judicial deci-
sions challenging the Trump administration’s immigration policy. Responding to the
flurry of legal challenges, the White House replaced the original order with executive
order 13780, which itself was superseded by Presidential Proclamation 9645, to in-
clude travel restrictions to the U.S. for individuals from North Korea and Venezuela,
while removing Iraq from the list. However, constitutional objections to the Trump
administration’s immigration policy persisted and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
in early 2018 to hear a case brought by the State of Hawaii, which argued that the
policy’s latest iteration remained motivated by an anti-Muslim animus.
Arguably, in light of the five-to-four majority of Republican-nominated justices
at the U.S. Supreme Court, the Trump administration now faced a more ‘friendly’
bench than in the lower courts that had previously censored its immigration policy.
However, given the Republican party’s initial objection of then-Presidential candi-
date Trump’s planned ‘Muslim ban’ and conservative Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
previous decisions to side with his liberal colleagues on core issues of conserva-
tive ideology,6 a judgement in favour of the Trump administration’s Presidential
Proclamation did not seem certain. Further, Justice Sonia Sotomayor warned that
allowing the Trump administration’s travel ban to go ahead would bear the hall-
marks of the U.S. Supreme Court’s infamous judgement in Korematsu v. United
States, which had legitimised the internment of Japanese Americans during World
War II.7 Nonetheless, eventually a five-to-four majority on the bench disagreed with
the plaintiff’s argument and upheld the Presidential Proclamation. Writing for the
majority in Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the proclamation
“is expressly premised on legitimate purposes and says nothing about religion.”8
h
These examples illustrate several features of the relationship between courts ex-
ercising constitutional review and the elected branches of government that define
6Washington Post, June 27, 2018. Justice Kennedy ideology: Judge swung more conserva-
tive before retiring, accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/
politics/supreme-court-2017-term/.
7New York Times, June 26, 2018. Sonia Sotomayor Delivers Sharp Dissent in
Travel Ban Case, accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/
sonia-sotomayor-dissent-travel-ban.html.
8The full text of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. Hawaii is available at https:
//www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf.
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the focus of this thesis. First, they show that constitutional questions surrounding
a legislative or executive act arise well in advance of courts actually hearing a re-
lated case. The shadow of courts’ exercise of constitutional review is long, and it
reaches into the chambers of legislatures and the offices of lawmakers in the exec-
utive branch. Scholars have pointed out that lawmakers anticipate that their acts
will be scrutinised by courts commanding the authority to strike them as unconsti-
tutional (see Stone, 1992; Vanberg, 1998). Rogers and Vanberg (2007, 443) argue
that “under the probabilistic threat of litigation (with the possibility of a judicial
veto), legislative majorities draft statutory provisions to be immune to the judicial
veto” (for similar arguments, see Blauberger, 2012; Wasserfallen, 2010). They do
so because a judicial veto comes with costs for lawmakers. When courts censor leg-
islative or executive acts as unconstitutional, they instruct lawmakers to return to
the drawing board and come up with new solutions that respect the boundaries of
courts’ interpretation of the constitution. At the very least, lawmakers then have
to allocate often scarce resources and floor time in legislatures to amend the acts
objected by courts (Vanberg, 2005).
However, the examples discussed above suggest that the prospects of being at
the receiving end of a judicial veto and the costs that come with it do not always
deter lawmakers from pushing ahead with acts high at risk of courts’ censure. In this
regard, the example of the German Bundestag’s passage of the BKAG appears even
more puzzling than the Trump administration’s pursuit of an immigration policy os-
tensibly discriminating along the lines of religion. Not only did German lawmakers
of the CDU/CSU and factions of the SPD ignore the constitutional warnings voiced
by lawmakers on the opposition benches, they also dismissed advice from members
of their own caucus. Negotiations on the BKAG were a particularly troublesome
episode for the SPD, as its proponents in the party had to defend the act’s constitu-
tionality against the objections from their party’s designated legal specialists. Amid
clear warning signs that the BKAG would infringe on the constitutional limits to
state surveillance, lawmakers in government persevered in their attempt to expand
the competences of federal law enforcement agencies.
Finally, the examples illustrate a feature of courts’ decision-making that has long
garnered the attention of scholars of judicial politics: Courts’ decision to defer to
the elected branches of government and the exercise of self-restraint in their ju-
risprudence. A long-standing debate among scholars of judicial politics has revolved
around courts’ role as countermajoritarian institutions, capable of frustrating the
political agenda of democratically elected lawmakers. In the words of Alexander
Bickel, when a court declares “unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of
an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people
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of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing major-
ity, but against it” (Bickel, 1986, 16). Some scholars have gone so far to argue
that courts’ unconstrained exercise of constitutional review has paved the way for
a juristocracy—government through courts instead of those mandated to rule by
the electorate (Tate and Vallinder, 1995; Hirschl, 2009; Stone Sweet, 2000). Yet,
the more recent literature has pushed back on the perception of judges as uncon-
strained and unaccountable lawmakers in robes. This work has shown that courts
themselves are acting under a series of constraints and carefully avoid jurisprudence
that precipitates conflict with the elected branches (see for example Clark, 2010;
Bailey and Maltzman, 2011, see also Dahl 1957). Lacking the ‘power of the purse or
sword’ and relying on the executive and legislative branches for their institutional
efficacy (Hamilton, 1961; Shapiro, 2013), courts may feel inclined to defer to the
elected branches when resistance to their jurisprudence is on the horizon.
The examples discussed above and the highlighted features in the choices of the
elected branches and courts underscore that there is more to inter-branch relations
than judges exercising constitutional review and lawmakers complying with their
judgements. Lawmakers pushing for policy conflicting with constitutional jurispru-
dence set the stage for confrontations with the judiciary. Courts, on the other hand,
seem to carefully navigate their exercise of constitutional review and avoid placing
excessive demands on the elected branches of government. These points give rise to
fundamental questions about the functioning of systems of limited government:
• Why do lawmakers provoke confrontation with courts capable of striking their
acts as unconstitutional?
• How do courts respond when lawmakers embrace policies conflicting with their
constitutional jurisprudence?
• How do courts resolve the tension in their role as effective checks on the elected
branches and their reliance on the latter for the efficacy of their judgements?
• Who eventually defines the constitutional limits to policy in systems of limited
government?
In this thesis, I offer an answer to these questions that is disarmingly simple.
The choices of lawmakers anticipating constitutional review allow courts to predict
how members of the elected branches would respond to their judgements. I argue
that lawmakers risking politically costly confrontations with courts signal their will-
ingness to evade compliance with jurisprudence limiting their policy options. These
signals then allow courts to avoid issuing decisions that are ultimately not enforced
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by the elected branches. Before I sketch the rationale of this argument in more
detail and discuss the general approach of this thesis, I briefly review the scholarly
literature that provides the building blocks of my theory.
1.2 The foundations of judicial authority
Courts exercising constitutional review of the acts of the elected branches occupy
a peculiar role in democratic polities. Alexander Hamilton famously described the
judiciary as ‘the least dangerous branch of government’. The judiciary commands
“neither force nor will, but merely judgement; and must ultimately depend on the aid
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgements” (Hamilton, 1961, 490).
And yet, courts have proven themselves as remarkably consequential institutions in
constitutional democracies (see Kapiszewski et al., 2013). Hirschl (2008) provides
an impressive list exemplifying the influence courts around the world have had on
the most fundamental questions of political life in their jurisdictions. Courts have
left their mark on questions such as Germany’s role in the European Union, decided
on the fate of the U.S. presidency, addressed the status of indigenous people in
Australia and New Zealand, and considered Israel’s definition as a Jewish state (see
Hirschl, 2008, 94). Where does courts’ authority stem from? How do courts get
other actors to enforce and comply with their judgements? And why do the elected
branches seem to tolerate courts capable of frustrating their political agenda? The
existing literature addressing these questions fills library shelves and it is useful to
review some of it here to establish the basic premises of the argument I present in
this thesis.
Vanberg (2008) distinguishes between two types of mechanisms—endogenous and
exogenous—that explain why courts play a consequential role in systems of limited
government. Endogenous accounts claim that independent courts help the other
branches of government to secure benefits they could otherwise not obtain. Douglass
North and Barry Weingast trace the origins of independent judiciaries capable of
placing constraints on other branches of government back to 17th century Great
Britain. The British crown was accustomed to raising money through forced loans
from its wealthy constituents, unilaterally renewing loans and paying less interest
than originally agreed (North and Weingast, 1989, 820). Faced with a crown that
controlled both policy and the courts at its pleasure, lenders had little choice but to
grudgingly agree to the monarchy’s terms.
However, aﬄuent strata of society eventually demanded institutional change to
limit the monarchy’s arbitrary power and posed a credible threat of overthrowing
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the crown. In the course of the Glorious Revolution and with parliament’s passage of
the Act of Settlement in 1701, judges’ tenure ceased to be subject to the monarch’s
pleasure but rested on good behaviour, establishing a fundamental prerequisite for
courts’ independence from the crown (see Ervin, 1970). Relinquishing control over
the judiciary, the British crown was able to make a credible commitment to respect
the property rights of its constituents and ensure it could continue borrowing to
serve its fiscal needs.
Similar arguments have been made by economists, who highlight that government
faces credibility problems when committing to property rights, which they see as a
prerequisite to spur private investment into the economy (see Feld and Voigt, 2003;
Hayo and Voigt, 2007; Laffont and Meleu, 2001, see also Moustafa 2007). Hayo and
Voigt (2007) argue that governments have time-inconsistent preferences and face
short-term incentives to renege on prior promises to property rights. Since potential
investors are aware of governments’ incentives, the latter instituted independent
judiciaries with jurisdiction to referee disputes over these rights to signal credible
commitment to their promises. Illustrating this argument empirically, Voigt et al.
(2007) show that upon gaining independence, some former British commonwealth
colonies decided to retain the authority of the Privy Council’s judicial committee
as an internationally guaranteed independent judiciary to increase the credibility of
their policy commitments.
The argument that independent courts allow the elected branches of government
to ‘lock-in’ policies has been taken up by political scientists as well. Landes and
Posner (1975) argue that by tying their hands and supporting an independent ju-
diciary, political actors can increase the shelf-life of their policies. Given lawmakers
in electoral democracies expect to rotate in and out of government office, delegating
the enforcement of their policies to an independent judiciary decreases the influence
incoming political majorities wield over past policies (for a similar argument, see
Stephenson, 2003).
This argument only bites where lawmakers actually have reasonable expecta-
tions that they will lose political power in the foreseeable future (see Ferejohn and
Weingast, 1992; Ramseyer, 1994; Helmke, 2002). Analysing patterns in the decision-
making within the judicial hierarchy of post-war Japan, Ramseyer and Rasmusen
(2001) show that given the Liberal Democratic Party’s firm grip on political power,
consistently controlling government office in the decades following World War II,
both the Japanese Supreme Court and lower courts routinely deferred to the long-
time political incumbent.
Exogenous explanations, on the other hand, hold that even if the elected branches
wanted to challenge the judiciary over unfavourable judgements, the costs lawmakers
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would have to bear for defying the courts render this option unattractive. Decades of
scholarship have shown that most courts sitting at the top of the judicial hierarchy,
such as the U.S. Supreme Court or the German Federal Constitutional Court, typi-
cally enjoy comfortable reservoirs of public support (see for example Gibson et al.,
1998; Gibson and Caldeira, 1995; Caldeira and Gibson, 1992; Gibson and Caldeira,
2003; Gibson and Nelson, 2016; Mondak, 1992; Vanberg, 2005).
Scholars of judicial politics distinguish between the public’s ‘specific’ support for
individual judgements of courts and ‘diffuse’ (or institutional) support. The concept
of diffuse support is based on work by David Easton and captures a “reservoir of
favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs
to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their
wants” (Easton, 1965, 273). Members of the public may occasionally disagree with
the direction of courts’ judgements. However, as long as courts avoid consistently
issuing decisions out of touch with dominant public opinion, the public’s faith in
courts’ institutional legitimacy is unlikely to waver (see for example Gibson et al.,
2005; Durr et al., 2000; Ura, 2014).
The public’s diffuse support for courts has consequences for the relationship
among courts and the elected branches. Vanberg (2001) highlights that lawmakers
frustrated by the constraints courts place on their actions risk the public’s ire at the
ballot box and spoil their electoral prospects should they decide to move against
the courts (see also Mayhew, 1974). Courts’ diffuse public support and institutional
legitimacy thus plays a critical role in ensuring that the elected branches respect
the constraints courts place on their actions (see Clark, 2010; Carrubba and Zorn,
2010; Vanberg, 2005). The public’s role in reinforcing courts’ authority vis-a`-vis the
elected branches leaves its mark on the decision-making of courts as well, however.
Analysing the decision-making of the U.S. Supreme Court, Casillas et al. (2011,
86) note that “not only do justices have reason to believe that ignoring the public
may compromise public confidence in the Court, but also the Court’s decisions—at
least for nonsalient cases—consistently respond to changes in public opinion.” The
public’s support is a foundation of courts’ authority but it simultaneously constrains
their decision-making. Existing literature holds that courts need to carefully pay
attention to the public’s mood in their judgements in order to avoid jeopardizing
a key source of their authority (see for example Hall, 2014; McGuire and Stimson,
2004; Sternberg et al., 2015, see also Bartels and Johnston 2013).
Endogenous and exogenous explanations of judicial authority in systems of lim-
ited government suggest that courts need to be foresighted in their decision-making
in order to mature in their role as constraints on the political power of the elected
branches. Clifford Carrubba neatly summarizes this point:
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Once created, an institutionally ‘immature’ court—one without pub-
lic backing—will fulfill the role set out by the governments admirably;
the court can facilitate compliance with the regulatory regime’s rules, but
it cannot impose its own preferences over those of the governments. [...]
If the same court ‘matures’ and gains public backing the story changes
dramatically. While the court is not totally free to rule as it wishes,
up to certain limits it is capable of getting government compliance with
the regulatory regime’s rules even when both governments and publics
would prefer otherwise. That is, the court develops truly independent
influence, or, put differently, the court’s decisions become institutionally
based exogenous constraints (Carrubba, 2009, 68).
Carrubba’s theory of the development of independent courts capable of placing
constraints on the elected branches suggests that courts need to nurture and sub-
sequently maintain their authority. A prominent strand of scholarship in judicial
politics has shown that courts engage in strategic decision-making to try to ward
off attempts by the other branches of government to undermine their authority and
institutional integrity. In the following section, I take a closer look at two specific,
separate threats to courts’ authority that are central to this scholarship: elected
branches’ backlash against courts in the form of court-curbing and lawmakers’ fail-
ure to comply with courts’ judgements.
1.3 Threats to judicial authority
To exercise constitutional review free from external influences is critical for courts to
serve as an effective check on the elected branches in systems of limited government.
Hence, unsurprisingly the establishment of courts tasked with controlling the acts of
the elected branches usually comes with a set of formal institutions designed to insu-
late courts from external pressures on their decision-making. Carrubba et al. (2015,
4) note that formal institutions such as “life tenure, strict rules against removal for
political reasons, protected budgets and so on are the types of institutional protec-
tions that are designed to ensure that judges do not simply defer to governments
for reasons unconnected to the legal merits of the cases they review.”
However, scholars of judicial politics have questioned whether these institutional
protections in fact translate into courts’ independent exercise of authority. This
strand of scholarship distinguishes between de jure independence, i.e. the formal
rules designed to insulate judges from external pressure, and de facto independence,
i.e. the expectation that outcomes of courts’ decisions not only reflect the sincere
22 Threats to judicial authority
beliefs of judges but are also effectively implemented (see for example R´ıos-Figueroa
and Staton, 2014; Linzer and Staton, 2015). So far, empirical evidence suggesting
a systematic link between the two concepts remains mixed at best (see Melton and
Ginsburg, 2014; Herron and Randazzo, 2003; Helmke and Rosenbluth, 2009).
Institutional protections of courts’ independence may not serve as a guaran-
tee of courts’ exercise of constitutional review free from external influences partly
because lawmakers nonetheless find ways to circumvent or undermine these insti-
tutions. When courts frustrate the political agenda of those controlling political
power, the latter face incentives to curb the courts. Court-curbing encompasses
action “that threatens to restrict, remove, or otherwise limit the Court’s power”
(Clark, 2010, 19). Court-curbing thus includes lawmakers’ attempts to undermine a
court’s institutional legitimacy in public speeches in legislatures or press interviews
(Carrubba et al., 2015). But it may also involve more serious attacks on the judi-
ciary, involving the slashing of courts’ budgets, restrictions on their jurisdiction, or
‘packing’ the court with loyal judges (see Handberg and Hill Jr., 1980; Rosenberg,
1992; Whittington, 2003). These attacks may leave courts dysfunctional and put
their role as effective checks on the elected branches in jeopardy.
For instance, documenting the evolution of the Russian Constitutional Court
during the early years of the post-Soviet Russian Federation, Epstein et al. (2001)
note that the court’s assertive use of its powers to challenge the executive branch
in the early 1990s provoked President Yeltsin to sign a decree in October 1993,
suspending the Constitutional Court until the adoption of a new constitution. Fol-
lowing the subsequent constitutional reform, judges on the Russian Constitutional
Court had inter alia lost their lifetime appointment, could no longer decide cases on
their own initiative or pass judgements on the constitutionality of political parties
(Epstein et al., 2001, 137).
The existing literature shows that episodes of court-curbing are not limited to
states with fragile political institutions (see Llanos et al., 2015), but remain a credible
threat in democratic polities with established institutions as well. Clark (2010)
documents several periods of court-curbing the U.S. Supreme Court had endured
between the pre-Civil War era and 2008 (see also Nagel, 1965; Rosenberg, 1992).
According to Clark, the latest period of ‘high’ court-curbing in the United States
began in 2002, noting that “Congress has been very proactive during recent years,
using new legislative techniques that have been designed to publicly condemn the
Court and side-step the possibility of judicial review” (Clark, 2010, 59).
Arguably to no surprise, lawmakers’ attempts to curb the judiciary eventually
leave their mark on the decision-making of courts. Clark (2009) shows that the U.S.
Supreme Court responds to lawmakers’ tabling of court-curbing legislation with
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subsequent self-restraint in its exercise of constitutional review. He argues that
justices on the U.S. Supreme Court interpret lawmakers’ choice to introduce and
debate court-curbing legislation in Congress as an indication that the court has lost
support among the public. Knowing that it may no longer be able to rely on the
public’s support pressuring lawmakers to duly enforce its decisions, the court then
becomes more deferential to Congress in its judgements.
Lawmakers’ attempts to undermine the institutional safeguards of courts’ formal
independence are not the only instrument available to the elected branches threat-
ening to undermine courts’ authority. Ferejohn and Weingast (1992, 276) note that
“[w]hereas much analysis of interpretation in the legal literature assumes that courts
have the last word, in reality there is no last move.”
Courts’ judgements censoring the actions of the elected branches for constitu-
tional incompatibility typically require a response from lawmakers. The elements of
legislative and executive acts a court had invalidated and taken off the books need
to be redrafted in light of the court’s jurisprudence. Scholars of judicial politics have
highlighted that lawmakers enjoy a degree of discretion in their response to courts’
judgements and may attempt to evade faithful compliance with the spirit of courts’
jurisprudence (Carrubba and Zorn, 2010; Staton and Vanberg, 2008; Larsson and
Naurin, 2016; Carrubba et al., 2008; Hall, 2011).
Evasion of compliance can take a variety of forms. Krehbiel (2016) references
German lawmakers’ response to the German Federal Constitutional Court’s 1992
objection to provisions in party finance laws affording financial advantages to estab-
lished political parties. Filling the gaps the court’s ruling had left in the legislative
text, German lawmakers simply added “a new clause that created a substantively
equivalent policy to the one ruled unconstitutional” (Krehbiel, 2016, 996). Other av-
enues for lawmakers to evade faithful compliance include informal and non-statutory
arrangements, which continue to apply practices objected by the court (see for ex-
ample the U.S. Congress’s continued use of the so-called ‘legislative veto’ in its bills
despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s objection of the practice in INS v. Chadha, see
Fisher, 1993), or the—possibly indefinite—delay of implementation of court rulings
(see Kapiszewski and Taylor, 2013).
The existing literature has shown that courts’ implementation dilemma, lacking
the power to coerce the elected branches into compliance with its jurisprudence, is
a concern for courts keen on maintaining their institutional integrity. Hall (2014,
354) notes that “justices’ concern for institutional maintenance may be partially
rooted in a fear of nonimplementation”, adding that “[f]requent nonimplementation
of the Court’s rulings might reduce its power and degrade its legitimacy over time.”
Excerpts from Vanberg’s interviews with former justices at the German Federal
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Constitutional Court corroborate this expectation:
You know, the court has issued many decisions that were never com-
plied with, for example about the treatment of civil servant pensions.
And there really isn’t anything the court can do about that. If no one
else takes an interest in it, that’s just the way it is going to be. And of
course the court has to be worried about that, that a tradition of ignoring
the court isn’t established (Justice of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, quoted in Vanberg, 2005, 122).
Courts’ reliance on the elected branches of government for the effective imple-
mentation of their judgements and the prospects of tarnishing their institutional in-
tegrity should the elected branches repeatedly fail to comply with their jurisprudence
has spawned a literature analysing how courts’ implementation dilemma reflects in
their decision-making. This literature expects courts to exercise constitutional re-
view of the actions of the elected branches strategically. Epstein and Knight (1998,
10) argue that “justices are strategic actors who realize that their ability to achieve
their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, the choices
they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act.”
The main argument of this literature claims that courts’ implementation dilemma
constrains courts’ decision-making. Given implementation of their judgements often
lies in the hands of lawmakers, courts anticipate how the latter would react to their
judgements—and strategically avoid judgements at risk of non-compliance (see Gely
and Spiller, 1990; Bergara et al., 2003). Hall and Ura (2015, 819) find evidence that
the U.S. Supreme Court “is less likely to invalidate important statutes that enjoy
greater support among current lawmakers” (for similar findings, see Whittington,
2007; Segal et al., 2011; Harvey and Friedman, 2009; Bailey and Maltzman, 2011).
Accordingly, the preferences of the elected branches can act as a constraint on
the decisions of courts tasked with controlling them. However, a series of recent
studies have shown that courts can employ a variety of strategies to attenuate these
constraints. Owens et al. (2013) find that justices at the U.S. Supreme Court ob-
fuscate the language they use in majority opinions in order to make it more costly
for a politically hostile Congress to review their judgements and potentially pur-
sue retaliatory measures for unfavourable judgements (for similar arguments, see
also Owens and Wedeking, 2011; Staton and Vanberg, 2008). Larsson et al. (2017,
881) analyse the use of references to precedent in the judgements of the Court of
Justice of the European Union and find that “the Court argues more carefully, by
means of reference to precedent, when it takes decisions that conflict with the posi-
tions of EU governments.” Finally, knowing that lawmakers risk backlash from an
Constrained constitutional review 25
electorate supportive of the court should they get caught evading compliance with
courts’ jurisprudence, courts attempt to increase the transparency of the political
environment in which implementation would take place, for instance by accompany-
ing their judgements with press releases or by scheduling oral arguments that garner
the attention of the media (Vanberg, 2005; Staton, 2006, 2010; Krehbiel, 2016).
1.4 Approach of the thesis
The literature reviewed in the preceding sections shows that the actions of the elected
branches and courts tasked with controlling them are highly interdependent. This
seems hardly surprising. After all, mutual interdependencies across the legislative,
executive and judicial branches are the intended product of systems of checks and
balances. In The Federalist 51, James Madison argues that to effectively constrain
the power of individual branches of government “[a]mbition must be made to coun-
teract ambition” (Madison, 1961, 356). In light of these mutual interdependencies,
it is equally unsurprising that scholars studying systems of limited government have
embraced a strategic outlook to explain the behaviour of courts, legislatures and
executive officials (see for example Vanberg, 2005; Rogers, 2001; Harvey and Fried-
man, 2006; Epstein and Knight, 1998; Segal et al., 2011; Bailey and Maltzman, 2011;
Iaryczower et al., 2002).
My approach in this thesis follows in the footsteps of scholarship perceiving
courts and the elected branches as strategic actors. In line with these accounts, I
expect courts to be aware that challenging the actions of the elected branches may
result in backlash against the courts, threatening their institutional integrity. At the
same time, courts know that should they decide to challenge the constitutionality
of policy, political majorities in legislatures and executive officials may attempt to
evade compliance with the spirit of courts’ jurisprudence. Consequently, I expect
courts to be uncertain whether or not it is worthwhile to pick a fight with the
elected branches over the constitutionality of policy and suffer backlash, given that
lawmakers may eventually come out on top and evade compliance.
In this thesis, I present a theoretical argument showing how courts solve this
dilemma and offer a new perspective on the strategic inter-branch relations in sys-
tems of limited government. Much of the existing literature has focused on the
constraints that courts enjoying comfortable public support place on the elected
branches. Departing from these accounts, this thesis is concerned with scenarios in
which courts’ authority to exercise constitutional review of executive and legislative
acts fails to counteract the ambition of the elected branches. The motivating em-
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pirical examples sketched at the outset of this chapter illustrate that lawmakers do
not always respond to incentives to avoid confrontation with courts. One possible
explanation for this phenomenon could be that lawmakers choose to pursue con-
troversial and ostensibly unconstitutional policies to appease the demands of fringe
groups among their electoral constituencies, knowing that courts will eventually
censor these policies and relieve lawmakers from actually applying them (for similar
arguments, see Salzberger, 1993; Graber, 1993; Whittington, 2005). While this ar-
gument seems plausible for fringe policies, it seems less applicable to policies at the
heart of governing majorities’ political agenda, such as the German government’s
counter-terrorism strategy in the BKAG in 2008 illustrated above.
In this thesis, I argue that lawmakers’ choice to pursue policies that provoke
confrontation with the judiciary helps courts to anticipate how lawmakers would
respond to judgements invalidating such policies—and when it is in courts’ best
interest to defer to the elected branches rather than to restrict their scope of action
for future policies. Given that systems of limited government induce both courts
and lawmakers to act strategically, lawmakers’ pursuit of controversial policies al-
lows courts to update their beliefs of whether or not they are facing lawmakers who
would resist faithfully implementing judicial vetoes of their policies. Put simply, law-
makers’ provocation of confrontation with courts signals a threat of non-compliance
should courts opt to challenge their policies. Crucially, I show that the credibility
of such signals is conditional on the costs associated with lawmakers’ pursuit of
controversial policies.
Existing studies have shown that political actors interacting in a strategic envi-
ronment can credibly signal their true preferences or intentions when their actions
are tied to costs (for an application of this logic to the signalling of foreign pol-
icy interests among states at the brink of violent conflict, see Fearon 1997). I do
not expect courts to respond to every instance of lawmakers’ provocation with self-
restraint in their jurisprudence. However, when it is politically costly for lawmakers
to pursue policies flouting the constitutional limits defined in courts’ jurisprudence,
courts have reason to believe that they are dealing with lawmakers prepared to
evade compliance with a judicial veto, should lawmakers nonetheless persist in their
pursuit of such policies.
The logic underlying this expectation is straightforward: When the political fall-
out from being censored by a court is particularly costly, then lawmakers willing to
eventually comply with a judicial veto should not opt for policies that are at risk of
being opposed by the courts in the first place. The type of lawmakers that provoke
confrontation, nonetheless, are then more likely to be the ones prepared to evade
compliance with the spirit of courts’ jurisprudence. In these scenarios, I expect
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strategic courts to be more likely to answer lawmakers’ pursuit of constitutionally
controversial policies with self-restraint. In other words, under these conditions, law-
makers’ provocation of confrontation places a political constraint on courts’ exercise
of constitutional review.
My theoretical argument, to be fleshed out in the next chapter, rests on a game-
theoretic analysis of the decision-making of courts and lawmakers in systems of
limited government. Game theory has been the preferred analytical tool for scholars
of judicial politics, who argue that courts and the elected branches act strategically
in light of their mutual interdependence (see for example Vanberg, 2005; Rogers,
2001; Clark, 2010; Stephenson, 2003; Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992; Staton, 2010).
Game-theoretic analyses discipline scholars to make their assumptions that enter
a theoretical model, the relevant actors, their possible courses of action, and their
motivations explicit (Kreps, 1990). This formalization of a theoretical model is
often useful as it “may lead to new insights by forcing us to think through the
implications of our assumptions” (Vanberg, 2005, 16). The class of game-theoretic
models I employ in this thesis is known as signalling games (see Cho and Kreps,
1987). These games involve an interaction between a more informed agent, here the
lawmaker, and a less informed agent, here the court, and “take their name from
the possibility that the sender’s action conveys information about her type to the
receiver” (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007, 214).
Like most game-theoretic models, the model of the strategic interactions between
courts and the elected branches I present in this thesis abstracts heavily from reality
and may seem overly simplistic. In reality, courts’ exercise of constitutional review
in a particular case is likely to be subject to a wide variety of factors, first and
foremost a case’s facts, the ideology and personal history of judges hearing the case,
differences among the judges on the bench, the plaintiff’s reasoning, interventions
from third parties to the case, and so forth (see for example Segal, 1984; Segal and
Spaeth, 2002; Glynn and Sen, 2015; Johnson et al., 2006; Clark and Lauderdale,
2010). My game-theoretic model strips away most of these factors and leaves only a
handful of elements characterising the strategic interaction between courts and the
elected branches. Despite this abstraction from reality (or as some may argue because
of it), game-theoretic models are still useful as they allow us to focus on the effect
of a particular aspect characterising the relationship among relevant actors on their
behaviour—here, the costs lawmakers expect to pay from provoking confrontation
with the courts (see Clarke and Primo, 2012).
My theoretical model produces empirically testable expectations. The empirical
analysis in this thesis testing these expectations focuses on the decision-making of the
German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC). The reasons for choosing the GFCC
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as the focus of my analysis are discussed further in the third chapter of this thesis.
However, it is worth mentioning here that while the model turns out to be useful in
explaining a puzzling feature of the GFCC’s decision-making, I believe that the key
insight of my theoretical model—courts respond with self-restraint to lawmakers’
costly signals of a non-compliance threat—is applicable to other courts as well.
As long as it is actually politically costly for lawmakers to provoke confrontation
with the judiciary, the strategic incentives for courts required to respond to such
confrontation described in the theoretical model should be at work. This makes the
theoretical model useful for explaining the decision-making of courts occupying an
equally powerful position in their respective political system as the GFCC, which
would include courts such as the U.S. Supreme Court or the Court of Justice of the
European Union.
The empirical test of my model combines both a statistical analysis of the
GFCC’s decision-making, qualitative evidence from interviews with former mem-
bers of the GFCC as well as the legislative and executive branches in Germany, and
a case study. It is worth stressing here that my qualitative evidence provides more
than just an illustrative narrative of the findings from my statistical analysis. Quali-
tative evidence, particularly from interviews with actors at the heart of my theory, is
an essential element of evaluating game-theoretic models. Vanberg (2005, 16) notes
that given game-theoretic models often involve actors’ beliefs about counterfactual
situations that never occur, “[a] crucial concern in assessing the power of a formal
model must therefore consist in determining whether the beliefs and perceptions of
real-world actors about the interactions they are engaged in and about the strategies
of other players correspond closely to the beliefs imputed to players in the model.”
1.5 Plan of the thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter introduces
the game-theoretic model and derives a set of empirically testable expectations of
how courts respond to lawmakers’ provocation of confrontation. The first part of
the third chapter discusses my case selection and the assembly of the dataset that
I use for my statistical analysis of the GFCC’s decision-making. I identified every
federal law reviewed by the GFCC between 1983 and 2017, and read the parlia-
mentary plenary debates on these laws to capture the political costs lawmakers in
government risked paying for provoking confrontation with the GFCC. The third
chapter’s second part then presents the result of the statistical test of the theoretical
model’s expectations.
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The fourth chapter presents evidence from my interviews with German lawmak-
ers and former members of the GFCC to evaluate whether my assumptions about
the beliefs of the actors in my theoretical model match up to the beliefs the cor-
responding actors in the real world hold about the strategic environment they find
themselves in. The fifth chapter offers a case study of the GFCC’s constitutional
review of the 2008 Federal Criminal Police Office Act, providing an analytic nar-
rative of the theoretical model’s main argument. While my approach in this thesis
remains by and large positive, in other words I do not evaluate whether the model’s
expected behaviour of courts and lawmakers is normatively desirable, the final chap-
ter considers the broader normative implications of my findings in this thesis.
Chapter 2
Signalling political constraints
In most modern constitutional democracies, courts can invalidate executive and leg-
islative acts for their constitutional incompatibility and play a critical role in ensur-
ing that the elected branches respect constitutional norms (Ginsburg and Versteeg,
2014). Several scholars have provided evidence of how courts exercising constitu-
tional review passively shape and constrain the actions of lawmakers.
Stone (1989) argues that the legislative process in the French parliament can-
not be assessed without considering both the direct and indirect influence of the
French Constitutional Council. The French parliament operates in the shadow of
the Constitutional Council and “there is some basis for the view that the institution
does function as a kind of third legislative chamber within parliamentary space, and
an umpire in the political ‘game’” (Stone, 1989, 30). Similar arguments have been
made for the indirect influence the German Federal Constitutional Court exerts on
the legislative process in the German parliament, urging lawmakers to ‘self-censor’
their policy-making (see for example Landfried, 1992; Vanberg, 2005; Ho¨nnige and
Gschwend, 2010), and the Court of Justice of the European Union, which induces
lawmakers in EU member states to draft their policies ‘with Luxembourg in mind’
(Blauberger, 2012, see also Wasserfallen 2010).1
However, in the previous chapter I argued that the prospects of courts’ exercise of
constitutional review do not always deter lawmakers from testing the constitutional
limits to their policies. Not every case of constitutional review a court considers
merits a judicial veto, and not every act that is eventually invalidated by a court
represents an instance of lawmakers willingly flouting constitutional limits on their
policy-making. The actual effects of their policies are often difficult to foresee for
lawmakers, and courts can serve as “an agency of sober second thought” (Note,
1Luxembourg is the seat of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
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1956, 1311), allowing lawmakers to correct any unintended consequences of their
policies (see Rogers, 2001).
But there is evidence that lawmakers in government at times persist in their pur-
suit of controversial policy even if a risk of breaching constitutional limits is tangible
at the policy-making stage. Ho¨nnige and Gschwend (2010, 510) show that between
1997 and 2007, members of the German Bundestag or state governments referred
roughly five federal laws for review to the German Federal Constitutional Court each
year—with about half of them eventually struck as unconstitutional by the court.
The third chapter in this thesis provides ample evidence from debates in the Ger-
man Bundestag, which shows that its members rarely wait for policy to be passed to
voice their constitutional concerns, but instead make themselves heard during the
legislative process. The following excerpt from a Member of Parliament’s statement
during the German Bundestag’s debate on the 2008 Act Reforming Inheritance and
Valuation Taxation is illustrative of this phenomenon:
Christine Scheel (Greens): For today’s vote, you submitted a highly
complex body of legislation, envisioning preferential treatment for some
citizens and disadvantages for others. I’m predicting that owing to its
unconstitutionality—this has been widely discussed—this legislation will
end up in Karlsruhe.2 It doesn’t bode well for parliamentary democracy
if legislation is passed, despite knowing it fails to conform with our con-
stitutional guidelines.3
Put simply, lawmakers who see their favoured policies end up reviewed and in-
validated by a court often had been warned about the constitutional risks inherent
in their choices. What seems puzzling is that the evidence laid out in subsequent
chapters of this thesis shows that lawmakers in government not only disregard consti-
tutional concerns coming from the opposition benches, which may be motivated by
political opportunism rather than genuine constitutional concerns, but also warn-
ings from independent experts heard during the committee stages and their own
political allies in parliament. Why would lawmakers pursue policies that provoke
confrontation with a court capable of censoring them?
This chapter’s focus is to present a theoretical model that can explain this type of
lawmakers’ behaviour and identify its implications for the decision-making of courts
in systems of limited government. The model I present in this chapter is formal
and applies game theory. In the following, I address the more intricate elements of
2Karlsruhe is the seat of the German Federal Constitutional Court.
3Translated from German, excerpt from the second reading of the 2008 Act Reforming Inher-
itance and Valuation Taxation, German Bundestag, November 27, 2008, 2. Beratung: BT-PlPr
16/190, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16190.pdf.
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the formal analysis in detail, while leaving the formal proofs of my argument to a
technical appendix at the end of this chapter.
2.1 Confrontation and judicial self-restraint
At the heart of the theoretical model is a dilemma for courts tasked with reviewing
the acts of the legislative and executive branches. The literature reviewed in the
preceding chapter suggests that courts know that their judgements censoring the
policies of political majorities are unlikely to be viewed favourably by the latter and
increase the chance of backlash. Not every instance of court-curbing will threaten
to deplete courts’ institutional integrity, but it is unlikely that a court challenging
the elected branches will ever escape some form of criticism of interfering with the
will of the democratically elected institutions (see Carrubba et al., 2015).
At the same time, even if courts decide to bear the risks of court-curbing and
challenge policies favoured by a political majority, courts know that lawmakers may
attempt to evade compliance with their judgements and find ways to continue to
apply the policies objected by the court (see Vanberg, 2005; Staton and Vanberg,
2008; Carrubba and Zorn, 2010). Hence, courts challenging the constitutionality of
policy expose themselves to the risk of court-curbing knowing that they may walk
away from confrontation with the elected branches without achieving their preferred
outcome, the correction of policy in line with their constitutional jurisprudence.
The dilemma for courts is then to assess whether challenging lawmakers over
policy is worth the risk. In the following, I model this dilemma as courts’ uncertainty
about the type of lawmakers they are facing. Given that lawmakers themselves risk
to spoil their electoral prospects if they choose to evade compliance with the demands
of courts (see Clark, 2010; Vanberg, 2001), some lawmakers may be prepared to
defend their policy choices against a judicial veto and bear these electoral risks—but
others are not. At the end of the previous chapter I mentioned that the theoretical
model simplifies a political process that is complex in reality and my approach
towards modelling courts’ uncertainty is an example of such simplification. I do
not explicitly model why there are different types of lawmakers, compliant and non-
compliant ones.
The existing literature offers several plausible reasons of why some lawmakers
may be more inclined to risk evading compliance than others. Clark (2010) argues
that due to their direct accountability to the electorate, lawmakers are better in-
formed than courts about how the public would react to them challenging judicial
authority. Following shifts in the public’s attitudes towards the court, the risk of
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electoral backlash for lawmakers defying courts’ demands varies over time and law-
makers are in a better position than courts to identify periods of low-risk. Similarly,
scholarship suggests that transparency of the political environment increases the
costs of non-compliance (Staton, 2006; Krehbiel, 2016; Vanberg, 2005), and it may
be easier for lawmakers than judges to assess whether a political issue is likely to
gain traction in the media and create the necessary transparency to make compliance
evasion too risky (but see Blauberger et al., 2018). Finally, lawmakers may simply
value some policies more than others and be more willing to evade compliance with
judicial vetoes on policies they consider as highly salient (Dahl, 1957, 286).
Regardless of which of these expectations is at work in reality, the key assump-
tion at the heart of my theoretical model is that courts lack perfect information
of whether or not lawmakers would evade compliance with their judgements. Note
that a lack of perfect information does not imply that courts are clueless about the
type of lawmakers they are facing, however. The model developed below incorpo-
rates courts’ prior beliefs about lawmakers’ types—the key is simply the absence of
courts’ certainty about the latter.
I expect courts to prefer challenging the actions of lawmakers who will eventually
comply with their judgements over walking away empty-handed from confrontation
with lawmakers. I argue that the solution to courts’ dilemma lies in the costs
that lawmakers risk from confrontation with the courts. Being censored by a court
comes with political costs for those who had openly supported the objected policies.
I expect these costs to bite in scenarios in which the subject of a judicial veto is
not the correction of an unintended consequence of policy (see Rogers, 2001), but
when lawmakers had received clear advice during the policy-making stages that their
choices infringe on constitutional norms.
When lawmakers ignore credible warning signs that their favoured policies are
unconstitutional and choose to push these policies through parliament regardless,
censure by a court offers ammunition to lawmakers’ political opponents—including
critics within their own party—to discredit their political acumen among the elec-
torate. Upon taking up their mandate in the legislature or executive office, lawmak-
ers are sworn to respect and protect the constitution. Ignoring concerns of breaching
constitutional norms voiced by representatives of all political colours, followed by
censorship through a court, allows members of the opposition parties and critics to
publicly question lawmakers’ commitment to ‘play by the rules’ (see Vanberg, 1998).
These costs described above are distinct from the costs lawmakers risk pay-
ing should they evade compliance and get caught (Vanberg, 2001; Mayhew, 1974).
Should a court strike constitutionally controversial policies, lawmakers who had
pushed these policies through the legislature pay the price for provoking confronta-
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tion regardless of whether or not they actually choose to evade compliance with the
court’s judgement. In other words, lawmakers willingly risking confrontation with
a court create political costs they suffer ex post should the court veto their policies.
I argue that lawmakers’ demonstrated willingness to pay these costs allows courts
to update their prior beliefs of whether or not they are facing lawmakers prepared to
evade compliance with an unfavourable judgement. I expect lawmakers to be aware
that they risk paying a political price for provoking confrontation with courts over
the constitutionality of their policies. Accordingly, compliant lawmakers, who are
ultimately willing to faithfully implement a judicial veto of their policies should be
less likely to risk exposing themselves to these costs. Compliant lawmakers would
have to pedal back and re-draft their policies to respect the constitutional boundaries
the court established in its jurisprudence, while still suffering the political fallout
from the judicial veto. For these types of lawmakers, ‘auto-limiting’ their policy
choices and taking constitutional concerns on board to avoid a court’s scrutiny in
the first place generally appears to be the more attractive option. This implies that
the lawmakers who do not avoid confrontation with the court and are undeterred in
their pursuit of constitutionally controversial policy are more likely to be the types
of lawmakers prepared to evade compliance. Before I formalize the argument in
the next section and show how lawmakers’ choices at the policy-making stage affect
courts’ decision-making, I briefly discuss the final building block of my theory.
The model rests on an assumption that lawmakers can actually identify the
constitutional limits to their policies at the policy-making stage and are thus able
to evaluate whether a court is likely to strike their policy choices. This assumption
requires that lawmakers can form reasonable expectations about the direction of
future constitutional review judgements. I argue that the legal reasoning courts
provide in existing case law and the legal precedent they set in their judgements
help lawmakers with this task.
Existing scholarship shows that by resolving constitutional review cases, courts
create legal rules, which define what kind of policies would qualify as compatible with
the constitution and guide the resolution of future cases (Callander and Clark, 2017,
see also Lax and Cameron 2007; Carrubba and Clark 2012; Clark and Lauderdale
2012). These studies draw on a doctrinal-politics approach and the ‘case-space
model’, which seeks to bring the theoretical arguments of judicial politics scholars
closer to what judges are actually doing in their work. Making the case for the
usefulness of a doctrinal-politics approach, Jeffrey Lax writes:
This model highlights legal cases as the vehicles for policy making,
but of course judicial policy making is more than simply case disposition
after case disposition. When appellate courts address judicial policy
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more generally, they typically do so in opinions that establish (new or
modified) legal rules for deciding current and future cases. The possible
set of cases is the ‘case space.’ A rule is a partition of the case space
into winners and losers (Lax, 2011, 133).
In the context of this thesis, it is these legal rules contained in courts’ jurispru-
dence, which separate constitutional from unconstitutional policies and serve as the
constitutional guardrails for lawmakers’ policy-making. In reality, these legal rules
are unlikely to always provide lawmakers a definite answer of whether or not a par-
ticular policy is unconstitutional or not, not least because some of the rules courts
create in their judgements closely stick to the facts of a particular case and are
unsuitable to be applied beyond the latter (see Fox and Vanberg, 2014). Here, the
model presented in this chapter again abstracts from reality and assumes that law-
makers can perfectly distinguish between policies in line and at odds with a court’s
jurisprudence. While this assumption benefits theoretical parsimony at the costs
of simplifying reality, the model still provides a useful insight into how lawmakers’
choice to adopt a policy despite expecting (and in the theoretical model, knowing)
that it conflicts with existing jurisprudence affects a court’s decision-making.
2.2 A formal model of constitutional review
In the following, I develop an extensive form game of incomplete information in-
volving three players, Nature (N), a lawmaker (L) and a court (C). Adding a third
player, Nature, is a tool commonly used in formal models to allow one player, here
the lawmaker, to be better informed about a certain aspect of the game than the
other player, here the court. The model’s sequence of play is shown in Figure 2.1.
At the start of the game, Nature randomly selects the lawmaker’s type, θ ∈
{0, 1}. If θ = 1, the lawmaker is non-compliant and evades compliance with a ju-
dicial veto that censors her policy choice. If θ = 0, the lawmaker is compliant and
corrects any policy struck by the court in line with the spirit of the latter’s decision.
Nature’s draw is only revealed to the lawmaker, hence the court is uncertain about
the lawmaker’s type. The court’s prior beliefs that it is facing a non-compliant law-
maker are characterized by the probability Pr(θ = 1) = p. Following Nature’s draw,
the lawmaker then chooses from two policy options, ρ ∈ {a, b}. Policy a conflicts
with the court’s existing constitutional jurisprudence, while policy b does not. If
the lawmaker chooses option a, the court is called upon to exercise constitutional
review and decides whether to strike or uphold policy a, d ∈ {strike, uphold}. After
the court’s choice, the lawmaker’s type is revealed and payoffs are allocated.




















Figure 2.1: Sequence of play and realized outcomes
To motivate the strategic interaction between the court and lawmaker I am
interested in, let the lawmaker prefer policy a over b. In other words, the lawmaker
prefers to pass policy unconstrained by the court’s jurisprudence. To illustrate,
consider the following example: A lawmaker interested in reducing social welfare
spending may pursue policy reforms that for some of her constituents result in
welfare payments that fall below a minimum guaranteed by the court’s constitutional
jurisprudence. The lawmaker knows that she would not be able to reduce spending
to her preferred level if she took the court’s constitutional jurisprudence into account
(i.e. through policy b), but could achieve her intended target through a policy that
does not pay respect to the court’s jurisprudence (i.e. through policy a).
On the other hand, let the court suffer a cost whenever the policy conflicting
with its constitutional jurisprudence (i.e. policy a) continues to be applied at the
end of the game, either because the court decided to uphold the policy or because
the lawmaker evaded compliance with a ruling striking policy a. When policy a
remains on the books after the court’s decision, the lawmaker receives a payoff of 1,
while the court suffers costs of −1. To simplify the algebra that goes into identifying
the game’s equilibria, let both the lawmaker and the court receive a payoff of 0 when
policy b is on the books. Note that the payoffs’ values are essentially arbitrary, yet
not their relation. What is important is that the lawmaker strictly prefers policy a
over b, while the opposite is the case for the court. Provided this is the case, the
payoffs’ actual values do not affect the game’s number or type of equilibria.
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The lawmaker and the court both anticipate costs should the court decide to
strike policy a as unconstitutional. The court knows that the lawmaker may dis-
cipline it for striking her preferred policy. Hence, let the court anticipate costs
k ∈ R+ (i.e. any positive, real number) for striking policy a. As discussed in the
previous chapter, court-curbing in response to an unfavourable judgement can come
in many forms, such as lawmakers’ statements seeking to undermine the public’s
faith in courts’ institutional legitimacy, cuts to courts’ budgets or amendments to
their jurisdiction. Given the severity of threats to courts’ authority varies across
these measures, the model allows the court’s anticipated costs k to vary as well.
The lawmaker, on the other hand, knows a judicial veto of policy a comes with
costs c ∈ R+, the political fallout from being censored by the court. The model
allows the lawmaker’s costs to vary as not every judicial veto of a policy will throw
the political future of those who authored the policy in jeopardy. Yet, as discussed
in the previous section, in some instances a court’s veto can provide lawmakers’
political opponents the necessary tailwind to successfully undermine the electorate’s
belief in lawmakers’ commitment to ‘play by the rules’ (see Vanberg, 1998).
Finally, the court knows that it may rely on the lawmaker responsible for pass-
ing policy a to give effect to its decision to strike policy a. Typically, lawmakers’
response to a court’s constitutional veto of their policy does not immediately follow
the court’s decision: Floor time in the legislature has to be re-allocated and the
policy addressing (or at least pretending to address) the court’s demands needs to
be shuttled through the legislative process, which requires time. Accordingly, the
lawmaker’s ability to evade compliance with a judicial veto is conditional on her
retaining office long enough to actually be in charge of implementing the court’s
decision. Let pi ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability that the same lawmaker responsible
for policy a will still be in office to take charge of implementing the court’s decision.
Summarizing the model’s primitives yields the following Bernoulli utility func-
tions for the lawmaker and the court:
UL = IL(IC(θpi − c) + (1− IC))
UC = IL(IC(−θpi − k)− (1− IC))
Here, IL identifies the lawmaker’s choice of policy (IL = 1 if the lawmaker chooses
policy a; IL = 0 if she chooses policy b) and IC identifies the direction of the court’s
decision (IC = 1 if the court chooses to strike policy a; IC = 0 if the court chooses
to uphold policy a). To illustrate, assume the lawmaker’s type is non-compliant,
θ = 1. If she chooses policy a (IL = 1) and the court chooses to uphold (IC = 0),
the lawmaker’s utility is simply UL = 1, whereas the court’s utility is UC = −1.
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However, should the court instead decide to strike (IC = 1), the lawmaker’s utility
is determined by UL = pi−c, while the court’s utility is determined by UC = −pi−k.
In this signalling game, a strategy for the lawmaker is a mapping from her type
into a policy choice, ρ : θ → {a, b}. A strategy for the court is a mapping from
its prior beliefs about the lawmaker’s type into a constitutional review decision,
d : p ∈ (0, 1)→ {strike, uphold}.
2.2.1 Analysis
In the following, I derive predictions about both the lawmaker’s policy choice and
the court’s response should the lawmaker choose policy a. Equilibrium solutions to
signalling games such as the one presented in this chapter require “that agents form
beliefs about the history reached at each information set and select best responses
given these beliefs” (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007, 209). These kinds of equilibria
are known as perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE).
Three types of PBE can be supported in this signalling game: (1) Separating :
The lawmaker chooses different strategies contingent on her own type and based
on the lawmaker’s choice the court can perfectly update its prior beliefs about the
lawmaker’s type; (2) Pooling : The lawmaker chooses the same strategy regardless of
her type and the court is unable to update its prior beliefs; and (3) Partial pooling :
The lawmaker chooses different (mixed) strategies contingent on her type and the
court is unable to perfectly update its prior beliefs about the lawmaker’s type.4 All
formal proofs are gathered in the technical appendix to this chapter.
I begin the formal analysis with scenarios in which the court never defers to
the lawmaker should the latter opt for policy a. Whenever the probability that the
lawmaker responsible for policy a would also take control of the implementation of
the court’s judgement is low enough relative to the court’s costs of striking policy
a, the court has no incentive to defer to the lawmaker. Specifically, when pi ≤ 1−k,
two types of PBE can be supported. A separating equilibrium exists, in which the
non-compliant lawmaker (θ = 1) opts for policy a and the compliant lawmaker
(θ = 0) for policy b. As long as the lawmaker’s costs satisfy the condition c < pi, the
non-compliant lawmaker’s preferred choice is to opt for policy a, despite knowing
that the court would strike it. In addition, given pi ≤ 1 − k, two (similar) pooling
equilibria exist, in which both types of lawmakers self-censor their policy-making in
anticipation of the court’s veto and never opt for policy a.
4Note that the formal proofs in the technical appendix to this chapter show that the court
remains uncertain whether or not it faces a non-compliant lawmaker should the lawmaker choose
policy a, yet knows that it faces a compliant lawmaker should the latter choose policy b.
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Proposition 1. Provided pi ≤ 1 − k, the court strikes whenever the lawmaker
chooses policy a. Given c < pi ≤ 1− k, a PBE exists in which the lawmaker chooses
policy a if θ = 1 and policy b if θ = 0, and the court chooses to strike policy a.
Given pi ≤ 1 − k ≤ c, a PBE exists in which the lawmaker always chooses policy b
and the court chooses to strike off the equilibrium path. Given pi ≤ c < 1 − k, a
PBE exists in which the lawmaker always chooses policy b and the court chooses to
strike off the equilibrium path.5
The separating equilibrium exemplifies an interesting dynamic. It shows that de-
spite the court’s best response to strike any policy conflicting with its jurisprudence,
the non-compliant lawmaker will still opt for policy a whenever the probability pi
that she gets a shot at evading implementation of the court’s ruling is sufficiently
high relative to the costs c she suffers from a veto. This finding suggests that as long
as the lawmaker’s anticipated political fallout from a judicial veto is negligible, the
mere chance of getting another shot at redrafting the policy in the future is enough
to compromise the efficacy of the deterrent the shadow of constitutional review is
thought to impose on lawmakers. I further discuss this finding in my interpretation
of the formal results below and return to it in my analysis of evidence from inter-
views with members of the German Bundestag in Chapter 4. At the same time, the
two pooling equilibria identified in the proof for Proposition 1 in the technical ap-
pendix show that otherwise, the lawmaker’s expected costs from suffering a judicial
veto induce her to pass policies respecting the court’s jurisprudence and pre-empt
the court’s exercise of constitutional review altogether.
I now analyse equilibrium behaviour for the remaining parameter space of pi, i.e.
pi > 1− k. In these scenarios, two types of PBE can be supported. I first consider
a pooling equilibrium, in which the lawmaker always picks policy a over policy
b, irrespective of her type. If the court’s prior beliefs of facing a non-compliant
lawmaker are sufficiently high relative to its own costs k and the probability of
relying on the lawmaker for faithful implementation pi, the court’ best response is
to self-censor its exercise of constitutional review and uphold policy a.
Proposition 2. Provided pi > 1− k and p > (1− k)/pi, a PBE exists in which the
lawmaker always chooses policy a and the court always chooses to uphold a.
The pooling equilibrium defined in Proposition 2 shows that the court defers
to the lawmaker when it expects to suffer high costs from striking the lawmaker’s
preferred policy, i.e. high values on k, and faces a lawmaker with a lasting grip
5Referring to the choice(s) of the court ‘off the equilibrium path’ here simply says how the court
would react if the lawmaker chose policy a. Given that in equilibrium the lawmaker never chooses
policy a in these scenarios, the node where the court can actually make a decision in the game-tree
in Figure 2.1 is never actually reached.
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on political power, i.e. high values on pi.6 This finding resonates with existing
scholarship showing that the prospects of turnover in government office—or lack
thereof—are systematically related to the deference courts show towards the elected
branches in their jurisprudence (see Ramseyer and Rasmusen, 2001; Stephenson,
2003; Ishiyama Smithey and Ishiyama, 2002). For instance, analysing more than
7,500 decisions issued by justices on the Argentine Supreme Court between 1976
and 1995, Helmke (2002) provides evidence that justices increasingly issue judge-
ments challenging government towards the end of both weak dictatorships and weak
democratic governments, yet act more deferentially as long as the incumbent demon-
strates a firm grip on political power.
The model’s final equilibrium shows that under certain conditions, the court has
an incentive to self-restrain even when it occupies a generally powerful position, that
is when the prospects of being disciplined by lawmakers for striking policy are low
(i.e. low values on k) and when the court can generally expect that its rulings are
subsequently implemented (i.e. low values on p). Provided the probability that the
lawmaker responsible for policy a would also take charge of implementing the court’s
decision is sufficiently high, the court then draws on the costs the lawmaker risks
suffering from a judicial veto to update its prior beliefs about the lawmaker’s type.
Specifically, in these scenarios the court makes a probabilistic decision of whether
or not to strike policy a, which is conditional on the lawmaker’s costs c.
Proposition 3. Given pi > 1 − k and p ≤ (1 − k)/pi, a PBE exists in which the
lawmaker always chooses policy a if θ = 1 and policy a with probability q(pi)∗ =
p(pi+k−1)
(1−k)(1−p) if θ = 0, and the court chooses to strike policy a with probability r(c)
∗ =
1/(1 + c).
This partial-pooling equilibrium indicates that the probability r(c)∗, the proba-
bility that the court strikes policy a, decreases in c, the costs the lawmaker would
suffer from a judicial veto. The intuition behind this finding is straightforward:
We should expect that a compliant lawmaker should not risk bearing the costs of
a judicial veto, given she would eventually apply a policy that conforms with the
court’s ruling. Hence, when the lawmaker has much to lose in case a court censors
her actions, yet chooses to pass a policy conflicting with the court’s constitutional
jurisprudence nonetheless, she credibly signals a non-compliant type (although the
equilibrium shows that given the court plays a mixed strategy, the compliant law-
maker is not always deterred from choosing policy a and plays a mixed strategy
herself). The higher the costs the lawmaker risks paying, the more credible the
6Note, the threshold (1 − k)/pi decreases in both k and pi, hence an increase in both k and pi
means that the parameter space for the court’s prior beliefs p supporting the pooling equilibrium
of Proposition 2 increases as well.
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Figure 2.2: Equilibrium predictions (pi denotes the probability that the lawmaker
controls implementation; p denotes the court’s prior beliefs about the lawmaker’s
type; k denotes court’s cost for striking a policy; c denotes the costs the lawmaker
pays when the court strikes policy a; c∗ ≡ 1− k)
signal. Given the court anticipates (at least some) costs from striking policy itself,
the court then becomes more cautious in its response to the lawmaker’s choice and
more likely to defer as the lawmaker’s anticipated costs increase.
2.2.2 Interpretation and comparative statics
The equilibrium behaviour of the court and lawmaker for the full space of the pa-
rameter pi (i.e. the probability that the same lawmaker who passed policy a would
also control the implementation of a judicial veto of policy a), and the parameter p
(i.e. the court’s prior belief that it is facing a non-compliant lawmaker) is illustrated
in Figure 2.2. One of the questions I seek to answer in this thesis is which of the two
actors effectively defines the constitutional boundaries to policy. The five equilibria
displayed in Figure 2.2 can be ranked according to the court’s ability to ensure that
only policies respecting the boundaries it defines in its constitutional jurisprudence
are applied. I discuss them in the order of this ranking in the following.
The two pooling equilibria Pooling (1) and Pooling (2) in Figure 2.2 suggest
that the court is most successful in preventing the application of policies conflicting
with its constitutional jurisprudence when lawmakers’ expected costs from being
censored by a court are sufficiently high and when it is unlikely that lawmakers
can hold on to political power long enough to be in a position to evade compliance
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with the court’s judgement.7 This observation fits neatly with the expectations of
scholars arguing that courts do not necessarily have to play an active role in order
to ensure that policies stay within the boundaries of the constitution (see Stone,
1992; Landfried, 1992; Rogers and Vanberg, 2007).
As long as both the lawmaker and the court know that it is costly for the former to
be at the receiving end of a court’s constitutional veto, a provocation of confrontation
is simply not worth it for any lawmaker lacking the prospects of having a shot at
evading compliance with the court’s judgement. Since the court knows that it has
little to fear in the way of both court-curbing and non-compliance (captured by the
condition pi ≤ 1 − k), it can essentially act unconstrained and would censor any
policy that conflicts with its interpretation of the constitution. Knowing that, the
lawmaker ‘auto-limits’ her policy-making and addresses any constitutional concerns
that come up during the policy-making stages to ensure that the policies she adopts
align with the court’s constitutional jurisprudence (see Stone Sweet, 2007).
The drivers of such ‘auto-limitation’ are the costs the lawmaker expects to pay
should the court censor her policies. Unless there are costs to ignoring constitutional
boundaries, the lawmaker has no incentive not to opt for its preferred policy, even
if an application of such policy would violate constitutional norms. This dynamic is
evident again in the model’s separating equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the court
still chooses to strike any policy that conflicts with its interpretation of the consti-
tution. If we think of the court’s judgements in constitutional review cases in terms
of legal rules separating constitutional from unconstitutional policies (see Lax, 2007;
Landa and Lax, 2009), then the legal rules the court establishes in scenarios captured
by the separating equilibrium reflect its sincere interpretation of the constitution.
However, the separating equilibrium also shows that the non-compliant lawmaker
will still opt for its preferred policy, despite knowing that the court will strike it.
While this behaviour may initially seem counter-intuitive, the separating equilibrium
provides the first indication that a lawmaker’s choice to provoke confrontation with
a court capable of striking her policies can be entirely rational. When the stakes
are low for a lawmaker prepared to evade compliance with a court’s judgement (i.e.
low values on her cost parameter c), passing her preferred yet ‘bound-to-fail’ policy
is preferable over working out an alternative policy that respects the court’s consti-
tutional jurisprudence. This equilibrium hence indicates that the court’s ability to
ensure that applied policies fall within the limits of its constitutional jurisprudence
can be compromised without the court ever deferring to the elected branches. Under
7This latter expectation is captured by the threshold 1 − k for the parameter pi. In every
equilibrium that falls to the left of the threshold 1− k in Figure 2.2, the court censors any policy
conflicting with its jurisprudence (but note that this does not necessarily prevent that such policies
are eventually applied, which is further illustrated in the discussion of the separating equilibrium).
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certain conditions, the prospects of the court’s exercise of constitutional review fail
to be an effective deterrent for some lawmakers. While the court formally defines
legal rules that match its sincere interpretation of the constitution, it cannot pre-
vent at least some lawmakers from (at least temporarily) implementing policies with
effects that stray beyond constitutional boundaries in practice.
Lawmakers’ costs from confrontation with the court operate in an intuitive way
in scenarios captured by the separating equilibrium—lower costs correspond to fewer
inhibitions among lawmakers against pursuing policies that conflict with courts’ con-
stitutional jurisprudence. Moving on to the partial-pooling equilibrium illustrated
in the bottom-right corner of Figure 2.2, the formal model shows that lawmakers’
costs from confrontation with a court can play another, distinct role in the strategic
interactions among courts and lawmakers in systems of limited government.
Compared to the conditions captured by the equilibria discussed in the previous
paragraphs, the political environment captured by the partial-pooling equilibrium
differs in one respect. While the court still has little to fear from court-curbing (i.e.
low values on the parameter k), lawmakers now stand a good chance of staying in
office long enough to be in charge of implementing (and possibly evading) a court’s
judgement that challenges their policies (i.e. high values on the parameter pi).8
Technically, for the partial-pooling equilibrium to take centre-stage, the relationship
between these two parameters could also be inverted (i.e. high values on k and low
values on pi). However, I believe that in reality we are more likely to encounter the
former kind of political environment, where courts enjoying comfortable levels of
diffuse public support that shield them from serious assaults on their institutional
integrity face lawmakers able to count on getting a shot at responding to the court’s
decision during their time in government office.
The model’s partial-pooling equilibrium shows that under these conditions, both
the non-compliant and compliant lawmaker pursue policies that conflict with the
court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Notably, the latter type of lawmaker makes
a probabilistic choice of whether or not pursue such policy. The probability with
which the compliant lawmaker opts for a policy that provokes conflict with the court
increases with the likelihood that she stays in office to take charge of implementation
(i.e. the parameter pi), the costs the court expects to pay should it strike the
policy (i.e. the parameter k), and the court’s prior beliefs of facing a non-compliant
lawmaker (i.e. the parameter p).9 This seems intuitive: As higher values on these
8Note that high values on pi and low values on k (or vice versa) also mean that the court’s prior
beliefs are more likely to satisfy the partial-pooling equilibrium’s condition p ≤ (1 − k)/pi than if
both pi and k have high values.
9Recall that the partial-pooling equilibrium shows that the compliant lawmaker chooses policy
a with probability q(pi)∗ = p(pi+k−1)(1−k)(1−p) .
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parameters make striking policy more risky and costly for a court hoping to avoid
non-compliance with its judgements, the tide turns in favour of the (compliant)
lawmaker, who in turn becomes less inhibited in her pursuit of policy conflicting
with the court’s jurisprudence.
The fact that both types of lawmakers now (at least potentially) pursue policies
at odds with the court’s existing jurisprudence pushes the court to find a way to dis-
tinguish among the two types. The court still prefers to strike an ‘unconstitutional’
policy if it faces a compliant lawmaker, but how can it determine the lawmaker’s
type? The model suggests that the court pays close attention to the costs the law-
maker risks paying in confrontation with the court in order to distinguish between
the lawmaker’s types. When two interdependent actors with diverging preferences
compete over an outcome (such as a policy), an actor can credibly signal her inten-
tions or type to her counterpart if her own actions are tied to costs. ‘Listening to
the pain’ others are bearing (or at least appear willing to bear) to pursue a certain
course of action allows actors to update their prior beliefs about the type of their
counterparts (Humphreys, 2016, 60, see also Fearon 1997).
In the theoretical model, the court ‘listens to the pain’ of the lawmaker to up-
date its prior beliefs of whether or not it is facing a non-compliant lawmaker. The
court has reason to believe that the costs lawmakers expect to pay should it strike
their policy are more likely to deter compliant lawmakers from provoking confronta-
tion with the court. Hence, if the prospects of a particularly detrimental political
fallout from being censored by the court fail to deter the lawmaker from provoking
confrontation, the court concludes that it is likely that it is facing a non-compliant
lawmaker. Figure 2.3 provides a simple illustration of how variation in the law-
maker’s costs translates into the decision-making of the court.
The horizontal axis displays the lawmaker’s (increasing) costs, while the vertical
axis displays the probability of the court striking a policy that conflicts with its
constitutional jurisprudence. It is easy to see that the probability of the court
striking policy decreases as the lawmaker’s expected costs from being censored by
the court increase (including scenarios where the lawmaker’s costs c actually exceed
the payoff she receives from implementing her preferred policy). The court becomes
more likely to defer to the lawmaker as the costs the lawmaker appears willing to
bear from confrontation with the court increase. Figure 2.3 also shows that provided
the lawmaker’s costs are close to zero, it is still likely that the court strikes a policy
conflicting with its jurisprudence. Unless the lawmaker’s costs are ‘painful’, they
cannot credibly signal her type.
Note that in scenarios captured by the partial-pooling equilibrium the court
never becomes entirely deferential to the lawmaker. The negative marginal effect of
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Figure 2.3: Probability r(c)∗ of court striking policy a conditional on lawmaker’s
cost c in a partial-pooling equilibrium with pi > 1− k and p ≤ (1− k)/pi
the lawmaker’s costs shown in Figure 2.3 gradually decreases as these costs increase
and the court always strikes policy with some positive probability.10 Consequently,
it is these environments, with a powerful lawmaker facing a powerful court, in which
we should be able to observe lawmakers and courts repeatedly clashing over the con-
stitutionality of policy, as neither faces sufficient incentives to consistently shy away
from confrontation. Yet, it is also these kinds of environments in which we should
expect courts to defer to lawmakers over the constitutionality of policy from time to
time. The model predicts that courts will grant lawmakers greater leeway in their
constitutional jurisprudence than they would ideally prefer—and that the likelihood
of courts deferring increases with the costs lawmakers risk from confrontation.
The model’s final equilibrium, Pooling (3) in Figure 2.2, captures scenarios in
which the cards are stacked against the court. In these political environments it is
highly likely that lawmakers will stay in office long enough to be in a position to
evade compliance with a judicial veto (i.e. high values on the parameter pi) while the
court also expects to pay high costs for striking lawmakers’ policies (i.e. high values
on the parameter k).11 Put simply, it is these scenarios in which a court is most
likely to walk away empty-handed from a bruising confrontation with lawmakers.
The model then predicts that the court will choose to defer to lawmakers when-
ever the latter pursue policies that conflict with the court’s jurisprudence. Knowing
that, neither type of lawmaker is deterred from pursuing such policies. In other
words, in these scenarios courts are in the least favourable position to ensure that
policies stay within the limits of its constitutional jurisprudence: The court delib-
erately crafts legal rules to classify lawmakers’ policies as constitutional.
10Technically, the probability r(c)∗ = 1/(1 + c) can take on the value zero in its limit as c→∞.
11Note that high values on the parameters pi and k also lower the threshold (1 − k)/pi for the
parameter p, which means that the court finds itself subject to the incentives characterised by the
pooling equilibrium Pooling (3) even if its prior beliefs of facing a non-compliant lawmaker are
relatively low.
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In reality, we may find such environments in (semi-)authoritarian polities, which
at least formally grant courts the power of constitutional review (see for example
Moustafa and Ginsburg, 2008; Gandhi, 2008). In these environments, the electoral
connection between those controlling the levers of political power and their con-
stituents may be compromised, which allows the former to stay in office long enough
to respond to any court judgement concerning their policies. An underdeveloped
electoral connection also diminishes the potential inhibitions lawmakers may have
against curbing courts.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that courts facing such an environment
are indefinitely trapped in the pooling equilibrium. While the model developed in
this chapter stays silent on this issue, others have shown that even courts facing
initially adverse political environments can gradually develop their institutional au-
thority and become an effective constraint on political power (see Carrubba, 2009;
Ginsburg, 2003). Moustafa (2003), for instance, shows how the Egyptian consti-
tutional court developed from an institutional guarantee signalling the Egyptian
regime’s commitment to property rights into an authority capable of providing ac-
tivists and human rights groups an avenue to challenge the state (see also Moustafa,
2007; Ginsburg, 2003).
Before I summarize the observations I have made based on my formal analysis
of the model and translate them into empirically testable hypotheses in the final
section of this chapter, I briefly discuss what I believe should not be concluded from
my formal analysis.
Arguably the two most interesting and novel findings of my analysis are that un-
der certain conditions, pursuing policies that will be struck by a court is a rational
choice for lawmakers, while at times courts will choose to defer to lawmakers when
the latter provoke a for themselves potentially very costly confrontation. One may
gain the impression upon reading this chapter that we should expect lawmakers to
frequently and willingly pursue policies that conflict with courts’ existing constitu-
tional jurisprudence. However, it is worth recalling that the model is built on the
premise that a lawmaker prefers a policy that conflicts with a court’s jurisprudence
over any other possible alternative.
In reality, this may actually be the case from time to time, and the evidence laid
out in the next chapter in fact shows that incidentally German lawmakers pursue
evidently unconstitutional policies. At the same time, there appears to be little
reason to believe that lawmakers generally favour policies a court would object to.
In other words, lawmakers’ choice to provoke confrontation with courts over policy
is a rare yet nonetheless important event for understanding and explaining courts’
decision-making in systems of limited government.
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2.2.3 Empirical implications
The formal model developed in this chapter has several implications, which can
be empirically evaluated. In the remainder of this thesis, I will provide empirical
tests for some of these implications, and where this is not possible I will nonetheless
make an effort to provide quantitative and qualitative evidence to illustrate the
plausibility of these claims. While formulating empirically testable hypotheses in
this section, I will also indicate which of the remaining chapter(s) of this book will
provide empirical evidence addressing these claims.
The first empirical implication I consider draws on the observation derived from
the formal model’s separating equilibrium. The model predicts that some lawmak-
ers pursue policies despite knowing that the court will strike them. Provided the
political costs from being at the receiving end of the court’s veto are negligible, these
lawmakers also know that they may get a chance at evading compliance with the
court’s decision in the future, making confrontation with the court worth the risk.
Hence, under these conditions, lawmakers opt for their preferred albeit ‘unconstitu-
tional’ policies instead of settling for any less attractive alternatives that would be
in line with the court’s constitutional jurisprudence:
Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, lawmakers should be more likely to risk confronta-
tion with a court when the costs from such confrontation are low (Chapter 4).
The second empirical implication I consider in the remainder of the thesis con-
cerns the probability that the authors of a policy reviewed by a court would also be
in charge of implementing the latter’s decision on that policy. As we move through
the theoretical model’s equilibria, the formal analysis suggests that, ceteris paribus,
as it becomes more likely that lawmakers will cling onto power long enough to
take charge of implementing a judgement on their policy choices, the risks of non-
compliance increase for a court. Assuming courts lacking the ‘power of the purse or
sword’ face incentives to avoid issuing decisions that are ultimately not enforced by
the legislative and executive branches then leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, a court should be less likely to strike a policy
when the probability that the policy’s author controls implementation of the court’s
decision is high (Chapter 3).
The probability that a policy’s authors would take charge of implementing the
court’s corresponding constitutional review decision also plays an implicit role in
the model’s final empirical implication I consider here. The model predicts that a
court should be more likely to deal with constitutionally controversial policies when
lawmakers can expect to hang onto power long enough to respond to the court’s
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decisions. In these scenarios, the shadow of constitutional review fails to deter non-
compliant and compliant lawmakers in government from pursuing policies at odds
with a court’s jurisprudence.
A key implication of the model is that courts should be more likely to show
self-restraint in their decision-making when lawmakers had ignored advice on the
constitutionality of their policies and thus face prospects of suffering high political
costs ex post a judicial veto. Ignoring warning signs of constitutional violations
during the policy-making stages can come back to bite lawmakers should a court
actually censor their policies. It lends the political opposition and critics (including
those in lawmakers’ own party), who had identified constitutional issues later ad-
dressed by the court, an opportunity to score political points by publicly questioning
their political acumen and commitment to upholding the constitution. The model
suggests that lawmakers showing their willingness to bear these costs are signalling
a credible non-compliance threat to the court, leading to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, a court should be less likely to strike a policy when
lawmakers had risked suffering high political costs for provoking confrontation with
a court (Chapters 3 and 5).
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented a formal theoretical model, which explains why lawmak-
ers at times adopt policies that conflict with courts’ constitutional jurisprudence and
predicts how courts respond when lawmakers provoke confrontation with them by
pursuing such policies. The model explicitly addresses a dilemma for courts lacking
immediate control over the implementation of their constitutional review rulings:
How can courts avoid issuing judgements that are subsequently not implemented
by lawmakers? The model provides a simple answer to this question. Lawmakers
credibly signal a non-compliance threat if their actions provoking confrontation with
courts are tied to high political costs.
The theoretical model predicts that when facing a credible non-compliance threat,
courts become less likely to strike policy as unconstitutional and establish legal rules
in their jurisprudence that grant lawmakers more leeway for their policy-making. Ac-
cordingly, by provoking confrontation with courts over the constitutionality of their
policies, lawmakers can indirectly shift the constitutional limits to policy in their
favour. In the remainder of this thesis, I bring original evidence from the German
Federal Constitutional Court’s exercise of constitutional review and the German
Bundestag’s policy-making to bear on this and other claims made in this chapter.
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2.4 Technical appendix
This appendix provides formal proofs of the propositions defined in this chapter.
Without loss of generality, consider the following tie-breaking assumptions:
• If indifferent between policy a and b, the lawmaker will choose policy b.
• If indifferent between striking and upholding policy a, the court will choose to
strike.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Separating equilibrium): Suppose the lawmaker
chooses policy a if θ = 1 and policy b if θ = 0. The court’s posterior beliefs
are given by Pr(θ = 1 | a) = 1 and Pr(θ = 0 | a) = 0. The court chooses to strike
policy a if −pi−k ≥ −1. Solving for pi yields pi ≤ 1−k. Given pi ≤ 1−k and θ = 1,
the lawmaker has no incentive to deviate from choosing policy a if pi−c > 0. Solving
for pi yields pi > c. Given pi ≤ 1 − k and θ = 0, the lawmaker has no incentive to
deviate from choosing policy b if −c ≤ 0 or c ≥ 0. A separating equilibrium exists
if c < pi ≤ 1− k.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Pooling equilibria): Suppose the lawmaker chooses
policy b if θ = 1 and policy b if θ = 0. Off the equilibrium path, arbitrary val-
ues can be assigned to the court’s posterior beliefs, i.e. Pr(θ = 1 | a) = λ and
Pr(θ = 0 | a) = 1− λ. Off the equilibrium path, the court chooses to strike policy
a if λ(−pi − k) + (1 − λ)(−k) ≥ −1. Solving for λ yields λ ≤ (1 − k)/pi. Given
λ ≤ (1 − k)/pi and θ = 1, the lawmaker has no incentive to deviate from its pre-
scribed strategy if 0 ≥ pi − c. Solving for pi yields pi ≤ c. Given λ ≤ (1 − k)/pi
and θ = 0, the lawmaker has no incentive to deviate from its prescribed strategy if
0 ≥ −c or c ≥ 0. If if c < 1 − k and pi ≤ c, then the condition λ ≤ (1 − k)/pi is
always satisfied and a pooling equilibrium exists if pi ≤ c < 1− k. If c ≥ 1− k then
the condition λ ≤ (1−k)/pi is always satisfied if pi ≤ 1−k and a pooling equilibrium
exists if pi ≤ 1− k ≤ c.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose the lawmaker chooses policy a if θ = 1 and
policy a if θ = 0. The court’s posterior beliefs are given by Pr(θ = 1 | a) = p and
Pr(θ = 0 | a) = 1−p. If the lawmaker chooses policy a, the court chooses to uphold
policy a if p(−pi− k) + (1− p)(−k) < −1. Solving for p yields p > (1− k)/pi. Given
p ∈ (0, 1), this condition is satisfied if pi > 1 − k. Given the court always chooses
to uphold policy a, the lawmaker has no incentive to deviate from its prescribed
strategy. A pooling equilibrium exists if pi > 1− k and p > (1− k)/pi.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose the lawmaker chooses policy a if θ = 1 and
policy a with probability q(pi)∗ if θ = 0. Suppose the court strikes policy a with
probability r(c)∗. The court’s posterior beliefs are given by Pr(θ = 1 | a) = p
p+q(1−p)
and Pr(θ = 0 | a) = q(1−p)
p+q(1−p) . Playing a mixed strategy, the court is indifferent
between striking and upholding if p
p+q(1−p)(−pi−k)+ q(1−p)p+q(1−p)(−k) = −1. Solving for
q yields q(pi)∗ = p(pi+k−1)
(1−k)(1−p) . q ∈ [0, 1] requires that p(pi+k−1)(1−k)(1−p) ≤ 1. Solving for p yields
p ≤ (1− k)/pi. Given p ∈ (0, 1), this condition is satisfied if pi > 1− k. If θ = 0, the
lawmaker has no incentive to deviate from her mixed strategy if r(−c) + 1− r = 0.
Solving for r yields r(c)∗ = 1/(1 + c). If θ = 1, the lawmaker has no incentive
to deviate from choosing policy a if r(pi − c) + 1 − r > 0. Solving for r yields
r < 1/(1 + c− pi). Plugging in r(c)∗ and solving for pi yields pi > 0, which is always
satisfied given pi ∈ (0, 1). A partial pooling equilibrium exists if pi > 1 − k and
p ≤ (1− k)/pi. QED
Chapter 3
Constitutional confrontation and ju-
dicial deference in Germany
The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter makes a novel claim on
how courts identify whether their constitutional review judgements are at risk of
non-compliance: Courts conclude that lawmakers who risk paying a high politi-
cal price for pursuing constitutionally controversial policies are more likely to be
the ones prepared to evade compliance with courts’ judgements. Put simply, law-
makers’ political costs from confrontation signal a non-compliance threat to courts.
Assuming courts face incentives to avoid conflict with the elected branches when
non-compliance with their jurisprudence is on the horizon, we should be more likely
to see courts display self-restraint in their judgements when lawmakers had provoked
a potentially costly confrontation with them.
In this chapter, I offer an empirical test of this claim, employing a statistical anal-
ysis of original data on the German Federal Constitutional Court’s constitutional
review of federal laws between 1983 and 2017. The theoretical model identifies two
conditions for political environments in which we should expect lawmakers’ costs
from confrontation to serve as a (credible) signal of a non-compliance threat:
1. A court challenging the actions of the elected branches is not at risk of suffering
high costs from court-curbing, and
2. Lawmakers anticipating constitutional review can reasonably expect to control
government office in the future, allowing them to respond to (and possibly
evade compliance with) the court’s judgements on their policy choices.
When these conditions apply, both courts and lawmakers occupy powerful po-
sitions in systems of limited government, with neither of them facing sufficient in-
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centives to consistently shy away from confrontation. A court knows that it is at
risk of non-compliance, yet given the costs from challenging lawmakers over their
policies are low, it will not always choose to defer to the elected branches. Law-
makers on the other hand know that their constitutionally controversial policies are
at risk of a constitutional veto. Yet, given it is likely enough that lawmakers get
an opportunity to respond to the court’s jurisprudence, with the latter thus facing
incentives to occasionally show self-restraint, even otherwise ‘compliant’ lawmakers
are not always deterred from provoking confrontation.
In the next section, I reflect on these conditions and discuss why Germany’s
constitutional politics since 1983 present a promising environment to evaluate the
core claim of my theoretical model. I then describe how I operationalized the relevant
parameters of my theoretical model to test (some of) the hypotheses developed in
the previous chapter, detail my data collection process and briefly describe relevant
patterns in my data. The third part of this chapter defines the statistical models I
estimate and presents the findings of my analysis, followed by a series of robustness
checks. The chapter concludes with a discussion of my findings.
3.1 Constitutional review in Germany
The empirical evaluation of the theoretical model’s claims centres on the case of
constitutional review by the German Federal Constitutional Court (in the following,
GFCC) for several reasons. First, in practice the GFCC’s exercise of constitutional
review of the legislative and executive branches’ acts closely reflects the interactions
among lawmakers and courts in systems of limited government that the theoretical
model tries to capture. Second, over the past three decades, the GFCC has oper-
ated in a political environment that matches the theoretical model’s two conditions
for lawmakers’ costly signalling to take centre stage: The GFCC has enjoyed high
diffuse public support that makes serious assaults on its institutional integrity prac-
tically unthinkable, while lawmakers in government (at least during some legislative
periods) had sufficient reason to believe that they would get a shot at responding
to the GFCC’s judgements on their policies.
I discuss these reasons for my case selection in more detail in the following
paragraphs and provide background information on the institutional features and
decision-making procedures of the GFCC relevant for my analysis in this chapter
along the way (for excellent, more comprehensive overviews over the institutional
history and practice of the GFCC, see work by Vanberg, 2005; Kommers, 1994;
Stone Sweet, 2000; Landfried, 1995).
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The GFCC is one of the busiest constitutional courts in the world and is regularly
called upon to review whether an act pursued by a German public authority conflicts
with the rights and norms that can be derived from the German constitution, the
Basic Law.1 A small fraction of the GFCC’s decisions concerns the compatibility of
German federal and state laws with the Basic Law (e.g. in 2018 the GFCC issued
decisions on the constitutionality of twelve federal or state laws).
A law’s constitutional compatibility can be challenged at the GFCC via three
different routes: (1) concrete norm control, i.e. lower courts can refer a law for review
to the GFCC should they believe that its application would result in a breach of
the constitutional rights of a party to a case they need to adjudicate;2 (2) abstract
norm control, i.e. the federal government, state governments or one quarter of the
members of the German Bundestag can refer a law for review to the GFCC; and (3)
constitutional complaints, i.e. individuals can challenge the constitutionality of a
law themselves once they have exhausted all other legal remedies (usually through
challenges of an act pursuant to a law in the lower courts), provided the challenged
law affects them personally, presently and directly.
The GFCC hears its cases in different institutional compositions. The court
comprises two Senates, with eight justices sitting on the bench of each Senate. The
Federal Constitutional Court Act states that the First Senate enjoys jurisdiction
over cases involving the possible violation of fundamental rights, while the Second
Senate primarily deals with ‘state matters’, such as disputes between the federal
government and Germany’s federal states or electoral complaints (although evidence
from my interviews with former clerks at the GFCC suggests that this distinction
in competences has been somewhat blurred due to the court’s immense workload).
Not every application challenging the constitutionality of a public authority’s
act is eventually heard in one of the GFCC’s Senates. Overall, the vast majority of
applications that reach the GFCC are decided in Chambers, which comprise three
justices each. The GFCC’s Chambers can refuse to admit an application for decision,
which means that the court does not substantively consider the constitutionality of
the challenged act (i.e. the challenged acts remain in effect).
1In 2018 alone, the GFCC issued decisions in more than 5,600 proceedings, with the vast
majority of these (roughly 5,400) originating from constitutional complaints filed by individu-
als alleging that their rights were violated by a German public authority. A detailed overview
over the workload of the GFCC since 1951 is published in English in its annual statistics sum-
mary from 2018, see https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/
Statistik/statistics_2018.pdf.
2Lower federal and state courts often hear cases involving disputes between individuals and
public authorities, e.g. recipients of welfare payments and public authorities issuing these pay-
ments. Generally, authorities’ decisions are made pursuant to federal or state laws, and in deciding
their cases lower courts may find that the application of a particular law results in infringements
of individuals’ constitutional rights. Given that lower courts in Germany cannot invalidate laws
for their constitutional incompatibility themselves, they then refer these cases to the GFCC.
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In the context of constitutional review of a law, a Chamber may refuse an appli-
cation admission for decision for instance because a challenged law does not affect
the individual lodging the application personally, presently and directly, or if the
Chamber finds that a lower court referring a law for review to the GFCC did not
adequately justify its reasons for referral. Decisions issued by Chambers require
unanimity. If justices in a Chamber cannot agree on whether an application chal-
lenging a law’s constitutionality is inadmissible, the case needs to be heard by one
of the Senates. Only a Senate of the GFCC can declare a law as unconstitutional.
Half of the justices on the GFCC are elected by the Bundestag, Germany’s lower
parliamentary chamber, and half of them are elected by the Bundesrat, parliament’s
upper chamber comprising government representatives of Germany’s sixteen federal
states. Justices serve twelve-year, non-renewable terms on the bench of the GFCC.
To be appointed, a justice requires the support of at least two-thirds of the re-
spective chamber’s members. The two-thirds requirement essentially demands that
governing majorities and the opposition in the parliamentary chambers cooperate
when appointing justices to the GFCC (Ho¨nnige and Gschwend, 2010, 513).
Ho¨nnige and Gschwend (2010) note that relative to the politics surrounding
the appointment procedures at the U.S. Supreme Court (see Moraski and Shipan,
1999; Szmer and Songer, 2005), we know remarkably little about how lawmakers in
the German parliament choose justices for the GFCC (see also van Ooyen, 2008).
Nonetheless, Vanberg (2005, 83) identifies a pattern in the selection process that is
closely related to the two-thirds requirement for appointments: In order to avoid
deadlock in the appointment process, “an informal division of seats on the court
has developed.” Throughout the timeframe for my analysis (1983 to 2017), the
GFCC has traditionally maintained an ideological parity within its two Senates,
with four justices in each Senate appointed by centre-right coalitions and the other
four appointed by centre-left coalitions. Accordingly, even if a coalition of political
parties enjoys a majority of seats in either the Bundestag or Bundesrat for several
consecutive terms, their political dominance does not translate into an ideological
shift on the bench of the GFCC in their favour.
To declare a federal or state law as incompatible with the constitution, a ma-
jority of justices in the Senate hearing the case needs to agree with this decision.
The votes individual justices cast in a case are not made public, unless a justice
takes the rare step of writing a dissenting opinion. If the vote in the Senate is tied,
the reviewed law is considered constitutional (i.e. the presiding justice in the Sen-
ate, usually the GFCC’s president or vice-president, does not cast a deciding vote).
Applications challenging the constitutionality of federal or state laws heard by the
GFCC generally concern specific paragraphs, rather than laws in their entirety. The
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decisions of the GFCC themselves carry the force of law, which means should the
court rule that specific paragraphs contained in a law are unconstitutional, they are
struck from the rest of the law’s text and lawmakers in the elected branches are
instructed to replace the objected paragraphs with provisions in line with constitu-
tional norms.3 Notably, given its decisions carry the force of law, the GFCC does
not rely on action by the elected branches for its decision to strike sections from a
law to take effect. This characteristic of the GFCC’s decisions makes it seem that
evading compliance with a ruling is effectively impossible for the elected branches.
However, Vanberg (2005, 7) argues that, in practice, the possibility of non-
compliance with the GFCC’s decisions is not simply academic, noting that “[e]vasion
of constitutional decisions in Germany, for example, is sufficiently frequent that an
article published in one of the nation’s preeminent newspapers, the Su¨ddeutsche
Zeitung, recently concluded that legislative majorities in Germany routinely evade
or circumvent FCC decisions that are politically costly or have significant budgetary
implications” (translated from German the article’s title from January 10 of 1998
reads ‘If it does not sit well, it is ignored’).
Vanberg (2005) provides examples of non-compliance with the GFCC’s decisions,
including the court’s so-called ‘Crucifix decision’,4 and its 1992 ruling on federal law
regulating the financing of political parties. In the latter case, the GFCC had ruled
that the provision of a fixed amount of money to each political party that had re-
ceived at least two percent of the vote in the previous federal election violated the
constitutionally guaranteed independence of political parties from the state. The
Bundestag subsequently passed a new law, which afforded every party one Deutsche
Mark for every vote it received in a federal election, while adding an additional
small bonus payment for each of the first five million votes a party captured. Van-
berg (2005, 4) notes that “this ‘bonus payment’ constitutes, in practice, little more
than the base amount that was declared unconstitutional by the court, as several
prominent constitutional lawyers have pointed out” (see also von Arnim, 1996).
To summarize, once the GFCC has been called upon to exercise constitutional
review of a federal or state law, the court can declare paragraphs contained in these
laws unconstitutional, striking them off the books. Yet, in practice, the GFCC
3Generally, the GFCC can choose one of two formulations when declaring paragraphs of federal
or state law unconstitutional: The court can declare paragraphs as (1) incompatible with the Basic
Law and consequently ‘null and void’, which effectively means that the paragraphs are struck from
the rest of the law’s text with immediate effect; otherwise, (2) the GFCC typically chooses to
declare paragraphs as incompatible with the Basic Law and instructs lawmakers to replace the
objected provisions by a certain date.
4After the GFCC had ruled a Bavarian school ordinance requiring the display of a crucifix in
public elementary school classrooms as unconstitutional in August 1995, the Bavarian parliament
responded with new legislation stating that “[i]n light of Bavaria’s historical and cultural traditions,
a cross is displayed in every classroom” (cited in Vanberg, 2005, 3).
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cannot prevent the elected branches from pursuing legislative or administrative re-
sponses to the GFCC’s decisions, which would allow them to evade compliance with
the spirit of the court’s jurisprudence. Existing literature has shown that the GFCC
is not alone with this dilemma. For instance, Carrubba and Zorn (2010) show that
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision-making is shaped by a concern for compliance
with its jurisprudence (see also Clark, 2010; Hall, 2014), while Larsson and Nau-
rin (2016, 403) provide evidence from the European Court of Justice’s decisions in
preliminary reference procedures implying that “judges are both concerned with—
and uncertain of—what the political reactions to their decisions will be.” In other
words, like other courts exercising constitutional review, the GFCC faces the kind
of compliance dilemma captured by the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2.
One of the reasons why the GFCC’s constitutional review of federal law appears
to be a fertile ground to test the theoretical model’s core claims is that the GFCC
has enjoyed consistently high levels of diffuse public support over the past three
decades. Evidence from public opinion surveys presented by Gibson et al. (1998,
351) suggest that not only are Germans very aware of the GFCC’s existence, but
also express remarkably high levels of trust in the GFCC “to make decisions that
are right for the country as a whole.”
Data covering the mid-1980s up until the early 1990s collected by the Emnid In-
stitute and reported by Vanberg (2005, 98) provide evidence of the German public’s
high diffuse support for the GFCC. Table 3.1 shows that the public’s trust in the
GFCC as an institution not only seems to be high, consistently outranking trust in
the Bundestag or the federal government, it also appears to be fairly stable over the
years (the general drop in trust in institutions shown for 1993 in Table 3.1 captures
the inclusion of respondents from East Germany, a pattern also reflected in the data
provided by Gibson et al. 1998). Further, there is no indication that the German
public’s high trust in the GFCC abated in more recent years. Table 3.2 reports data
from the German General Social Survey, again capturing the German public’s trust
in the GFCC, the Bundestag and federal government between 2008 and 2018, which
reinforces the impression that the GFCC’s standing amongst the German public by
far outweighs that of the executive and legislative branches.
High levels of public trust in the GFCC are a critical factor in my case selec-
tion. First, recall that the main focus of this chapter is to empirically evaluate the
theoretical model’s claim that courts tend to respond with deference to lawmakers
who had provoked a for them potentially costly confrontation. The literature re-
viewed in the first chapter of this dissertation highlights that the public’s diffuse
support is a critical source of courts’ authority in systems of limited government.
Vanberg (1998, 305) argues that “it is electorally costly to be perceived to be in
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Institution 1982 1986 1990 1993
GFCC 82% 85% 84% 73%
Bundestag 61% 74% 65% 44%
Federal government 59% 66% 61% 43%
Table 3.1: Proportion of respondents stating that they trust an institution in re-
sponse to the question “I am now going to read you a list of public institutions and
organizations. Please tell me for each institution or organization whether you trust
it, or whether that is not the case. How about ... ?” Table is based on representation
by Vanberg (2005, 98) and reports data from Emnid Institute (1995)
Institution 2008 2012 2018
GFCC 62% 67% 70%
Bundestag 27% 36% 42%
Federal government 29% 37% 40%
Table 3.2: Proportion of respondents reporting values of 5 and above on a 7-point
Likert scale in response to the survey item “I am now going to read out a number
of public institutions and organisations. Please tell me for each institution or or-
ganisation how much trust you place in it. Please use this scale: 1 means you have
absolutely no trust at all – 7 means you have a great deal of trust.” Table reports
data from Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (2018)
conflict with the court”, yet this argument rests on the assumption that the elec-
torate is actually supportive of the court’s role. Unless the public considers a court
as a legitimate authority, lawmakers are unlikely to face costs for ignoring a court’s
jurisprudence. Qualitative evidence from German media coverage and interviews
presented in subsequent chapters illustrates that lawmakers in the Bundestag and
federal government indeed risk public shaming for flouting the court’s jurisprudence.
Given the GFCC’s public support outweighs the support enjoyed by the legis-
lature and the federal government, the costs lawmakers risk paying may in fact be
too high for them to ever provoke confrontation with the GFCC. This would render
the German case unsuitable to test the empirical implications of the formal model’s
partial-pooling equilibrium and the dissertation’s core argument derived from it.
However, evidence collected for the statistical analysis presented below (as well as
the qualitative evidence considered in subsequent chapters) shows that despite the
risks associated with provoking confrontation with the GFCC, lawmakers nonethe-
less occasionally pursue policies disregarding widespread constitutional concerns.
The German court’s high public support plays another, albeit related role for
my case selection. At times the GFCC has to weather vociferous criticism from
lawmakers questioning the court’s ‘undue’ influence in the legislative process. To
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illustrate, in response to a series of GFCC decisions invalidating federal law, one
of the most senior members of the Christian-conservative CDU and then-President
of the Bundestag, Norbert Lammert, penned a rather thinly veiled threat in one of
Germany’s most prominent newspapers, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Lam-
mert wrote that a parliament left overly restricted by the GFCC’s jurisprudence may
“choose to defend itself” and amend the constitution “in order to avoid unwelcome
jurisprudence in the future.”5
The German public’s high diffuse support for the GFCC effectively shields the
court from lawmakers’ efforts that would threaten the court’s institutional integrity
actually being implemented. Whittington (2003, 460) notes that “[a]n attack on the
courts may provoke a public backlash against those who seek to subvert a cherished
national institution, independent of any calculation about the particular actions
that the court has taken or may take in the future.” This sentiment is reflected in
the evidence I gathered from interviews with former members of the Bundestag and
the German federal government. In a telephone interview conducted on March 23,
2019, I asked a former member of the Bundestag how lawmakers can respond to the
GFCC’s—in their opinion—activist jurisprudence, who then replied:6
Lawmaker 1: Once in a while, you hear calls to change the personnel
at the constitutional court or to amend the court’s jurisdiction. Theo-
retically, that is possible and when the emotions are running high, these
options may seem feasible. But in the end, people shy away from actually
doing it. You know, there is a general consensus in Germany that the
Federal Constitutional Court is a necessary institution, and the public
definitely holds the court in high regard.
The first of my theoretical model’s conditions for courts to draw on lawmakers’
costs to assess the credibility of a non-compliance threat states that courts should
not be at risk of suffering high costs themselves due to court-curbing. Overall, in
light of the GFCC’s high diffuse public support over the past decades, protecting the
court from the more serious attacks on its institutional integrity, I believe that the
environment in which the GFCC has operated since 1983 matches this condition.
My model’s second condition states that lawmakers need to have sufficient reason
to believe that they will get an opportunity to evade compliance with the court’s
5Original in German, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 10, 2017. Lammert fordert
Zuru¨ckhaltung, accessed April 2, 2019. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/
bundesverfassungsgericht-lammert-fordert-zurueckhaltung-15009324.html
6While some of my interviewees I spoke to in the course of my research agreed to be quoted
by name, some asked for anonymity. To ensure consistency in the following, statements made by
interviewees are anonymised and names are replaced with indicative placeholders, e.g. Lawmaker
1, Justice 3 or Clerk 3 throughout the rest of this thesis.


































































Figure 3.1: Annually cumulated proportion of respondents (in %) reporting their
vote intention in response to the question “Which party would you vote for if fed-
eral elections were held this Sunday?” Figure reports Politbarometer survey data
provided by Forschungsruppe Wahlen (2019)
jurisprudence in the future. Only then is it likely enough that both ‘compliant’ and
‘non-compliant’ lawmakers take their chances and risk pursuing policies that provoke
confrontation with the court, pushing the court to look for ways to distinguish among
the two types of lawmakers (i.e. the scenario captured by the model’s partial-pooling
equilibrium). In the remainder of this section, I will consider evidence suggesting
that during some periods within the timeframe for my analysis (1983 to 2017), both
types of lawmakers in the German Bundestag faced sufficiently positive electoral
outlooks to risk confrontation with the GFCC.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview over every German government cabinet in office
between 1983 and 2017, along with survey data from the German Politbarometer
(Forschungsruppe Wahlen, 2019), which has documented political parties’ popular-
ity among the German electorate since 1977. Figure 3.1 shows that a conservative-
liberal coalition under Chancellor Helmut Kohl consistently controlled government
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office between 1983 and 1998. For Chancellor Kohl’s first three full terms in of-
fice, Politbarometer data suggests that the governing coalition’s electoral popularity
dipped each mid-term, yet recovered in time for federal elections to the Bundestag
in 1987, 1990 and 1994.7
Towards the end of Kohl’s last term in office, the governing coalition of the CDU,
CSU and FDP saw its electoral support waver and lost its parliamentary majority
in the 1998 elections to the SPD and the Green party. During its two terms in office,
Chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der’s cabinet pursued a sweeping reform of social welfare
policy, which effectively alienated the SPD’s traditional electoral constituencies.8
The loss of electoral support for the SPD and Green party’s governing coalition
was exemplified by the SPD’s performance in state parliamentary elections. Most
notably, the SPD experienced dramatic losses in elections to the state parliament
of North Rhine-Westphalia, one of the party’s traditional strongholds, in May 2005,
which prompted the Chancellor to seek early federal elections to “find clarity whether
the German public will continue to support the government’s agenda.”9 The SPD
and Green party subsequently lost their governing mandate in the 2005 federal
elections, and government office has since been controlled by the CDU/CSU and
Chancellor Angela Merkel, albeit with different junior coalition partners (including
so-called ‘grand-coalitions’ with the SPD).
The discussion in the previous paragraphs falls short of an in-depth analysis of
public opinion and electoral shifts in Germany since the early 1980s. Nonetheless,
this brief overview serves an illustrative purpose to support my case selection: Dur-
ing some periods between 1983 and 2017, lawmakers in government enjoyed the
kind of electoral fortunes that—according to the model—would provide lawmakers
with enough incentives to pursue policies provoking confrontation with the GFCC
even if they were willing to eventually comply with a constitutional veto. From the
early 1980s until the mid-1990s, the GFCC faced a relatively popular conservative-
liberal coalition that managed to hold on to government office for sixteen consecutive
7Helmut Kohl was first elected chancellor in October 1982 when his predecessor Helmut Schmidt
of the SPD lost a so-called ‘constructive vote of no-confidence’ in the Bundestag. Following the
change in government office from a SPD/FDP-led cabinet to a CDU/CSU/FDP governing coalition,
early elections were then called for March 1983.
8Coined as the ‘Agenda 2010’, Chancellor Schro¨der’s cabinet responded to a trend of stag-
nating economic growth with policies reforming the labour market, social security, taxation
and public budgets. Particularly the so-called ‘Hartz’ legislative reform package caused contro-
versy, as it inter alia provided incentives to individuals experiencing long-term unemployment to
take up work by cutting welfare payments by up to 30% should they refuse to take a ‘reason-
able’ job (effectively any form of legal employment), see Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung,
June 31, 2007, Die Agenda 2010, accessed April 4, 2019, https://www.bpb.de/apuz/28920/
die-agenda-2010-eine-wirtschaftspolitische-bilanz?p=all.
9Original in German, Spiegel Online, May 22, 2005. Schro¨der will
Neuwahlen, accessed April 4, 2019. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
politisches-beben-schroeder-will-neuwahlen-a-357076.html
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years,10 while the same political (sister) parties, the Christian-conservative CDU and
CSU, consistently defined the government’s agenda since the mid-2000s under the
leadership of Chancellor Merkel.
Provided the theoretical model adequately reflects the behaviour of lawmakers
and courts in systems of limited government, periods of consistency in government
office should coincide with lawmakers being prepared to take high political risks when
pursuing policies that provoke confrontation with the GFCC (e.g. the Conservative-
led coalitions between 1983 and 1998 as well as 2005 and 2017). Yet, we should be
less likely to observe lawmakers’ high-risk taking when governing coalitions struggle
for electoral support (e.g. the SPD-led coalitions between 1998 and 2005). Descrip-
tive evidence presented in the next section suggests that this is in fact the case.
The next section revisits the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter based
on the formal analysis of the theoretical model and translates them into empirically
testable expectations for the GFCC’s exercise of constitutional review of federal law.
I then identify and operationalize the variables that make up these hypotheses for
the German context and provide descriptive statistics for my data.
3.2 Hypotheses and data
The theoretical model’s empirical implication at the centre of the statistical anal-
ysis in this chapter states that courts are more likely to respond with deference in
their judgements to lawmakers who had provoked a for them potentially costly con-
frontation (see hypothesis 3 in Chapter 2). This implication can be translated into
a hypothesis tailored at the GFCC’s review of the Bundestag’s federal laws: Ceteris
paribus, the GFCC should be less likely to strike a law when lawmakers had risked
suffering high political costs for provoking confrontation with the GFCC.
The second implication of the model considered here concerns the relationship
between a court’s decision-making and the likelihood that lawmakers who had au-
thored the reviewed act would also control the implementation of a court’s corre-
sponding judgement. Hypothesis 2 discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that as we move
across the theoretical model’s equilibria, a higher likelihood of lawmakers control-
ling the implementation of judgements concerning their own policies comes with a
higher likelihood of courts showing self-restraint in their exercise of constitutional
review. Tailored to the GFCC’s review of federal laws, this hypothesis reads: Ce-
teris paribus, the GFCC should be less likely to strike a law when the probability that
the law’s author controls implementation of the GFCC’s decision is high.
10Effectively, Chancellor Kohl’s first term in office began in October 1982 with then-Chancellor
Schmidt’s defeat in the Bundstag’s ‘constructive vote of no confidence’.
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These hypotheses refer to the same outcome variable, the GFCC’s decision to
declare a federal law unconstitutional. The operationalization of this variable for my
analysis is (fairly) straightforward: For each case of constitutional review involving
federal laws the GFCC’s Senates decided between 1983 and 2017, I identified whether
the court declared the challenged paragraphs (or parts thereof) unconstitutional.
Here, I was able to draw on replication data provided by Krehbiel (2016), who
extended Vanberg’s (2005) data on the German court’s constitutional review of
federal laws to the time period from 1983 to 2014. I then further extended the data
to 2017 myself. The variable Strike is binary and coded 1 if the GFCC declared the
challenged paragraphs (or parts thereof) unconstitutional, and coded 0 otherwise.
Between 1983 and 2017, the GFCC’s Senates issued decisions in 363 cases involving
constitutional challenges of federal law paragraphs. Each year the GFCC’s Senates
collectively heard roughly 10.4 of these cases and struck the challenged paragraphs
in about 5.3 cases.11
3.2.1 Explanatory variables
The explanatory variable at the centre of my attention in this chapter captures
lawmakers’ expected costs for pursuing policies that provoke confrontation with a
court. When presenting the theoretical model in the previous chapter, I linked these
costs to lawmakers’ choice to ignore advice received at the policy-making stages,
highlighting that their plans would violate constitutional norms.
When a court strikes a policy lawmakers had pursued despite warning signs that
it would fail to match the requirements of constitutional jurisprudence, lawmakers’
critics and political opponents get an opportunity to discredit their political acumen
among the electorate and question their commitment to respect constitutional norms
(see Vanberg, 1998). Hence, flouting their colleagues’ constitutional concerns can
turn out to be politically costly for lawmakers. Crucially, lawmakers’ choice to ignore
constitutional objections raised publicly in parliament is also a signal easily observed
by courts, given that justices supported by a team of law clerks are typically well-
informed about the legislative proceedings which produced the policies they review
(see McCubbins et al., 1992, and qualitative evidence presented in Chapter 4).
In order to measure the political costs lawmakers pushing for constitutionally
controversial policies risk paying, I studied the parliamentary debates of all federal
11It is worth mentioning here that, unlike Vanberg (2005) and Krehbiel (2016), I exclude decisions
issued by any of the GFCC’s Chambers on the admissibility of a challenge in my main analysis, as
these types of decisions are substantially different from Senate decisions (i.e. they generally do not
consider the constitutionality of a law). However, I include the decisions of the GFCC’s Chambers
in one of my robustness checks discussed in section 3.3.3 with results provided in Table 3.10.
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laws that eventually ended up at the GFCC between 1983 and 2017 and identified
whether lawmakers in the Bundestag had considered (parts of) a federal law uncon-
stitutional prior to its adoption. In a first step, I referred to the preamble of each
GFCC decision to identify the federal laws containing the challenged paragraphs.
Different paragraphs of the same law can be challenged in different cases heard by
the court. For instance, different parts of the 2007 Act Implementing the Residency
and Asylum Directives of the European Union were challenged in two different cases
heard by the GFCC, 2 BvL 16/09 and 1 BvL 4/12.12 In the former, the Higher Ad-
ministrative Court of Baden-Wuerttemberg referred a case to the GFCC to consider
the constitutionality of legislation allowing government to refuse residence permits
for immigrants, whose next of kin had been convicted of particular crimes. The
latter case involved a challenge of the constitutionality of legislation excluding im-
migrants with particular types of residence permits from access to public parental
allowances. In total, paragraphs of 241 different federal laws were challenged in
the 363 cases heard by the GFCC’s Senates between 1983 and 2017. The fact that
different parts of federal laws can be challenged in different cases complicates the
statistical models I estimate slightly and I return to this point further below.
Once I identified the challenged federal laws for each GFCC case, I referred to the
Bundestag’s Parliamentary Material Information System to access the texts of the
final parliamentary debates for each challenged law. Specifically, in order to avoid
including lawmakers’ constitutional concerns which had been addressed through a
subsequent amendment, I only considered statements delivered by members of the
Bundestag at debates which took place right before final votes on the law were
cast.13 I then read each of these debates and identified whether members of the
Bundestag had considered parts of the considered draft law as unconstitutional. To
illustrate the types of statements I identified as constitutional objections, consider
the following examples from several different parliamentary debates:
Horst Gobrecht (SPD): After hearing from so many experts, I find it
difficult to understand how a majority here can, I may say with open eyes,
12The GFCC uses a simple system to label its cases. The first number identifies the Senate
hearing the case. The following code then identifies the type of proceeding: BvL marks concrete
norm control proceedings, BvR marks constitutional complaints and BvF marks abstract norm
control proceedings. Finally, the first number of the last block identifies the annual running case
file, while the second number identifies the year the respective application was filed with the court.
13For ordinary legislative procedures, the Bundestag schedules three readings. The third reading
generally does not include a substantive debate of the law, concludes with Members of Parliaments
voting on the law and usually follows straight after the second reading. Unless the Bundestag
substantively debated the law at the third and final reading, I accessed the text of lawmakers’
statements delivered during substantive debates at the second reading. When a federal law was
passed following the meeting of a conciliation committee comprising selected representatives of the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat, I considered statements delivered by members of the Bundestag
after the conciliation had met.
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adopt a provision that goes against the constitution and thus must end
negatively, quite frankly negatively for everyone who sat here today.14
Rainer Funke (FDP): Federal officials employed at the Federal Post
Office should not be treated differently than federal officials, for instance,
working for the Federal Ministry of Finances. The FDP and myself
remain committed to this principle. And that is why we will not consent
to this unconstitutional law.15
Horst Seehofer (CSU): You simply pretend that the entire population
invests four percent of its income into a private pension provision. I
predict: Your approach will eventually fail at the Federal Constitutional
Court. It amounts to a socio-political injustice to ask pensioners to make
additional sacrifices based on an unfounded assumption that everyone in
Germany invests into some form of private provision.16
When reading the statements delivered by Members of Parliament at the final
debates in the Bundestag, I coded whether a law was considered unconstitutional
by members of the parliamentary opposition and whether members of the govern-
ing coalition caucus voiced constitutional objections. We may generally expect that
members of the parliamentary opposition feel few inhibitions to attack government’s
legislative plans for their supposed constitutional incompatibility. Hence, we should
not conclude that every instance of governing majorities ignoring constitutional con-
cerns voiced from the opposition benches is an example of government willingly dis-
regarding constitutional constraints on their policy choices. Raising constitutional
issues may be an attempt by the opposition to score political points and reflect
political opportunism rather than genuine legal concerns.
On the other hand, taking the step to publicly discredit their political allies’
policy choices is likely to be far more consequential for members of the governing
coalition caucus. While we cannot confidently rule out that these statements are also
instances of political point-scoring (and I return to this argument in my discussion of
robustness checks further below), defying party discipline and publicly accusing their
14Translated from German, excerpt from the second reading of the Act on the Recovery of the
Economy and Employment and Unburdening of the Federal Budget in the German Bundestag,
December 15, 1982, 2. Beratung: BT-PlPr 09/139, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/
WP9/2058/205893.html.
15Translated from German, excerpt from the second reading of the First Act on the Amend-
ment of the Federal Post Office Employee Act in the German Bundestag, September 24, 2004, 2.
Beratung: BT-PlPr 15/127, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP15/952/95286.html.
16Translated from German, excerpt from the second reading of the Act to Secure the Sustainable
Financing of Public Pensions in the German Bundestag, March 11, 2004, 2. Beratung: BT-PlPr
15/97, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP15/968/96835.html.
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colleagues of failing to uphold constitutional norms comes with at least some political
costs for members of the coalition caucus who do so. Accordingly, we may expect
that members of the governing coalition caucus should generally be more likely
to voice constitutional concerns only if they genuinely believe that government’s
plans infringe on constitutional norms.17 In light of this, I expect that flouting the
concerns voiced by members of their own caucus comes with higher political risks
for lawmakers in government, relative to ignoring constitutional concerns voiced by
the parliamentary opposition.
The variable Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) is binary and coded
1 if at least one member of the parliamentary opposition objected to the law citing
their constitutional concerns, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the variable Constitutional
objections by governing MP(s) is binary and coded 1 if at least one member of the
governing coalition caucus objected to the law citing their constitutional concerns,
and 0 otherwise.
To no surprise, the data suggests that members of the opposition are far more
likely to argue that a federal law fails to conform with constitutional principles
than their colleagues from the majority caucus. Out of the 363 cases heard by the
GFCC’s Senates between 1983 and 2017, 175 (48%) involved federal laws, which had
been considered unconstitutional by the opposition in the Bundestag prior to their
adoption. At the same time, only 29 cases (8%) involved federal laws which had been
considered unconstitutional by members of the governing coalition caucus. Again to
no surprise, the two variables are not independent of each other and objections voiced
by members of the governing caucus usually come hand in hand with objections
voiced by the parliamentary opposition (the p-value of the corresponding χ2-test
statistic is roughly 0.01, and only eight out of 363 cases heard by the GFCC’s
Senates dealt with federal laws considered unconstitutional ‘only’ by members of
the governing coalition caucus).18
Since the variable Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) will play a key
role in the analysis as it serves as a proxy for lawmakers risking high costs from
provoking confrontation with the GFCC it is worthwhile to take a closer look at
the laws considered unconstitutional by members of the governing coalition cau-
cus. Table 3.3 provides a chronological overview over every federal law identified
as unconstitutional by a member of the Bundestag serving in the governing coali-
tion caucus, along with the coalition that adopted the law, the corresponding cases
17Consider for example the decision of Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger to
resign from office in protest against government’s plans for a so-called ‘big eavesdropping operation’
eventually implemented through the 1998 Act on Improving Measures to Combat Organised Crime.
18Cases involving concerns raised ‘only’ by members of the governing coalition caucus involve
objections by Christian-conservatives of the CDU/CSU to the regulation of abortion in federal law
concerning the 1990 Treaty on the Reunification of Germany.
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Federal law and adopting coalition GFCC case(s)
Act amending the Law on Restrictions to the Privacy
of Correspondence, Post and Telecommunications of 13
September 1978 (BGBl. I S. 1546); SPD/FDP
1 BvR 1494/78 (1984)
Act on Tax Adjustments of 19 December 1985 (BGBl.
I S. 2436); CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvL 2/04 (2008)
Act of 23 September 1990 on the Treaty of 31 August
1990 between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic on the Reunification
of Germany and the Agreement of 18 September 1990
(BGBl. II S. 885); CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvR 1341/90 (1991),
1 BvR 454/91 (1992),
1 BvR 1467/91 (1992),
1 BvR 1452/90 (1996),
2 BvL 6/95 (1997)
Act on the Regulation of Outstanding Property Is-
sues as amended by the Second Law on Outstanding
Property Issues of 14 July 1992 (BGBl I S. 1257);
CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvR 1452/90 (1996),
1 BvF 1/94 (1999),
2 BvR 955/00 (2004)
Act on the Safeguarding and Structural Improvements
of Social Health Insurance of 21 December 1992 (BGBl.
I S. 2266); CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvR 2167/93 (1998),
1 BvR 264/95 (1999),
1 BvL 16/96 (2000),
1 BvR 422/00 (2000),
1 BvR 630/93 (2000),
1 BvL 4/96 (2001),
2 BvF 2/01 (2005)
Act on Amendments to the Basic Law (Article 16
and Article 18) of 28 June 1993 (BGBl. I S. 1002);
CDU/CSU/FDP
2 BvR 1938/93 (1996)
Act amending Procedural Law concerning Asylum, For-
eign Nationals and Citizenship of 30 June 1993 (BGBl.
I S. 1062); CDU/CSU/FDP
2 BvR 1938/93 (1996),
2 BvR 1507/93 (1996),
2 BvR 1516/93 (1996),
2 BvL 2/98 (1999)
Continued on next page
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Table 3.3 – Continued from previous page
Federal law and governing coalition GFCC case(s)
Act on the Re-regulation of the Provision of Services
to Asylum Seekers of 30 June 1993 (BGBl. I 1993 S.
1074); CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvR 293/05 (2006)
Act on Adjusting Contractual Law with regard to the
Use of Property in Acceding Territories of 21 September
1994 (BGBl. I S. 2538); CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvR 995/95 (1999)
Act on Compensations based on the Law on Outstand-
ing Property Issues and on State Compensation for Ex-
propriation under Occupation Law or on the Basis of
Sovereign Acts by Occupying Powers of 27 September
1994 (BGBl I S. 2624); CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvR 1408/95 (1996),
1 BvR 2307/94 (2000),
1 BvL 17/00 (2001)
1996 Annual Tax Act of 11 October 1995 (BGBl I S.
1250); CDU/CSU/FDP
2 BvR 301/98 (1999),
2 BvR 400/98 (2002),
2 BvL 5/00 (2004)
Act on Amendments to the Basic Law (Article 13) of
26 March 1998 (BGBl I S. 610); CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvR 1104/92 (2001),
1 BvR 2378/98 (2004)
Act on Improving Measures to Combat Organised
Crime of 4 May 1998 (BGBl I S. 845); CDU/CSU/FDP
1 BvR 1104/92 (2001),
1 BvR 2378/98 (2004)
Act Implementing the Residency and Asylum Directives
of the European Union of 19 August 2007 (BGBl I S.
1970); CDU/CSU/SPD
2 BvL 16/09 (2010),
1 BvL 4/12 (2012)
Act on the Lisbon Treaty of 13 December 2007 of 8
October 2010 (BGBl II S. 1038); CDU/CSU/SPD
2 BvR 2136/09 (2009),
2 BvE 2/08 (2009)
Act on Amendments to the Basic Law (Articles 23,
45 and 93) of 8 October 2010 (BGBl I S. 1926);
CDU/CSU/SPD
2 BvE 2/08 (2009)
Continued on next page
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Federal law and governing coalition GFCC case(s)
Act on Prevention by the Federal Criminal Police Office
of Threats from International Terrorism of 25 December
2008 (BGBl I S. 3083); CDU/CSU/SPD
1 BvR 966/09 (2016)
Act on Combating Child Pornography in Communi-
cation Networks of 17 February 2010 (BGBl I S.78);
CDU/CSU/SPD
1 BvR 508/11 (2011)
Table 3.3: Federal laws (with adopting governing coalition) objected as unconstitu-
tional by members of the governing coalition caucus and corresponding cases heard
by the German Federal Constitutional Court (with year of decision)
heard by the GFCC and the year the court eventually issued its decision (note that
Table 3.3 also includes GFCC cases in which a Chamber ruled an application as
inadmissible). Several interesting patterns can be derived from Table 3.3.
First, half of the laws objected by members of the governing coalition caucus
were passed by the CDU/CSU and FDP’s governing coalition between 1983 and
1994 (with an additional three adopted by the same coalition between 1994 and
1998), while none were adopted by the governing coalition of the SPD and Green
party between 1998 and 2005. The theoretical model developed in the previous
chapter provides one possible explanation for this pattern. The SPD and Green
party struggled for electoral support and arguably lacked clear prospects of retaining
government office in the future to respond to the GFCC’s rulings on their policies.
Governing coalitions of the CDU/CSU and FDP, one the other hand, faced an
electorally more favourable environment between 1983 and 1994. The pattern we
can observe in Table 3.3 appears consistent with the assumption that lawmakers are
forward-looking and take into account how likely it is that they would still control
government office to respond to the court’s decisions invalidating their policies.
Second, the laws listed in Table 3.3 cover a variety of issue areas, ranging from
taxation, immigration law and public health insurance to internal security policy,
property rights of individuals and businesses in the former German Democratic
Republic and abortion.19 Hence, while at face value most of these issue share some
propensity to be at the centre of controversial political debates, there is no indication
19Prior to reunification, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal German Republic
had different approaches towards women’s rights to terminate pregnancies. Plans to incorporate
Eastern Germany’s more liberal regulations on abortion into the 1990 Treaty on Reunification
faced opposition from several conservative politicians among the CDU and the Bavarian CSU.
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that German lawmakers’ willingness to criticise their colleagues in the governing
coalition caucus for failing to respect constitutional constraints on their actions is
limited to a particular issue area.
Finally, Table 3.3 shows that some of the challenged laws involved amendments
of the constitution, while others were adopted by a grand-coalition of the two elec-
torally strongest parties in Germany between 1983 and 2017, the CDU/CSU and
SPD. Given that amendments to the German Basic Law require the support of a
two-thirds majority in the Bundestag it seems plausible that the GFCC may be
more reluctant to challenge a law that secured widespread backing among Members
of Parliament. Therefore, I control for the variable Constitutional amendment in my
analysis, which is coded 1 if the law involves a change of the Basic Law, and 0 oth-
erwise. Similarly, to avoid confounding effects of laws passed by electorally stronger
governing coalitions, my analysis includes an additional control variable, Law by
grand-coalition, which is coded 1 if the reviewed law was adopted by a coalition of
the CDU/CSU and SPD, and 0 otherwise.
It is worth adding here that it is generally difficult to measure the extent of
support among members of the Bundestag for a particular law, as votes are only
recorded when a roll-call vote is specifically requested, which was the case for only
31% of the laws reviewed by the GFCC’s Senates between 1983 and 2017. In all other
instances, members of the Bundestag voted by show of hand, and in the majority of
cases in my data there is no clear indication how lawmakers (and often even their
party factions) voted on a particular draft.
Another critical factor concerning the variable Constitutional objections by gov-
erning MP(s) relates to the individuals voicing their constitutional concerns. It
is possible that these lawmakers are typically backbenchers at the fringes of their
political parties, criticising their colleagues in the coalition caucus to pander to a
particular electoral constituency. A pattern of the GFCC upholding laws, which
had been objected by these backbenchers for their supposed unconstitutionality,
may thus not reflect the GFCC’s response to a signalled non-compliance threat but
may simply be due to a lack of substance in backbenchers’ claims.
To account for this possibility in my robustness checks, I re-run my analysis
while distinguishing lawmakers of the governing coalition caucus voicing constitu-
tional concerns according to their seniority. The variable Seniority of objecting
governing MP(s) comprises three categories: No objections if no member of the
governing coalition voiced constitutional concerns; Senior governing MP(s) if con-
stitutional concerns are voiced by a cabinet member, a governing party’s designated
spokesperson for a policy area, a member of a governing party’s executive board or
a governing party member serving as parliamentary committee chair; and Junior
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Category Frequency % of observations
No objections 334 92%
Junior governing MP(s) 12 3%
Senior governing MP(s) 17 5%
Table 3.4: Distribution of the variable Seniority of objecting governing MP(s)
governing MP(s) if constitutional concerns are voiced by any other member of the
governing coalition caucus. This operationalization follows from the assumption
that lawmakers considered as senior require the support of their party colleagues to
attain these positions and hence should not be considered backbenchers. Table 3.4
provides the distribution of the variable Seniority of objecting governing MP(s).
Moving on to the second explanatory variable of interest for the analysis in
this chapter, I require a measure that captures the likelihood that lawmakers who
had authored the reviewed law would also take control of crafting the response to
the GFCC’s corresponding judgement. To capture this likelihood, I first identified
whether the legislative paragraphs challenged at the GFCC were passed by the gov-
erning coalition in office at the time of the court’s decision. The variable Current
government is binary and coded 1 either if the law containing the challenged para-
graphs was passed during the current legislative period at the time of the court’s
decision, or if the law was passed during the previous legislative period, provided
the then-governing coalition had won subsequent elections and was still in office at
the time of the court’s decision. Otherwise, the variable was coded 0. In 74 (20%)
out of the 363 cases heard by the GFCC’s Senates, the court reviewed laws authored
by the then-governing coalition.
In a second step, I then specified an interaction term in my statistical model(s),
involving the measure Current government and a measure capturing the time left
until the next federal parliamentary elections at the date of the court’s decision, the
variable Years until election. For the latter variable, I counted the exact number of
days between the date of the GFCC’s decision and the date of the next scheduled
election, and then expressed this time period in years.20 On average, the GFCC’s
Senates issued their decisions roughly 2.2 years prior to the next federal elections to
the Bundestag (the variable’s standard deviation is roughly 1.2 years).
The rationale underlying the interaction effect is as follows: When the GFCC
issues a decision early on during a legislative period it can expect that the legislative
20To account for the early elections in September 2005, which were announced by Federal Pres-
ident Horst Ko¨hler on July 21, 2005, I considered the GFCC’s anticipated date of the next federal
elections to be October 1, 2006, for decisions issued prior to President Ko¨hler’s announcement,
and September 18, 2005 (the actual date of the elections) after the announcement.
Constitutional confrontation and judicial deference in Germany 71
response to a judicial veto (potentially evading compliance) would be authored by
the current government. As elections draw closer, however, the probability that a
different governing coalition would take charge of responding to the court’s decision
increases. I expect the court to be less likely to strike the challenged paragraphs
when the time until the next elections is longer, provided the law was passed by
the current governing coalition (i.e. in line with this expectation, the sign of the
interaction term’s regression coefficient should be negative).
One concern about this operationalization is that a court conscious of a non-
compliance threat may simply choose to postpone a decision sufficiently long enough
in the hope of finding a politically more favourable climate in the future. It seems
difficult to generally rule this possibility out, however, there are also indications that
the GFCC’s discretion over the timing of its decisions is somewhat limited. In my
interviews with members of the GFCC I asked how much control justices enjoy over
the timing of their decisions. In a telephone interview conducted on April 14, 2019,
one former justice noted:
Justice 1: When applications land on our desks then of course we
have to decide them. As mentioned earlier, there is some degree of
discretion and the publication of a decision can be pushed back by a
couple of months. For example, the Federal Constitutional Court will
not drop a political bombshell, so to speak, during an election season.
But you have to understand, a lot of the scheduling at the court is done
by the administration, of course we need to prioritise some things over
others once in a while, but the decisions at the Federal Constitutional
Court are subject to a preliminary planning cycle by the administration.
Another factor likely to limit the GFCC’s discretion in scheduling decisions ac-
cording to political considerations is that in doing so the court may tarnish its
institutional legitimacy among actors in Germany’s political system that frequently
interact with it. In cases involving the constitutional review of federal (or state) laws,
the GFCC generally seeks the opinion of interested parties to a case, comprising rel-
evant interest groups (e.g. the Federation of German Industries and trade-unions)
and non-governmental organizations. These interested parties are aware that the
GFCC currently considers a constitutional question that is relevant to their opera-
tions and often require constitutional clarity over a law under review at the GFCC.
Thus, deliberately delaying constitutional review decisions may come with costs
for the court’s reputation that may outweigh the costs of deferring to the elected
branches in an individual case.
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3.2.2 Control variables
Given that my empirical tests in this chapter rely on observational data, i.e. values
on my independent variables of interest are not randomly assigned to individual
observations, it is critical for my analysis to carefully avoid omitted variable bias.
In addition to the variables Constitutional amendment and Law by grand-coalition
discussed above, I therefore include a battery of control variables in my statistical
models, which—if omitted from my analysis—may confound any observed effect of
my independent variables. First, as federal laws on some policy issues may be more
likely to touch upon constitutional rights, and hence may be correlated with both
instances of lawmakers objecting a law as unconstitutional and the court’s decision-
making, I control for the issue area of the challenged legislative paragraphs. The
variable Policy area is categorical and draws on the existing operationalization em-
ployed by Krehbiel (2016) and Vanberg (2005). The variable distinguishes between
eight policy areas, namely economic regulation (serving as the reference category
in my analysis), social insurance, education policy, family law, individual rights,
institutional disputes, judicial process, as well as budgets and fiscal policy.
Second, any observed effect of the variables Constitutional objections by oppo-
sition MP(s) and Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) may be linked to
the type of constitutional review procedure at the GFCC (concrete norm control,
abstract norm control or constitutional complaints). For instance, members of the
Bundestag may be more likely to refer a law for review through abstract norm con-
trol if the law had attracted constitutional controversy during the legislative process.
At the same time, relative to abstract and concrete norm control proceedings, the
GFCC may be less likely to strike laws as unconstitutional in proceedings involv-
ing constitutional complaints, as individual citizens (and their legal representation)
may be in a less favourable position than judges serving in the lower courts and
members of the Bundestag or state governments to evaluate the constitutionality
of a law prior to lodging their application with the court. Hence, I control for the
categorical variable Court proceeding, distinguishing between abstract norm control
(the reference category), concrete norm control and constitutional complaints.
Finally, the court may be less concerned about a non-compliance threat when
a considerable amount of time lies between the reviewed law’s adoption and the
court’s corresponding ruling, either because it took several years before an appli-
cation challenging the law reached the court or because a case lingered on at the
court for years. Therefore, I control for the time that has passed between the date
the challenged law had been adopted and the date the court issued its correspond-
ing ruling, Years since adoption, as well as the time it took the GFCC to issue its
ruling since the corresponding application had been filed with the court’s registrar,
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Length of proceeding.21 On average, between 1983 and 2017 the GFCC’s Senates
issued their rulings roughly 6.8 years after the reviewed law had been adopted by
the Bundestag (the standard deviation of the variable Years since adoption is 4.6
years), while their proceedings lasted on average 3.7 years (the standard deviation
of the variable Length of proceeding is roughly 2.3).
3.3 Estimation and analysis
In the following, I consider each hypothesis in turn and first specify the statisti-
cal model I employ to test the hypothesis, followed by a brief discussion of how I
estimated the models’ coefficients. I then discuss the sign and uncertainty of the
relevant regression coefficients, and finally provide an intuition of what these coef-
ficients mean in substantive terms. Throughout this section, I will make an effort
to visualize the relevant results of my analysis rather than providing lengthy ta-
bles displaying a myriad of regression coefficients (although the latter will make an
appearance in the appendix to this chapter). The specification of my statistical
models requires a fair bit of notation and I will stick to the type of notation seen in
Gelman and Hill (2007), while resorting to matrix notation where useful. To save on
notation for nominal variables with more than two categories, I express regression
coefficients for these variables through a single coefficient.22
3.3.1 Costly signalling and judicial deference
I first consider my theoretical model’s core claim: The GFCC is more likely to
respond with deference to lawmakers who had provoked a for them potentially costly
confrontation. The dependent variable Strike is binary, accordingly I estimate a
logistic regression model. Since paragraphs challenged in different court cases are
nested in federal laws, I allow intercepts to vary across federal laws. Throughout this
section, let i indicate the individual challenged paragraphs and j indicate federal
laws. Model 1 to test this claim is then defined as follows:
21While I can pin down the time that had passed between a law’s adoption and the court’s
corresponding decision to the exact number of days (then expressed in years), I can only identify the
year an application was lodged with the GFCC, yet not its exact date. Hence, the variable Length of
proceeding reports only an approximate time the GFCC spent on a particular proceeding. However,
lacking access to the files submitted by individual applicants (e.g. lower courts or individuals filing
a constitutional complaint) that would allow me to identify the exact date the GFCC received an
application, referring to the year seems to be the best option.
22For instance, the nominal variable Policy area comprises eight categories and would require
coefficients for seven dummy variables, one for each category save the reference category. For
convenience, I write down only one regression coefficient for the variable Policy area.
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Pr(Strikei = 1) = logit
−1(β0 + β1 ·Obj. opposition MP(s)i+
β2 ·Obj. governing MP(s)i + β3 · Const. amendmenti+
β4 · Law by grand-coalitioni + β5 · Policy areai+
β6 · Court proceedingi + β7 · Years since adoptioni+
β8 · Length of proceedingi + αLaw IDj[i] )
αLaw IDj ∼ N(0, σ2Law ID), for j = 1, . . . , J (number of laws)
All statistical models in this chapter are estimated using the statistical comput-
ing environment R. Maximum likelihood estimation of the model’s parameters fails
to converge when relying on the R package arm (Gelman et al., 2018). I therefore
follow advice by Gelman and Hill (2007) and employ a Bayesian approach to esti-
mate the model parameters. Throughout this chapter, the Bayesian estimation of
the models’ parameters relies on the rstanarm package (Stan Development Team,
2016). For each model, I specify rstanarm’s weakly informative default (normal)
prior distributions (i.e. normal priors of regression coefficients for explanatory vari-
ables are centred at 0 with a standard deviation of 2.5, the default prior for the
intercept has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 10). For each model esti-
mated in this chapter, I run four chains with 1000 warm-up iterations and 5000
sampling iterations, yielding a total of 20,000 draws describing the model param-
eters’ posterior distributions. Across all models estimated in this chapter, none of
the parameters’ Rˆ values exceed 1.01, well below the critical threshold of 1.2 defined
by Gelman and Rubin (1992).
My interpretation focuses on the regression coefficients for the main explanatory
variables of interest, Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) and Constitu-
tional objections by governing MP(s). Results for the remaining coefficients of Model
1 are displayed in Table 3.5 in the chapter’s appendix. Figure 3.2 reports posterior
distributions and their respective means of the coefficients for the two explanatory
variables of interest. We can quickly spot an interesting pattern in the relationship
between lawmakers’ constitutional objections and the GFCC’s decision-making. The
posterior mean of the coefficient for Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) is
positive and its highest posterior density (HPD) effectively allows us to be confident
that the coefficient is not negative (note that the coefficient’s 95% HPD interval just
overlaps zero). The coefficient suggests that the GFCC was more likely to invalidate
a federal law (or parts thereof) if members of the opposition in the Bundestag had
objected the law as unconstitutional just prior to its adoption.
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Model 1: GFCC strike
Posterior means with 90% and 95% HPDs
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Figure 3.2: Posterior means, 90% and 95% highest probability densities for main
fixed-effects coefficients of Model 1; posterior distributions are illustrated in grey
This result seems hardly surprising. While controlling for objections voiced by
members of the governing coalition caucus, the reference category for the variable
Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) by and large captures laws, which did
not attract any constitutional concerns at the final stage of the legislative process.
Notwithstanding the possibility that members of the opposition declare government
policy as unconstitutional to score political points, the measure may still come
somewhat close to an ‘objective’ evaluation of the constitutionality of a law. Laws
which did not attract constitutional objections in the Bundestag may simply be
more likely the ones which actually do not infringe on any constitutional norms. At
the same time, it seems plausible to assume that at least some of the laws, which
were objected by members of the parliamentary opposition, indeed conflict with the
constitution. Accordingly, we should expect the GFCC to be more likely to strike
(parts of) these types of laws.
Interestingly, the opposite appears to be the case if members of the governing
coalition caucus had objected a federal law as unconstitutional. The coefficient’s
posterior mean for the variable Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) is
negative (as well as every point within the coefficient’s 95% HPD), suggesting that
the court was less likely to strike federal law as unconstitutional when lawmakers in
government had ignored constitutional concerns from their own political allies. The
theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 provides an explanation for this otherwise
counter-intuitive finding. Insisting on the pursuit of constitutionally controversial
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Model 1: Predicted probabilities of Strike = 1 for GFCC decisions (1983−2017)













Effect for objections by governing MP(s)
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Figure 3.3: First difference in predicted average marginal probabilities for Consti-
tutional objections by opposition MP(s) and Constitutional objections by governing
MP(s) with 5.0th–90th and 2.5th–97.5th percentiles of predictions
policy while dismissing the concerns of their political allies can prove costly for
lawmakers in government if a constitutional court indeed strikes their policy as
unconstitutional. Yet, given this choice is associated with political risks, lawmakers
signal their willingness to defend their policy against a judicial veto and evade
compliance with the court’s judgement if necessary. Observing such signals, a court
concerned about non-compliance with its jurisprudence has then reason to become
more deferential in its decision-making.
I now illustrate the substantive effects for variation on the variables Constitu-
tional objections by opposition MP(s) and Constitutional objections by governing
MP(s). Given the random effects bear on the results, I predict average marginal
probabilities, indicating the average change in the probability of Strike = 1 across
all groups (i.e. laws) in my data while manipulating values on the main indepen-
dent variables of interest.23 I predict the difference in average marginal probabilities
between the two variables’ levels (i.e. 0 and 1), respectively. Figure 3.3 shows that
the model predicts that the GFCC was on average about 10.0 percentage-points
23Specifically, I hold an independent variable of interest k in the data-matrix X constant at a
specific value x to create the matrix Xi. Let B denote a matrix containing fixed-effect coefficient
estimates and Γ denote a matrix containing random-effect coefficient estimates from the Bayesian
model’s sampling iterations, I then calculate Hi = α + XiB + ZΓ. The matrix Hi contains
the predicted log-odds for each sampling iteration across the observations in Xi. I can transform
these into predicted probabilities through Mi =
exp(Hi)
1+exp(Hi)
. I can then calculate the expectation of
average marginal probabilities across the sampling iterations and their 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
Constitutional confrontation and judicial deference in Germany 77
more likely to strike federal law paragraphs if the federal law had been objected by
members of the parliamentary opposition as unconstitutional than if no opposition
members had raised concerns. On the other hand, when constitutional concerns
had been raised by members of the governing majority, the model predicts that the
GFCC was on average about 22.2 percentage-points less likely to strike the chal-
lenged paragraphs, a substantial decrease in the court’s use of its constitutional
veto. The GFCC is more likely to back-off from challenging lawmakers if the latter
had signalled determination in their pursuit of controversial policy by taking the risk
of ignoring constitutional objections from their own political allies. This evidence
appears consistent with the theoretical model’s claim that courts are more likely
to respond with deference to lawmakers, who had provoked a for them potentially
costly confrontation.
3.3.2 Anticipation of elections
Next, I provide an empirical test of the claim that the GFCC should be less likely to
strike a federal law when it is likely that the lawmakers responsible for the reviewed
act would also be in charge of crafting the response to the GFCC’s judgement (see
hypothesis 2 in Chapter 2). At the heart of my empirical test is an interaction effect
involving the variables Current government and Years until election. Again, given
the dependent variable Strike is binary, while challenged paragraphs are nested in
federal laws, I estimate a multi-level logistic regression model, allowing intercepts
to vary across federal laws. Model 2 is then defined as:
Pr(Strikei = 1) = logit
−1(β0 + β1 · Years until electioni + β2 · Current governmenti+
β3 · Years until electioni · Current governmenti+
β4 · Policy areai + β5 · Court proceedingi+
β6 · Years since adoptioni + β7 · Length of proceedingi+
αLaw IDj[i] )
αLaw IDj ∼ N(0, σ2Law ID), for j = 1, . . . , J (number of laws)
Figure 3.4 illustrates the posterior means, 90% and 95% HPDs for the coeffi-
cients of the variables Years until election and Current government, as well as their
interaction term. Results for all coefficients of Model 2 are displayed in Table 3.6
in the appendix to this chapter. The posterior mean, 90% and 95% HPDs of the
coefficient for the variable Years until election suggest that the GFCC appears more
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Model 2: GFCC strike
Posterior means with 90% and 95% HPDs
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Figure 3.4: Posterior means, 90% and 95% highest probability densities for main
fixed-effects coefficients of Model 2; posterior distributions are illustrated in grey
likely to strike federal law as the time left until the next election to the Bundestag
increases—provided the reviewed law was not authored by the current governing
coalition. In other words, when considering laws that were not adopted by the cur-
rent incumbent, the GFCC tends to avoid striking federal laws when elections are
around the corner. Evidence from interviews with former justices and law clerks
at the GFCC provides an explanation for this pattern. In a telephone interview
conducted on April 18, 2019, one of the justices noted:
Justice 1: Something that is rarely mentioned when people cover the
Federal Constitutional Court is that we do pay attention to the timing of
our decisions. For instance, the court will not issue a politically sensitive
decision during an election season, we don’t do that.
Accordingly, the GFCC may generally be less likely to strike a law as the next
elections are drawing closer simply because the court carefully avoids playing a
proactive role in the electorates’ decision-making at the ballot box. At the same time,
the interaction term’s coefficient provides some indication that this relationship may
not hold when the GFCC reviews laws that were passed by the incumbent governing
coalition. The posterior mean for the interaction term’s coefficient is negative and
its absolute size (-0.51) is larger than the size of the coefficient for the variable Years
until election (0.29). This suggests that the GFCC on average appears less likely to
strike a law as the time until the next election increases, provided the court reviews
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a law adopted by the incumbent governing coalition. Nonetheless, Figure 3.4 also
shows that the coefficient’s 90% and 95% HPDs (including positive values) do not
allow us to confidently rule out that the coefficient is in fact positive (or zero).
However, it seems worthwhile to push the data a little harder. It is possible
that the effect of the timing of upcoming elections not only depends on whether
the GFCC reviews a law by the incumbent governing coalition, but also whether or
not the governing coalition at the time of the court’s decision comprised Germany’s
two main political parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD. During the timeframe of
my analysis, grand-coalitions of the CDU/CSU and the SPD controlled government
office between 2005 and 2009 as well as between 2013 and 2017. At least up until
the most recent federal elections in September 2017, it seemed highly likely that
either the CDU/CSU or the SPD would lead the next governing coalition following
an election. Accordingly, whether or not the GFCC reviews a law authored by the
current incumbent in these scenarios should not bear on any effect the timing of
the next federal election may have on the court’s decision. In other words, in these
cases the coefficient for the interaction effect should be effectively zero. In order to
account for this pattern, I estimate the statistical model again after sub-setting my
data. Model 3 excludes observations in which the GFCC issued its decisions while a
grand-coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD was in office (i.e. Grand-coalition = 0),
while Model 4 is estimated relying on data including only GFCC decisions issued
during the legislative terms from September 2005 until September 2009 and from
September 2013 to September 2017 (i.e. Grand-coalition = 1).
Results for Model 4 provided in Table 3.8 in the appendix show that none of
the coefficients for the explanatory variables of interest, Years until election and
Current government as well as their interaction effect, are distinguishable from zero
(although it needs to be acknowledged that the estimation of Model 4 relies on only
76 observations). The posterior mean of the interaction term’s coefficient in Model
4 falls close to zero, suggesting that the effect of the variable Years until election is
not conditional on the variable Current government when considering only GFCC
decisions issued during a grand-coalition term.
Turning to the results from Model 3 and evidence from GFCC decisions issued
while no grand-coalition controlled government office, we can now be relatively con-
fident that the interaction term’s coefficient is indeed negative. Figure 3.5 shows
that the 95% HPD of the interaction term’s coefficient just overlaps zero while its
90% HPD includes only negative values. This evidence suggests that the likelihood
of the court striking federal law decreases as the time until the next federal election
increases, provided the GFCC reviews a law authored by the incumbent governing
coalition (and given that the decision is not issued during a grand-coalition term).
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Model 3: GFCC strike
Posterior means with 90% and 95% HPDs
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Figure 3.5: Posterior means, 90% and 95% highest probability densities for main
fixed-effects coefficients of Model 3; posterior distributions are illustrated in grey
In the following, I consider whether these coefficients translate into a substan-
tially discernible effect. Again, I predict average marginal probabilities, indicating
the average change in the probability of Strike = 1 across all groups (i.e. laws) in my
data while manipulating values on the main explanatory variables of interest, Years
until election and Current government.24 Figure 3.6 illustrates average marginal pre-
dicted probabilities across the range of Years until election for Current government
= 0 (dark grey) and Current government = 1 (light grey). The predictions’ 2.5th
and 97.5th percentiles show that the probabilities for each scenario are at no point
clearly distinguishable from each other across the range of the variable Years until
election. In other words, there is not sufficient evidence to support the claim that
the GFCC is less likely to strike a federal law when it is likely that the lawmakers
responsible for the law would also be in charge of implementing the court’s decision
(see hypothesis 2 in Chapter 2).
What does this mean for the empirical evaluation of the theoretical model pre-
sented in Chapter 2 in a more general sense? Hypothesis 2 draws on the observation
from the formal analysis that—holding everything else constant—increasing the like-
lihood of the policy’s authors controlling implementation of the court’s judgement
corresponds to movement across the model’s equilibria. This movement starts at the
24Specifically, I allow the variable Years until election to vary from its minimum value 0.01 to
its maximum value 3.98 in the data, and consider its effect for both cases of Current government
= 0 and Current government = 1.
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Figure 3.6: Predicted average marginal probabilities for Current government across
range of Years until election (solid lines indicates mean values of predicted proba-
bilities, shaded areas indicate 2.5–97.5th percentiles of predictions)
model’s pooling equilibrium showing that all types of lawmakers ‘auto-limit’ their
policy choices knowing the court would strike every policy it considers unconstitu-
tional, and it eventually ends at a pooling equilibrium where all types of lawmakers
ignore constitutional jurisprudence knowing that the court will never challenge them.
The justification for selecting Germany as the case for the model’s empirical
evaluation in this thesis centred on the assumption that the GFCC exercises consti-
tutional review in an environment matching the conditions of the model’s partial-
pooling equilibrium: a court enjoying high levels of public support reviewing the
acts of lawmakers controlling (at least for long periods within the timeframe of the
analysis) government office for several consecutive terms. It is these kinds of en-
vironments in which the costs lawmakers appear willing to pay from confrontation
with the court signal a non-compliance threat and the evidence presented in Section
3.3.1 appears consistent with this claim.
However, it is also these kinds of environments in which the likelihood that
lawmakers responsible for the reviewed law would also control the implementation
of the courts’ judgement does not directly reflect in the court’s decision-making but
in the choices of lawmakers (i.e. otherwise ‘compliant’ lawmakers are more likely
to risk confrontation with the court as their chance at getting a shot at controlling
implementation increases). While it seemed worthwhile to test hypothesis 2 in the
German context, it is possible that—particularly in light of the GFCC’s high public
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support—German lawmakers’ chances of controlling implementation of the GFCC’s
judgements on their own policies are never high enough to move from an environment
characterised by the model’s partial-pooling equilibrium to a scenario in which the
GFCC consistently exercises self-restraint (the model’s final pooling equilibrium).
3.3.3 Robustness checks
In addition to the statistical models estimated for the main analyses discussed in
Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, I implement a series of robustness checks. First, I estimate
a multi-level logistic regression model, including the full set of both explanatory and
control variables discussed in this chapter in a single model, Model 5.
Results for Model 5 are displayed in Table 3.9 in the appendix to this chap-
ter. Table 3.9 shows that when considering the full set of explanatory and control
variables, the results remain virtually the same as for the main analyses discussed
in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. The posterior mean of the coefficient for the variable
Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) is negative with the coefficient’s 95%
HPD comprising only negative values. This evidence is consistent with the theoret-
ical model’s core claim that courts are more likely to respond with self-restraint to
lawmakers provoking a for them potentially costly confrontation. At the same time,
as in Section 3.3.2, results from Model 5 for the coefficients of the variables Years
until election and Current government as well as their interaction term show that
there is not enough evidence to support the claim that the GFCC is more likely to
show self-restraint in its decision when the likelihood that lawmakers responsible for
the laws the court reviews would control implementation of the judgements is high.
The second set of robustness checks digs a little deeper regarding the evidence
from Model 1, supporting the theoretical model’s core claim. Evidence presented in
Section 3.3.1 shows that the GFCC is less likely to strike a federal law if it had been
objected as unconstitutional by members of the governing coalition caucus prior
to its adoption. While the theoretical model of Chapter 2 provides one possible
explanation for this counter-intuitive pattern, another explanation appears consis-
tent with this evidence. Some lawmakers in the governing coalition caucus may use
constitutional objections in the Bundestag to send a highly visible signal of their
position on a policy issue to pander to a particular constituency. Several former
members of the German government highlighted in my interviews that every new
legislative initiative is carefully screened by constitutional lawyers working for two
of the federal government’s ministries, the Justice Ministry and the Ministry for
Internal Affairs (the so-called ‘constitutional ministries’). One lawmaker noted in a
telephone interview conducted on November 11, 2017:
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Lawmaker 5: Generally, it seems to me that the Ministry for Internal
Affairs tries to make as much use as possible of the scope of action the
constitution leaves us, while my feeling always was that the Justice Min-
istry tends to make the case that some initiatives go too far. What then
follows is a close exchange among these ministries and every initiative is
subject to their joint scrutiny.
Following the ministries’ screenings of federal laws’ constitutional compatibility,
any subsequent objections voiced by members of the governing coalition at the end
of the legislative process may reflect opportunistic political motivations rather than
genuine constitutional concerns. We should then expect the court to be less likely to
strike these types of laws, an expectation that appears consistent with the evidence
discussed in Section 3.3.1.
To evaluate this alternative explanation for the empirical pattern shown by Model
1, I first turn to the decisions the GFCC makes about the admissibility of consti-
tutional review cases. The GFCC can refuse to admit constitutional complaints
directed against laws for decision in its Senates if applicants fail to show that the
challenged law affects them personally, presently and directly. In addition, when
considering laws referred for review by lower courts, the GFCC can rule a case as
inadmissible if the lower court fails to demonstrate which constitutional norm the
challenged act appears to violate and how it arrived at this conclusion. In other
words, a lower court has to show that the law referred for review harbours a viola-
tion of constitutional norms that merits the GFCC’s scrutiny.
A closer look at the data shows that between 1983 and 2017, the GFCC dismissed
twelve cases involving laws objected as unconstitutional by members of the governing
caucus as inadmissible. These cases include constitutional complaints concerning the
2010 Act on the Lisbon Treaty of 13 December 2007 in 2 BvR 2136/09, which had
been objected by some members of the Bavarian CSU, and a lower court referral of
the 2007 Act Implementing the Residency and Asylum Directives of the European
Union in 1 BvL 4/12, parts of which had been considered unconstitutional by the
governing SPD’s Chair of the Bundestag’s Committee for Internal Affairs.
The GFCC’s rules concerning the admissibility of cases allow the court to avoid
overburdening its Senates with cases which do not require scrutiny of the challenged
act’s constitutional compatibility on the merits, and dismiss these cases through
Chamber decisions instead. Given the GFCC enjoys some discretion over the cases
it hears in its Senates and dismiss the kinds of cases that do not involve a substantive
constitutional question mitigates concerns that—rather than providing evidence in
support of the theoretical model’s core claim—the empirical pattern shown by Model
1 reflects governing lawmakers voicing constitutional for purely political motivations.
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All of the GFCC’s cases included in the analysis of Model 1 made it past the court’s
admissibility test, suggesting that they involve substantial constitutional questions
that merit the GFCC’s scrutiny.
Nonetheless, it is still worthwhile to evaluate whether governing lawmakers’ con-
stitutional objections of laws play a discernible role in the GFCC’s choice to admit
constitutional review cases for decision. If members of the governing coalition caucus
voice constitutional concerns about federal laws for purely political reasons rather
than legal motivations, applications challenging these laws should not be more likely
to be admitted for decision at the GFCC than any other applications. Vice versa,
if all constitutional concerns voiced by governing lawmakers indeed speak to consti-
tutional issues meriting the GFCC’s scrutiny, the court should also be more likely
to admit hearing cases involving laws subject to these concerns.
To test these arguments, I consider the effect of the variable Constitutional ob-
jections by governing MP(s) on an outcome variable capturing whether the GFCC
admitted a case for decision (Admission = 1) or not (Admission = 0). The multi-
level logistic regression model, Model 6, includes the same control variables as Model
1 in Section 3.3.1 and is defined as follows:
Pr(Admissioni = 1) = logit
−1(β0 + β1 ·Obj. opposition MP(s)i+
β2 ·Obj. governing MP(s)i + β3 · Const. amendmenti+
β4 · Law by grand-coalitioni + β5 · Policy areai+
β6 · Court proceedingi + β7 · Years since adoptioni+
β8 · Length of proceedingi + αLaw IDj[i] )
αLaw IDj ∼ N(0, σ2Law ID), for j = 1, . . . , J (number of laws)
Figure 3.7 reports posterior means, 90% and 95% HPDs for the regression co-
efficients of the variables Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) and Con-
stitutional objections by governing MP(s). Results for the remaining coefficients of
Model 6 are provided in Table 3.10 in the chapter’s appendix. The posterior mean
of the coefficient for the variable Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) and
its 95% HPD show that we can be confident that the coefficient’s true value is in-
deed positive. This does not seem surprising. Model 1 in Section 3.3.1 already
showed that the GFCC is more likely to strike federal laws, which lawmakers of the
parliamentary opposition had previously objected as unconstitutional. Hence, it is
plausible to expect the court to be more likely to admit challenges of these kinds of
laws for decision in the first place.
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Model 6: GFCC admission
Posterior means with 90% and 95% HPDs
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Figure 3.7: Posterior means, 90% and 95% HPDs for coefficients for main fixed-
effects coefficients of Model 6; posterior distributions are illustrated in grey
Turning to the coefficient for the variable Constitutional objections by governing
MP(s), the evidence is less clear cut. The coefficient’s posterior mean is positive,
however its 90% and 95% HPDs (both overlapping zero) show that we cannot be
confident in ruling out that its true value is zero. Evidence from Model 6 does not
allow us to confidently rule out that, ceteris paribus, applications challenging laws
objected as unconstitutional by lawmakers of the governing coalition caucus are just
as likely to be admitted for decision at the GFCC as any other applications.
Accordingly, Model 6 does not provide further conclusive evidence to push back
on claims that governing lawmakers’ objections reflect political motivations rather
than constitutional concerns, thus explaining the empirical pattern shown by Model
1 in Section 3.3.1. Nonetheless, given that cases that made it past the GFCC’s ad-
missibility test concern a substantive constitutional question, the core argument of
the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 provides an (at least equally) plausible
explanation for the empirical pattern shown by Model 1: Lawmakers dismissing con-
stitutional concerns voiced by their political allies signal a credible non-compliance
threat to courts and induce the latter to exercise self-restraint.
A second robustness check for the results obtained from Model 1 involves substi-
tuting the dichotomous variable Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) with
the variable Seniority of objecting governing MP(s). As discussed in Section 3.2.1
above, it is possible that lawmakers of the governing coalition caucus voicing consti-
tutional concerns are backbenchers at the fringes of their political parties, criticising
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government to pander to a particular electoral constituency. Similar to the moti-
vation underlying the previous robustness check, a pattern of the GFCC upholding
laws which had been objected by government backbenchers may thus not reflect the
GFCC’s response to a credible non-compliance threat but may simply be due to a
lack of substance in backbenchers’ claims of unconstitutionality.
Recall that the variable Seniority of objecting governing MP(s) comprises three
categories: No objections if no member of the governing coalition voiced constitu-
tional concerns; Senior governing MP(s) if constitutional concerns are voiced by a
cabinet member, a governing party’s designated spokesperson for a policy area, a
member of a governing party’s executive board or a governing party member serv-
ing as parliamentary committee chair; and Junior governing MP(s) if constitutional
concerns are voiced by any other member of the governing coalition caucus. In
the following, I estimate a multi-level logistic regression model, Model 7, including
the same set of control variables as Model 1, yet replacing the explanatory variable
Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) with the variable Seniority of objecting
governing MP(s). Model 7 is then defined as:
Pr(Strikei = 1) = logit
−1(β0 + β1 ·Obj. opposition MP(s)i+
β2 · Senior gov. MP(s)i + β2 · Junior gov. MP(s)i+
β3 · Const. amendmenti+
β4 · Law by grand-coalitioni + β5 · Policy areai+
β6 · Court proceedingi + β7 · Years since adoptioni+
β8 · Length of proceedingi + αLaw IDj[i] )
αLaw IDj ∼ N(0, σ2Law ID), for j = 1, . . . , J (number of laws)
The category No objections by governing MP(s) serves as the reference category
for the variable Seniority of objecting governing MP(s) in Model 7. If the empirical
pattern uncovered by Model 1 was driven by backbenchers’ constitutional concerns
lacking legal substance, the coefficient for the category Junior governing MP(s)
should be negative and clearly distinguishable from zero, while the same should not
be the case for the coefficient for the category Senior governing MP(s).
Figure 3.8 reports the posterior distributions, their means as well as 90% and
95% HPDs for the coefficients of the categories Senior governing MP(s) and Junior
governing MP(s) of the variable Seniority of objecting governing MP(s). Results for
the remaining coefficients of Model 7 are displayed in Table 3.11 in the appendix.
With the caveat in mind that the inference from Model 7 is driven by a very small
Constitutional confrontation and judicial deference in Germany 87
Model 7: GFCC strike
Posterior means, 90% and 95% HPDs
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Figure 3.8: Posterior means, 90% and 95% HPDs for coefficients for main fixed-
effects coefficients of Model 7; posterior distributions are illustrated in grey
number of observations in the categories Senior governing MP(s) and Junior gov-
erning MP(s) (17 and 12 observations, respectively), there is no conclusive evidence
suggesting that the seniority of the governing lawmakers voicing constitutional con-
cerns about a law makes a difference in the GFCC’s decision-making. The coeffi-
cients’ posterior means reported in Figure 3.8 are both clearly negative, and while
their 95% HPDs indicate that the coefficient estimates are not distinguishable from
zero at conventional levels of confidence, wide uncertainty intervals surrounding the
estimates seem not surprising given the few number of observations the inference
relies on. Overall, the results obtained from Model 7 show the same general pattern
as Model 1 in my main analysis. The GFCC appears less likely to strike federal
laws as unconstitutional if lawmakers of the governing coalition caucus (irrespective
of their seniority) had objected the reviewed laws as unconstitutional prior to their
adoption in the Bundestag.
3.4 Discussion
In this chapter, I set out to test the core empirical implication derived from the
theoretical model presented in Chapter 2: I expect courts to be more likely to show
self-restraint in their jurisprudence when lawmakers send costly and thus credible
signals of a non-compliance threat. I identified Germany’s constitutional politics
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between 1983 and 2017 and the GFCC’s constitutional review of federal law as
a suitable case to empirically test this claim. Within this timeframe, both the
GFCC and lawmakers in the elected branches occupied (at least during certain
legislative terms) powerful positions in Germany’s political system, setting the stage
for constitutional confrontations over policy.
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter suggests that the GFCC was
indeed less likely to strike parts of federal laws when members of the governing
coalition had previously objected these laws as unconstitutional. Ignoring their
colleagues’ constitutional concerns may backfire for lawmakers in government once
a constitutional court actually invalidates their policies. However, because this
choice is politically risky, it also signals lawmakers’ determination to courts, which
according to my theoretical model explains the GFCC’s propensity to exercise self-
restraint when considering these types of cases.
While this empirical pattern may raise normative concerns, which will be further
discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis, it is worth mentioning here what
the empirical evidence presented in this chapter does not suggest. First, the data
that I have collected provides an indication that—at least in Germany—it is very
rare that constitutional concerns coming from the benches of the governing coali-
tion are ignored (it happens in less than 10% of the GFCC’s constitutional review
cases involving federal laws). In other words, there is little evidence that governing
majorities frequently disregard credible warning signs that their actions would con-
flict with constitutional norms, pushing constitutional boundaries and constantly
provoking clashes with the GFCC. Unsurprisingly, it happens far more often that
government disregards claims of constitutional incompatibility voiced by the parlia-
mentary opposition, although it is difficult to assess the credibility of each of these
claims. In addition, if anything, the results of my analysis show that the GFCC is
indeed more likely to strike federal laws when members of the opposition had rang
the constitutional alarm bells.
Even when lawmakers in government occasionally do flout their political allies’
concerns, the evidence considered in this chapter does not suggest that the GFCC
will always back off from challenging them. The interpretation I give to the main em-
pirical finding presented in this chapter suggests that lawmakers costly signalling of
a non-compliance threat effectively allows the GFCC to avoid the kinds of confronta-
tions that would visibly rattle at the pillars of systems of limited government, with
courts invalidating the elected branches’ act and the latter failing to comply. In sys-
tems of limited government, the competences that can shape policy are distributed
across the elected and judicial branches, with the branches’ ‘ambition counteracting
ambition’ (Madison, 1961). After all, lawmakers’ costly signalling may help courts
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to navigate the tension in their role as effective checks on the elected branches and
their reliance on the latter for the efficacy of their jurisprudence.
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3.5 Appendix
In the following, I tabulate results for fixed-effect coefficient estimates of each model
estimated in Chapter 3. Each table reports the coefficient estimates’ posterior
means, posterior distributions’ standard deviation as well as 95% highest poste-
rior density (HPD) intervals. Further, the tables report the number of laws (i.e.
groups in the multi-level models), the total number of observations and the variance
of their random-effect, σ2Law ID. Replication files for all analyses presented in this
chapter are available upon request.
Main analyses
Table 3.5: Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% HPDs of fixed-effects
coefficients of Model 1 – GFCC strike of federal laws, 1983 to 2017
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) 0.53 0.31 -0.09 1.15
Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) -1.28 0.63 -2.57 -0.09
Constitutional amendment -2.40 1.76 -6.15 0.80
Law by grand-coalition 0.86 0.51 -0.10 1.93
Policy area: Education 1.47 1.02 -0.46 3.55
Policy area: Family law 0.71 0.74 -0.69 2.24
Policy area: Individual rights 1.00 0.53 -0.02 2.09
Policy area: Institutional disputes 1.98 0.86 0.34 3.72
Policy area: Judicial process 0.57 0.64 -0.69 1.81
Policy area: Social insurance 0.49 0.44 -0.35 1.40
Policy area: Budgets/Fiscal policy 0.77 0.49 -0.17 1.76
Court proceeding: Concrete norm control 0.79 0.58 -0.31 1.98
Court proceeding: Constitutional complaints 0.96 0.57 -0.11 2.14
Years since adoption 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.11
Length of proceeding -0.02 0.06 -0.15 0.11
σ2Law ID: 0.18
Number of groups (Law ID): 241
Number of observations: 363
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Table 3.6: Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% HPDs of fixed-effects
coefficients of Model 2 – GFCC strike of federal laws, 1983 to 2017
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Years until election 0.29 0.15 -0.00 0.60
Current government 0.30 0.72 -1.13 1.74
Years until election × Current government -0.51 0.35 -0.97 0.16
Policy area: Education 1.35 1.09 -0.74 3.53
Policy area: Family law 0.93 0.78 -0.56 2.56
Policy area: Individual rights 0.89 0.56 -0.19 2.01
Policy area: Institutional disputes 2.02 0.91 0.34 3.90
Policy area: Judicial process 0.50 0.66 -0.80 1.80
Policy area: Social insurance 0.52 0.47 -0.38 1.49
Policy area: Budgets/Fiscal policy 0.81 0.52 -0.20 1.86
Court proceeding: Concrete norm control 0.75 0.61 -0.42 1.99
Court proceeding: Constitutional complaints 0.90 0.60 -0.24 2.14
Years since adoption 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.10
Length of proceeding -0.02 0.07 -0.16 0.12
σ2Law ID: 0.44
Number of groups (Law ID): 241
Number of observations: 363
Table 3.7: Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% HPDs of fixed-effects
coefficients of Model 3 – GFCC strike of federal laws given Grand-coalition = 0
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Years until election 0.36 0.17 0.04 0.71
Current government 0.94 0.83 -0.68 2.58
Years until election × Current government -0.69 0.38 -1.47 0.04
Policy area: Education 1.17 1.13 -1.05 3.43
Policy area: Family law 1.54 0.92 -0.24 3.38
Policy area: Individual rights 0.96 0.64 -0.25 2.27
Policy area: Institutional disputes 2.57 1.03 0.66 4.70
Policy area: Judicial process 1.29 0.73 -0.15 2.75
Policy area: Social insurance 0.98 0.54 -0.05 2.07
Policy area: Budgets/Fiscal policy 1.32 0.61 0.16 2.56
Continued on next page
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Table 3.7 – Continued from previous page
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Court proceeding: Concrete norm control -0.35 0.68 -1.71 0.98
Court proceeding: Constitutional complaints -0.21 0.67 -1.54 1.12
Years since adoption 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.20
Length of proceeding -0.02 0.08 -0.18 0.12
σ2Law ID: 0.31
Number of groups (Law ID): 191
Number of observations: 287
Table 3.8: Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% HPDs of fixed-effects
coefficients of Model 4 – GFCC strike of federal laws given Grand-coalition = 1
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Years until election 0.12 0.48 -0.75 1.16
Current government -1.26 1.66 -4.49 2.07
Years until election × Current government 0.21 1.51 -2.92 3.09
Policy area: Education 1.14 2.18 -3.12 5.44
Policy area: Family law -0.87 1.49 -3.63 2.30
Policy area: Individual rights 3.18 1.78 -0.09 6.81
Policy area: Institutional disputes -0.30 1.89 -4.06 3.35
Policy area: Judicial process -2.97 1.96 -6.97 0.80
Policy area: Social insurance -0.74 1.14 -2.94 1.60
Policy area: Budgets/Fiscal policy -0.15 1.17 -2.60 2.13
Court proceeding: Concrete norm control 3.21 1.33 0.61 5.86
Court proceeding: Constitutional complaints 3.08 1.29 0.65 5.74
Years since adoption -0.13 0.10 -0.35 0.07
Length of proceeding -0.01 0.29 -0.58 0.57
σ2Law ID: 0.92
Number of groups (Law ID): 64
Number of observations: 76
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Robustness checks
Table 3.9: Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% HPDs of fixed-effects
coefficients of Model 5 – GFCC strike of federal laws, 1983 to 2017
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) 0.59 0.34 -0.06 1.28
Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) -1.29 0.67 -2.66 -0.01
Years until election 0.32 0.16 0.03 0.64
Current government 0.15 0.73 -1.28 1.61
Years until election × Current government -0.36 0.36 -1.08 0.32
Constitutional amendment -2.37 1.79 -6.09 0.91
Law by grand-coalition 1.02 0.57 -0.03 2.21
Policy area: Education 1.31 1.06 -0.70 3.45
Policy area: Family law 0.70 0.78 -0.76 2.32
Policy area: Individual rights 1.10 0.57 0.04 2.28
Policy area: Institutional disputes 2.26 0.93 0.53 4.13
Policy area: Judicial process 0.53 0.66 -0.78 1.83
Policy area: Social insurance 0.50 0.47 -0.38 1.47
Policy area: Budgets/Fiscal policy 0.83 0.53 -0.17 1.89
Court proceeding: Concrete norm control 0.74 0.61 -0.44 1.98
Court proceeding: Constitutional complaints 0.90 0.60 -0.23 2.12
Years since adoption 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.12
Length of proceeding -0.01 0.07 -0.16 0.12
σ2Law ID: 0.51
Number of groups (Law ID): 241
Number of observations: 363
Table 3.10: Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% HPDs of fixed-effects
coefficients of Model 6 – GFCC admission of applications challenging federal law,
1983 to 2017
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) 0.59 0.28 0.05 1.17
Constitutional objections by governing MP(s) 0.55 0.61 -0.63 1.78
Constitutional amendment -0.56 1.47 -3.36 2.45
Continued on next page
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Table 3.10 – Continued from previous page
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Law by grand-coalition -0.60 0.36 -1.34 0.09
Policy area: Education 0.33 1.00 -1.57 2.34
Policy area: Family law 0.60 0.66 -0.69 1.90
Policy area: Individual rights -0.05 -0.87 -0.09 0.75
Policy area: Institutional disputes 0.44 0.69 -0.91 1.79
Policy area: Judicial process 0.27 0.52 -0.75 1.28
Policy area: Social insurance 0.12 0.37 -0.60 0.85
Policy area: Budgets/Fiscal policy 0.64 0.44 -0.24 1.50
Court proceeding: Concrete norm control -3.85 0.98 -5.92 -2.10
Court proceeding: Constitutional complaints -4.17 0.96 -6.20 -2.46
Years since adoption 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.13
Length of proceeding 0.47 0.07 0.34 0.61
σ2Law ID: 0.37
Number of groups (Law ID): 371
Number of observations: 662
Table 3.11: Posterior means, standard deviations and 95% HPDs of fixed-effects
coefficients of Model 7 – GFCC strike of federal laws, 1983 to 2017
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Constitutional objections by opposition MP(s) 0.52 0.31 -0.09 1.14
Junior governing MP(s) -1.48 0.91 -3.35 0.24
Senior governing MP(s) -1.05 0.76 -2.59 0.46
Constitutional amendment -2.48 1.75 -6.16 0.72
Law by grand-coalition 0.88 0.51 -0.08 1.93
Policy area: Education 1.48 1.02 -0.48 3.56
Policy area: Family law 0.71 0.74 -0.70 2.20
Policy area: Individual rights 0.98 0.53 -0.04 2.07
Policy area: Institutional disputes 1.97 0.86 0.35 3.74
Policy area: Judicial process 0.55 0.64 -0.71 1.79
Policy area: Social insurance 0.49 0.44 -0.36 1.39
Policy area: Budgets/Fiscal policy 0.78 0.49 -0.18 1.78
Court proceeding: Concrete norm control 0.78 0.58 -0.33 1.98
Continued on next page
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Table 3.11 – Continued from previous page
Variable Mean SD 2.5% 97.5%
Court proceeding: Constitutional complaints 0.95 0.58 -0.14 2.12
Years since adoption 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.11
Length of proceeding -0.02 0.07 -0.15 0.11
σ2Law ID: 0.20
Number of groups (Law ID): 241
Number of observations: 363
Chapter 4
Perspectives on constitutional con-
frontation
The previous chapter provided a statistical analysis of the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court’s (GFCC) review of federal laws between 1983 and 2017. The empirical
evidence is consistent with a central implication of the theoretical model presented
in this thesis: The GFCC appears less likely to strike federal laws when lawmakers
had previously dismissed their political allies’ concerns that their policies were at
odds with the court’s jurisprudence. The theoretical model claims that lawmakers’
choice to flout their colleagues’ constitutional concerns and provoke a costly con-
frontation with the GFCC signals a credible non-compliance threat. Courts lacking
immediate control over the implementation of their decisions then face incentives to
show deference to lawmakers in the elected branches.
In the following, I depart from the approach of the previous chapter and employ
a different kind of data source to evaluate the empirical implications of the theoret-
ical model and its underlying assumptions. In this chapter, I present and discuss
evidence from interviews with justices and law clerks at the GFCC, lawmakers in
Germany’s executive and legislative branches, as well as journalists familiar with
the GFCC’s exercise of constitutional review. The evidence presented in this chap-
ter provides something the previous chapter’s statistical analysis of constitutional
review cases decided by the GFCC could not offer: It allows for a glimpse into the
perceptions of the actors at the centre of this thesis’s theoretical model.
The evidence presented in this chapter stems from a total of fifteen interviews. It
is not the goal of this chapter to provide an overview of perceptions representative of
the views of every lawmaker in the Bundestag and the German federal government or
justices and law clerks at the GFCC. Instead, the main objective is to provide thicker,
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more detailed evidence from conversations with individuals who have been closely
involved in the interactions between the GFCC and the legislative and executive
branches, which speaks to the various causal mechanisms implied by the theoretical
model of Chapter 2. Hearing from the actors whose behaviour the model seeks to
explain is particularly relevant for the evaluation of a formal model. Vanberg (2005,
116) notes that “the subjective perceptions of the actors whose behavior is being
explained constitute a crucial ingredient in rational choice approaches”, adding that
“assessing how well a model maps up to the ‘players’ actual perceptions’ is one way
to evaluate the adequacy of a rational choice explanation.”
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 implies that both lawmakers and
courts anticipate each others’ reactions to their own behaviour and under certain
conditions therefore refrain from pursuing certain courses of action. For instance, if
being at the receiving end of a court’s veto is very costly, some lawmakers may choose
not to pursue a constitutionally controversial policy because they know a court
would strike it, yet others may not. It is often difficult to evaluate whether actors’
anticipated ‘off-the-equilibrium path’ behaviour implied by the model is indeed the
driving force behind the patterns we can observe in reality when resorting to the type
of observational data we have seen in the previous chapter. Accordingly, getting a
glimpse of the relevant actors’ subjective perceptions of the complex situations they
are finding themselves in becomes all the more relevant.
The discussion of the qualitative evidence from interviews in this chapter serves
two primary purposes. First, it allows me to evaluate some of the key assumptions
that went in to the development of the formal model presented in Chapter 2. Second,
it allows me to illustrate some of the empirical implications derived from the formal
model. Specifically, this chapter’s qualitative evidence speaks to the following points:
1. The theoretical model assumes that lawmakers anticipate courts’ constitu-
tional review and can assess whether or not their policies conflict with con-
stitutional jurisprudence. How—if at all—can lawmakers evaluate whether a
court would object to their policy choices?
2. Some of the formal model’s equilibria predict that under certain conditions
lawmakers ‘auto-limit’ their policy-making because of the costs that come with
a court’s veto, while another shows that lawmakers’ willingness to provoke
costly confrontation signals a credible non-compliance threat. Do lawmakers
actually worry about being censored by a court? If yes, are there circumstances
under which lawmakers risk confrontation with a court nonetheless? Under
which conditions is the political fallout from a court’s veto particularly costly?
3. The model assumes that courts know that their decisions are at risk of non-
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compliance and are therefore sensitive to information signalling a credible non-
compliance threat. Are members of the court paying attention to the political
processes that produced the acts they review? Do courts consider the potential
for backlash in their decision-making? How—if at all—do they respond to a
possibility of lawmakers’ non-compliance with their jurisprudence?
Between May 2017 and April 2019, I interviewed three former justices and five
former law clerks of the GFCC, five former members of the Bundestag and the
German federal government (two former Federal Ministers of Justice, a senior official
at the Federal Chancellery and members of the executive boards of two of Germany’s
main political parties), as well as two journalists of Germany’s most prominent media
networks. All interviews except for one were conducted in German via telephone
(one justice provided brief written answers to my questions), lasting between thirty
minutes and two hours. Overall, I contacted more than forty potential interviewees,
with the majority of them declining to be interviewed or not responding to my
inquiries. The majority of lawmakers I contacted did not reply to my inquiries or
follow-up messages, while most (former) justices of the GFCC actually replied, yet
noted that they categorically refrain from giving interviews about the court.
Acknowledging that lawmakers as well as justices and law clerks who agreed
to be interviewed would possibly be hesitant to speak frankly about some of the
phenomena I am most interested in (e.g. lawmakers’ willingness to provoke con-
frontation with a constitutional court, and the court’s exercise of self-restraint when
facing the prospects of non-compliance), I offered my interviewees the opportunity
to decline the recording of our conversations. Some interviewees made use of this
option and in these cases I relied on hand-written notes I had made during the
conversations. I also assured my interviewees that I would reference evidence from
our conversation in ways that would guarantee their anonymity. In the following, I
therefore attribute quotes in a way that prevents others from identifying them (e.g.
referring to ‘Justice 1’ or ‘Lawmaker 3’).
The fact that my interests touch upon potentially sensitive information also had
implications for (and somewhat limited) the type of questions I was able to ask.
An overview over the set of questions I posed to my interviewees is provided in the
chapter’s appendix.
4.1 Anticipating constitutional review
The first implication of the theoretical model I consider in this chapter concerns
lawmakers’ anticipation of courts’ exercise of constitutional review. The model
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assumes that lawmakers are able to draw on a court’s existing jurisprudence to
evaluate whether the court would generally prefer to strike their current plans for
a specific policy. This assumption is central to the core argument derived from the
model: Lawmakers need to anticipate that their policies are at odds with a court’s
jurisprudence but pursue these policies nonetheless (and risk paying the costs for
this choice) in order to signal a credible non-compliance threat.
Do lawmakers in Germany’s legislative and executive branches actually anticipate
constitutional review and evaluate whether their policy choices are in line with
the GFCC’s jurisprudence? Evidence from my interviews with lawmakers strongly
suggests that they do. However, as briefly discussed in Chapter 2, several lawmakers
also stressed that there is no certainty in their evaluations. In an interview conducted
on April 4, 2019, one lawmaker noted:
Lawmaker 3: I don’t think you can predict the court’s future deci-
sions, but we definitely know their general direction. The decisions of
the Federal Constitutional Court are based on decades of jurisprudence.
This started in the 1950s and the court’s interpretation of constitutional
rights, particularly their core areas, has certainly become more and more
concrete over the years.
In an interview conducted on March 19, 2019, another lawmaker offered a similar
answer to the question whether the legislative and executive branches anticipate the
GFCC’s future decisions on their policies:
Lawmaker 4: You know there is an old saying, at sea and in court,
you are in god’s hand. What I am trying to say is, you basically never
know exactly how a case is going to turn out in court. I am a lawyer
myself and we also don’t know these things for sure, after all there are
plenty of cases you lose. But at the very least, you usually have an idea
how things would play out at the court.
Other lawmakers highlighted how the legislative and executive branches in Ger-
many assess whether a planned policy lives up to the GFCC’s constitutional jurispru-
dence. These responses show that both branches rely on specialised experts familiar
with the GFCC’s jurisprudence during the policy-making stages. One lawmaker
interviewed on November 11, 2017, noted that employees of two federal ministries
are typically involved in assessing the constitutionality of a new policy:
Lawmaker 5: Two ministries, which we call ‘constitutional min-
istries’, play a role here. First, there’s the Ministry for Internal Affairs
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with a designated department for constitutional law. And then there is
also the staff at the Ministry of Justice, who usually say ‘you need to
consider our input as well’.
As another lawmaker pointed out in an interview conducted on February 22,
2019, legal experts in these ministries are qualified to assess new policy proposals
in light of the GFCC’s jurisprudence, with their assessments complemented by the
expertise from academics and practitioners heard in the Bundestag’s committees:
Lawmaker 2: We have experts in the committees and specialised
lawyers working for the ministries who are certainly capable of under-
standing these judgements. I think the judgements usually make it quite
clear what the Federal Constitutional Court wants, if not in their oper-
ative part then in their reasoning.
The impression that lawmakers have access to expertise allowing them to assess
whether their policies are at risk of the GFCC’s censure, albeit not with certainty,
is summarized in the following reply offered in an interview from March 23, 2019:
Lawmaker 1: There are eight justices in each Senate and you never
quite know how they will decide. But sure, there is plenty of existing
jurisprudence in which the Federal Constitutional Court interprets the
Basic Law. And then you can check, well, what did the court previously
tell us on this specific point, and that can serve as a guidance. The
court’s settled case law plays a particularly relevant role here. You also
need to remember, every new law goes through the legal departments
of the ministries and there are plenty of talented lawyers who use this
case law to make a judgement call about the constitutionality of the law.
And we also have the hearings in the committees, with academic, legal
expertise feeding into the legislative process.
Lawmakers’ responses suggest that legal experts in the federal ministries and
experts invited to hearings of the Bundestag’s committees are familiar with the
GFCC’s case law and provide assessments of the constitutionality of new policy
proposals. The evidence presented in this section shows that it is plausible to assume
that lawmakers in Germany’s executive and legislative branches can rely on these
expert assessments to mitigate their uncertainty about the GFCC’s views on their
policies. In other words, lawmakers can evaluate whether their policies are at odds
with the court’s constitutional jurisprudence and thus at risk of the GFCC’s censure.
The next section considers evidence shedding light on how lawmakers use this kind
of information in their decision-making.
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4.2 Auto-limitation and confrontation
The previous section provided evidence suggesting that lawmakers have a relatively
good sense of whether or not their policy proposals match up with the court’s
constitutional jurisprudence. A key theme of this thesis is lawmakers’ behaviour in
light of this information. Do lawmakers draft their policies in a way that allows
them to avoid confrontation with the court? If yes, what are the drivers behind
such decisions? Is the GFCC’s jurisprudence sometimes ignored, and if so, why?
4.2.1 Respecting jurisprudence
Existing scholarship expects lawmakers to shy away from provoking confrontation
with courts over their policies because of the costs that come with it (see Stone,
1992; Vanberg, 2005; Rogers and Vanberg, 2007). The shadow of constitutional
review shapes lawmakers’ decisions at the policy-making stages and leads them to
‘auto-limit’ themselves to policies a court would approve (see Landfried, 1992; Stone
Sweet, 2000). This expectation is also reflected in some of the pooling equilibria of
the theoretical model and hypothesis 1 discussed in Chapter 2. I asked lawmakers
about the role the GFCC’s jurisprudence plays in the legislative process. Some
lawmakers pointed out that they make a conscious effort to only pass laws which
respect the court’s jurisprudence. One lawmaker noted:
Lawmaker 5: The Federal Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence plays
a very significant role. When you are working on a draft, you always try
to meet the requirements of the jurisprudence. And the core principles of
constitutional rights, you know the ones the court repeats in its decisions
over and over, play an especially important role. Every law that we pass
protects these core rights, we take this very seriously.
In a subsequent statement about the legislative and executive branches’ respect
for the GFCC’s jurisprudence in their actions, the same lawmaker highlighted the
likely consequences of government’s decision to flout constitutional jurisprudence in
the legislative process:
Lawmaker 5: You know, we also face the scrutiny of the legislature
and the opposition. Even if a majority in the legislature would say, ‘oh
well, let’s turn a blind eye to this particular decision’ you can imag-
ine that the opposition would respond ‘how dare you treat the court’s
jurisprudence that way’ and that’s why we stick closely to the Federal
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Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. We don’t take risks, we respect
the jurisprudence.
These statements imply that lawmakers may simply recognize a court’s inter-
pretation of the constitution and the constraints on lawmakers’ actions that follow
from it as legitimate, and therefore respect it in their policy-making. Yet, espe-
cially the latter statement suggests that even if lawmakers would prefer to ignore
a court’s constitutional jurisprudence, lawmakers know that doing so would her-
ald consequences. The lawmaker’s reference of the opposition’s expected response
to government’s choice to flout constitutional jurisprudence illustrates that such
choices come with costs. Vanberg (1998, 305) argues “that it is electorally costly to
be perceived to be in conflict with the court”. The lawmaker’s latter statement sug-
gests that the political opposition in the legislature plays a critical role in uncovering
and publicising governing majorities’ incongruence with the court’s jurisprudence,
which can turn out to be a disadvantage for lawmakers in government when vying
for the electorate’s support (for a similar argument, see Mayhew, 1974).
Other lawmakers offered a reason for why it may be electorally costly to be
perceived to be in conflict with the GFCC’s jurisprudence: the comfortable support
the court enjoys among the German public. One lawmaker initiated our conversation
(even before I asked my first question) by referencing the prestige the GFCC enjoys
in Germany:
Lawmaker 1: Before we begin, let me just say that I believe that
the Federal Constitutional Court is the most eminent court in the world.
You don’t find a court enjoying such prestige anywhere else.
Asked about how lawmakers respond when the GFCC’s jurisprudence censors
the governing majorities’ actions and places constraints on the legislature’s future
policy-making, the same lawmaker later added:
Lawmaker 1: I think a general tension between the court and the
legislature is unavoidable. But don’t get me wrong, I don’t think there
is actually a conflict between the court and the legislature. Of course
we sometimes wish that the court had decided a case differently, but in
the end there is no doubt that you have to accept it. You also need to
consider that the court’s prestige among the public is much higher than
that of the legislature.
These statements indicate why the legislative and executive branches in Ger-
many generally face incentives to respect the GFCC’s jurisprudence in their actions,
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regardless of whether they respond to a particular decision or whether they draft a
new policy that touches upon existing jurisprudence.1
As shown in Chapter 3, the GFCC enjoys a comfortable reservoir of support
among the German public, far beyond the support the legislative and executive
branches can rely on (see also Gibson et al., 1998; Sternberg et al., 2015; Vanberg,
2005). The evidence presented here illustrates that lawmakers are aware of the
GFCC’s popularity among the public and know that ignoring the court’s jurispru-
dence has consequences. Pursuant to Article 93 of the German constitution, all
government institutions are bound by the GFCC’s jurisprudence, and lawmakers
have reason to expect that their own reputation would suffer if they were found
to ignore the court’s jurisprudence. The statements suggest that some lawmakers
therefore (at least sincerely believe they) limit themselves to policies that are in
line with the court’s jurisprudence, reflecting expectations of two of the theoretical
model’s pooling equilibria and existing scholarship (see Vanberg, 1998; Stone, 1992;
Rogers and Vanberg, 2007).
4.2.2 Flouting jurisprudence
The motivating theme of this thesis and the theoretical model is the impression that
despite the costs this choice may entail, lawmakers at times disregard jurisprudence
and provoke confrontation with courts, an impression that is antithetical to lawmak-
ers’ reported assertions that every effort is made to respect the GFCC’s decisions.
When lawmakers mentioned in our conversations that the GFCC’s decisions are re-
spected by the other branches, I followed up by providing them with examples of
laws (e.g. the Federal Criminal Police Office Act in 2008), which had been adopted
by the Bundestag despite widespread constitutional concerns voiced by members of
both the opposition and governing factions in parliament.
I asked lawmakers, why majorities in the Bundestag occasionally vote in favour of
laws despite such widespread constitutional concerns. Their responses to this ques-
tion were fairly mixed. One lawmaker listed several reasons for this phenomenon.
1Recall that the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 considers lawmakers’ behaviour at
two stages of their interaction with courts: first, their choice of whether or not to pass a policy
at odds with a court’s existing jurisprudence (i.e. prior to the court’s decision in the model); and
second, their response to a court’s decision to strike such a policy (i.e. after the court’s decision
in the model). For the sake of theoretical parsimony, the model considers only a single interaction
between lawmakers and a court. However, even this simplified snapshot of the complex dynamics
between lawmakers and courts implies that the two actors face each other repeatedly (possibly
over the same issue) and that lawmakers’ choice at both stages in the model (prior and after the
court’s decision) boils down to the same question: whether or not lawmakers opt to comply with
the court’s jurisprudence. In other words, lawmakers’ choice to flout existing jurisprudence prior
to the court’s decision in the model is essentially an instance of non-compliance.
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The lawmaker’s response implies that disagreement over the constitutionality of
policy is a result of the legal education (and lack thereof) the members of the Bun-
destag have enjoyed. However, the lawmaker also alludes to some members of the
Bundestag simply considering it worth the risk to pursue ostensibly unconstitutional
policies as the court may show self-restraint in its jurisprudence:
Lawmaker 4: I think there are a lot of things that play into this. First
of all, not everyone sitting in the Bundestag is a lawyer, and those who
are not see things quite differently than those who have studied law. Do
you remember the Aviation Security Act? The crux here was whether
you can shoot down a plane and sacrifice hundreds of lives to save thou-
sands of lives in the event of a terrorist attack. Personally, I always
knew that’s out of question, you learn that during your undergraduate
law studies, but here emotions are pitted against a legal principle. Sec-
ond, even among the lawyers you will always find diverging opinions, ask
three lawyers and you’re lucky if you get two opinions. We often see that
in the committee hearings. I also always had the impression that people
were hoping, well, maybe we will get away with it. You need to consider,
when we talk about things like the prevention of terrorist attacks, what
we are really talking about is making sure that no one is getting hurt,
and we are facing an immense responsibility here.
The theme of the legislature’s risk-taking in the shadow of constitutional review
also featured in other lawmakers’ responses. Interestingly, one of the lawmakers who
had previously insisted that the GFCC’s jurisprudence always needs to be observed,
offered a reply that points to the legislature’s constitutional mandate and leeway to
design policy:
Lawmaker 1: Like I said before, you never quite know how the Federal
Constitutional Court will decide. In the end, I need to ask myself, how
great is the risk that I am willing to take? And if I’m not prepared to
take any risks, then I’m limited in my leeway to create policy. In the
end, it’s us who are in charge of politics, it’s us who are tasked with
designing policy. I’ve always maintained that if the justices want to get
into politics, then they’ll have to get themselves elected to parliament.
This statement is an indication that lawmakers are willing to assert that it is the
legislature and not the court which eventually writes the laws. The statement also
suggests that lawmakers are willing to take risks in the shadow of constitutional
review to see their preferred policies on the books, a central implication of the
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theoretical model. The model’s separating and partial-pooling equilibria imply that
‘non-compliant’ lawmakers are prepared to pursue policies that are at high risk of
a court’s censure simply because they know that they may get a chance to evade
compliance with the court’s decision in the future. This expectation is reflected in
a statement one of the lawmakers offered in reply to examples of majorities in the
Bundestag dismissing widespread constitutional concerns:
Lawmaker 3: You mentioned the Federal Criminal Police Office Act.
Here, I think political preferences played a role, some people are just
convinced that everything needs to be done for security. Politically, that
may be understandable, but in the end it’s not faultless in legal terms.
And sometimes it’s the ones who believe that eventually you can still try
to construe a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in a certain
way, who assert themselves. That’s also where you tend to see the tension
between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry for Internal Affairs,
both of them have constitutional departments, but possibly different
opinions on a law. And of course there are representatives of the law
enforcement authorities, who push for more security and say, well, in the
end let the court decide if necessary. Personally, I don’t think that’s the
way we should go, it’s a matter of respect for constitutional rights and
the Basic Law. I find it very problematic when the constitution’s limits
are tested time and again.
There is at least some evidence that lawmakers at times put their political pref-
erences before legal considerations, and evidence that they do so because they know
that a court’s decision to strike their policy is not the last act. An even more explicit
reference to lawmakers’ option to evade compliance with unwelcome jurisprudence
is evident in the following response one of the lawmakers offered after highlighting
that lawmakers are capable of anticipating the GFCC’s future decisions:
Lawmaker 2: I think the real issue is not whether we can anticipate
how the court will decide. Let me point you to some nasty statements
former members of the federal government have made in the past, who
said, please pardon my language, ‘Up yours to those justices in Karl-
sruhe’. These sentiments are extremely disappointing, and especially
with some of the more ideologically charged issues it happens that the
government tries to do the absolute bare minimum to implement the
court’s jurisprudence, or even straight up says ‘we’re not going to imple-
ment this at all’.
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Lawmakers’ perceptions that we have seen so far in this section suggest that
lawmakers are well aware that flouting the GFCC’s jurisprudence has consequences.
The electorate is highly supportive of the GFCC’s role in Germany’s political system
and lawmakers know that ignoring its decisions may come back to bite them at
the ballot box, much in line with the expectations of existing scholarship (see for
example Carrubba and Zorn, 2010; Clark, 2010; Vanberg, 2005). However, when
presented with examples of lawmakers dismissing constitutional concerns coming
from both sides of the legislature’s aisle, my interviewees were at least ready to
admit that lawmakers are at times prepared to take risks in their pursuit of policies
touching upon constitutional rights. Some of the statements reported above linked
lawmakers’ willingness to take risks to the legislature’s interest to defend its leeway
to create policy and lawmakers’ option to evade compliance with a judicial veto, an
assumption at the heart of the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2.
4.2.3 The costs of ignoring advice
The core argument derived from the theoretical model states that lawmakers signal
a credible non-compliance threat when they provoke confrontation despite knowing
that a court’s censure of their policies would come with high costs. In Chapter 3,
I operationalized these costs by identifying whether lawmakers in government had
disregarded concerns by members of the governing coalition’s own caucus that their
policies would fail to meet the requirements of the court’s jurisprudence.
Existing scholarship has highlighted that non-compliance with courts’ jurispru-
dence is potentially costly for lawmakers when electorates’ diffuse support for courts
is high (see Carrubba, 2009; Vanberg, 2005, see also Whittington 2003). However,
the existing literature has also shown that it is generally difficult for the electorate to
determine whether lawmakers in government actually evade compliance (see Staton,
2006; Krehbiel, 2016, see also Staton and Vanberg 2008). I assume that scenarios
in which lawmakers disregard credible advice that their policies fail to meet the
requirements of constitutional jurisprudence and are subsequently censored by the
court, are instances of non-compliance easily observed by the public: It is the court
itself, which highlights lawmakers’ non-compliance.
Do lawmakers believe that dismissing their colleagues’ constitutional concerns
and subsequently being censored by the GFCC entails risks? Some of the lawmakers’
statements suggest that the GFCC’s decisions invalidating government policy benefit
the opposition and tarnish the governing factions’ reputation among the electorate:
Lawmaker 1: Think of politics a bit like tennis, you try to score
points, and once you have enough points then you win the set. And
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sure, the opposition scores points when the government loses in court,
but that doesn’t mean that they win the whole match or will win the
next elections. [...] But yeah, it’s not irrelevant what happens at the
court, and it could be that a party or politician’s performance at the
court plays a role for their reputation.
Lawmaker 3: You asked about the risks. Yes, I do believe the Federal
Constitutional Court’s choice to strike a law comes with a loss in repu-
tation among the public, especially when those who made these laws are
legal experts themselves.
Lawmaker 4: That certainly helps, if the judgement comes in and
you’re in the opposition you can then react to it and say ‘look, you can’t
even agree among yourselves’. [...] Generally, it’s never nice to lose at
the Federal Constitutional Court, especially if you’re still in office. But
you know, it still happens that the governing factions fall flat on their
faces at the court, once, twice, but then still don’t seem to learn.
These statements illustrate that lawmakers are aware that their political oppo-
nents may exploit GFCC decisions striking policy as opportunities to discredit their
political acumen among the electorate. Further, the latter statement indicates that
some lawmakers nonetheless appear unwilling to correct course in line with constitu-
tional jurisprudence even after suffering the costs of a loss in court. This behaviour
appears consistent with the theoretical model’s assumption that ‘non-compliant’
lawmakers will evade compliance with a court’s decision even after suffering the
political fallout following censorship by the court.
In previous chapters, I briefly discussed another possible consequence of lawmak-
ers dismissing constitutional concerns voiced by members of the governing coalition
caucus. Doing so may provide tailwind to intra-party critics once the GFCC had
struck the law in question. Evidence from my interviews speaking to this assump-
tion appears mixed at best. In one of the interviews, a lawmaker seized on the
example of the 2008 Federal Criminal Police Office Act to highlight that members
of the SPD, who had supported the act, faced continued opposition from within the
party once the GFCC had struck it:
Lawmaker 2: You know, there are some in the SPD who subscribe
to more conservative beliefs than others, particularly on questions of
internal affairs and security. And if you look at the Federal Criminal
Police Office Act, you’ll realize that the CDU/CSU managed to get these
people on their side. I can tell you that these people certainly didn’t
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make new friends in the party. [...] After the Federal Constitutional
Court’s ruling, the CDU/CSU didn’t care at all how we would move on
with the act at the federal level, and delegated much of the mess to the
states. And of course we continue to bang the drums against those who
had supported the act, even when they are from our own party.
However, another lawmaker questioned the assumption that those who had dis-
missed their political allies’ constitutional concerns would face tangible consequences
within their own party once the GFCC had struck the act in question:
Lawmaker 1: I can’t think of an example of someone being held po-
litically accountable or resigning after losing a case in court. [...] Let
me give you an example, just think of the law governing the European
elections. We first had a five-percent electoral threshold but that was
struck by the court. And then the German delegates from Brussel asked
us, ‘well, can’t you just do at least one with a three-percent threshold?’
Personally, I warned my colleagues that the court wouldn’t change its
mind on this issue within a matter of years and would also strike the
three-percent threshold. And that’s what happened. But I remember,
that time the party whip had said ‘we’re doing it and I take the respon-
sibility.’ That was a rare case where we said, we see the risk but we go
for it anyway. And do you know who the party whip was at that time?
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, he’s the Federal President now.
Overall, while lawmakers’ perceptions do not suggest that flouting constitutional
concerns and subsequently losing in court derails the political careers of the individ-
uals who had assumed responsibility for the act in question, lawmakers’ statements
nonetheless suggest that doing so tarnishes political parties’ reputation among the
electorate and hence involves costs, a key assumption of the theoretical model.
Chapter 3 provided a key reason for distinguishing constitutional concerns voiced
by members of the governing coalition caucus from concerns voiced by the politi-
cal opposition when measuring these costs: We can assume that members of the
opposition feel few inhibitions to attack government’s plans for their supposed un-
constitutionality, thus these attacks are more likely to reflect political opportunism
rather than genuine legal concerns. Constitutional concerns voiced from within the
governing coalition caucus, on the other hand, should be rather rare occasions as de-
fying party discipline and accusing their colleagues of failing to uphold constitutional
norms may have ramifications for those making these claims. Hence, constitutional
objections voiced by members of the governing coalition caucus should be more likely
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to reflect genuine legal concerns and ignoring them should be particularly damaging
to lawmakers’ reputation should a court indeed strike the act in question.
Descriptive evidence presented in Chapter 3 appears consistent with this assump-
tion. The opposition frequently accuses government of failing to respect the GFCC’s
jurisprudence (e.g. about half of the laws reviewed by the GFCC’s Senates between
1983 and 2017 had been considered unconstitutional by members of the opposition),
while constitutional objections coming from within the governing coalition caucus
are rare. The pattern of lawmakers routinely employing constitutional concerns to
discredit government policy also featured in my interviews. One lawmaker noted
that constitutional arguments are a common feature of debates in the Bundestag:
Lawmaker 1: Basically, in Germany it happens quite often that peo-
ple make use of references to constitutional law when we debate the
more contested legislative proposals in the Bundestag. That’s sort of a
German peculiarity and happens all the time. Think of it as political
sparring with legal arguments.
Interestingly, in an interview from March 3, 2019, a former justice of the GFCC
also referred to the frequent nature of constitutional objections heard in the Bun-
destag and highlighted the negative effects of this characteristic on the political
discourse in the legislature:
Justice 3: I have repeatedly criticised that members of the Bundestag
use constitutional arguments to contest legislative proposals. It would
be catastrophic for the political life in Germany if all of these concerns
would be taken seriously, and if—and that happens rather too often than
too seldom—every legislative project would be abandoned because there
is a potential ‘constitutional risk’.
This statement has two implications: First, it shows that justices at the GFCC
know about the political discourse happening in the Bundestag (and the subsequent
sections in this chapter focus on this aspect in more detail); second, lawmakers in
the Bundestag may in fact be well-advised not to change course on every legislative
proposal once constitutional concerns are voiced, as most of these concerns are likely
to lack substance. This latter sentiment may seem surprising, coming from a justice
at a constitutional court. But it illustrates that contesting an unwanted law by
claiming that it fails to live up to the GFCC’s constitutional jurisprudence has
become ‘normalized’ and common for debates in the Bundestag.
In light of this impression and the relative infrequency of constitutional concerns
coming from the benches of the governing coalition caucus, it nonetheless seems plau-
sible to assume that these latter kinds of constitutional objections stand out from
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the rest of similar concerns. As discussed above, constitutional concerns voiced by
members of the governing coalition caucus are more likely to reflect genuine legal
concerns, while they may also be the more visible ones among the accusations of
government failing to uphold constitutional norms commonly hurled against govern-
ment’s policy proposals. Hence, ignoring these kinds of constitutional concerns may
be particularly costly for lawmakers in the governing coalition.
Most of lawmakers’ perceptions reported in this chapter appear consistent with
the assumptions and implications of the theoretical model presented in Chapter
2. Lawmakers are capable of assessing how the court would respond to their poli-
cies and generally face incentives to respect the GFCC’s jurisprudence in light of the
electoral risks that come with non-compliance. However, several lawmakers also indi-
cated that lawmakers may not always shy away from risking confrontation, knowing
that they may get a shot at construing the court’s judgement in a way that would
nonetheless allow them to pursue their preferred policies. In the following sections,
I present evidence from my interviews with justices and law clerks at the GFCC,
outlining how the court perceives lawmakers’ choices to provoke confrontation.
4.3 Perspectives from the court
So far we have heard from lawmakers and had a chance to get glimpse of their percep-
tions of the complex inter-branch dynamics in systems of limited government. I now
turn my attention to the perceptions of the justices and law clerks at the GFCC.2
The formal model presented in Chapter 2 assumes that courts’ decision-making in
constitutional review cases is affected by two features of their relationship with the
legislative and executive branches. First, courts are aware that decisions challenging
government policy can result in backlash against them in the form of court-curbing,
with varying implications for courts’ institutional integrity. Second, courts know
that they cannot coerce the elected branches into compliance with their jurispru-
dence and are aware that lawmakers may seek to evade faithful implementation of
their decisions. In light of these features defining courts’ compliance dilemma, the
formal model predicts that (under certain circumstances) courts draw on the polit-
ical costs lawmakers risk paying for provoking confrontation with the judiciary to
assess the likelihood of lawmakers’ non-compliance.
2The law clerks, or rather academic assistants, (in German, ‘wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter’),
at the GFCC assist justices with research tasks related to their case files and often draft the
court’s decisions. Each justice is assisted by four law clerks, and while they are not involved in
the deliberations among justices over individual cases, which are held behind closed doors, hearing
from them is nonetheless useful as they are highly familiar with the factors that shape the court’s
decision-making in light of their task.
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4.3.1 The prospects of backlash against the GFCC
The model’s first assumption I consider here concerns courts’ awareness that law-
makers in the legislative and executive branches may opt to discipline courts for
striking their policies. The assumption that there are (at least some) costs for
courts for striking policy is central to the formal model: Unless striking policy en-
tails some form of costs, a court would face no incentive to show self-restraint in
its decision-making—striking policy the court considers unconstitutional would then
always be its best option, even if lawmakers’ non-compliance is likely.
I asked former justices and law clerks at the GFCC whether they recognize
that some of the court’s decisions may cause frustration among lawmakers in the
legislative and executive branches, ultimately leading the latter to clip the GFCC’s
authority. Overall, both justices and law clerks highlighted in their answers that the
court certainly risks drawing lawmakers’ ire when challenging their policies, while
there is nonetheless evidence that backlash against the court falls short of having
serious consequences for the GFCC’s institutional integrity. One former justice of
the GFCC interviewed on November 8, 2017, noted:
Justice 2: I definitely remember more and less difficult times for the
court, by difficult meaning that the politicians were, well, pretty annoyed
by the court. You asked whether there were any differences between the
governing coalitions, no, I never thought that this was a question of
who was currently in charge. That’s rather a consequence of particular
decisions. Sure, the decision on equal status for same-sex partnerships
definitely caused more anger among some parties than others. But not
all of the decisions that caused outrage, so to speak, had such a clear
ideological touch, just think of one of the more general decisions like the
one on the thresholds for the elections to the European Parliament.
Asked about how justices at the GFCC respond to anticipations of backlash
against the court, the same justice added:
Justice 2: You know, that’s just part of our job, to sometimes cause
displeasure. We make sure that we stick to our duties as justices, but of
course we all know about the political consequences of our decisions. I
don’t want to rule out that in times when the court gets the impression
that the politicians’ patience is particularly overstretched, that you need
to make sure not to overstep, to take extra care when you know that you
are treading in mined terrain.
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Another justice interviewed on April 18, 2019, noted that members of the court
can anticipate whether their decisions to strike laws will prompt criticism of the
court based on their interactions with lawmakers during the proceedings of a case:
Justice 1: You usually know pretty well, which of the decisions will
spark anger. That’s usually quite obvious from the proceedings at the
court and the oral arguments, we obviously know what the concerned
parties said about the law and the case.
One of the GFCC’s former law clerks noted in an interview conducted on June
5, 2017, that the GFCC avoids becoming embroiled in disputes with the legislative
and executive branch by showing self-restraint in its decision-making:
Clerk 4: I would say the Federal Constitutional Court is also a polit-
ical court, and you can’t decide every case in a dogmatic fashion without
considering the consequences in practice. And the court finds ways not
to become part of political disputes. [...] I think it’s fair to say, when you
look at the progression of some cases, that the court finds compromises
in its decisions. One example I can think of is the norm control proceed-
ing concerning the film promotion fund, you know, where larger cinema
operators have to pay fees into the film promotion fund. Here you tap
into fiscal constitutional law and that’s a pretty delicate chapter, what
are taxes, what are fees, all of that is pretty complex. In terms of fiscal
constitutional law, there were a lot of reasons to consider this fund as
unconstitutional but in the end that’s not what happened, the fund was
considered constitutional. That’s actually more than just a compromise.
Asked how the GFCC negotiates the tension between the court and the leg-
islative and executive branches, another former law clerk mentioned in an interview
conducted on May 18, 2017, that the court jeopardizes its role in Germany’s political
system should it continuously decide to place onerous constraints on lawmakers:
Clerk 1: I think there’s quite a sensitivity for this tension among the
justices. They have to know whether they are asking too much from the
legislature. The court certainly knows that if you constantly intervene
and if there is a strong political group, they may get rid of the court in
the long run. In my time at the court, one thing was always clear, the
legislature needs room to breathe.
The impression that lawmakers in the legislative and executive branches may
ultimately opt to disband the GFCC to avoid further constraints on their actions
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was not shared by other clerks and lawmakers themselves. While highlighting that
the GFCC in principle exercises self-restraint, one former law clerk interviewed on
May 26, 2017, referenced the court’s standing among the public and the GFCC’s
geographical distance from the capital, which alleviate any ire against the court:
Clerk 3: We hear complaints that the Federal Constitutional Court
acts as if it were a substitute for the legislature quite often, but I think
that’s pretty much cheap talk. First of all, the court doesn’t initiate the
proceedings itself, someone needs to bring the cases to us. And when
a case comes we can’t say, well, that’s an issue we don’t want to talk
about. I can’t tell you how often justices mention that the legislature’s
leeway needs to be respected when they deliberate, I was never part of
that, but my impression is that the court exercises restraint wherever it
can. A lot of the laws we review are junk, but that doesn’t make them
unconstitutional. Second, the Federal Constitutional Court has a stand-
ing among the public, it’s simply a well-established institution. There
have been certainly controversial decisions, but the media’s treatment of
the court is quite friendly and there’s never widespread anger directed at
the court from the public. In Karlsruhe we’re also quite far away from
the action and any critique of the court is attenuated.
When discussing the case selection of Germany for the statistical analysis (i.e.
the focus on a constitutional court not at risk of suffering serious consequences
for challenging lawmakers), Chapter 3 already offered evidence from one of my
interviews, suggesting that lawmakers are well aware that the GFCC’s comfortable
reservoir of public support prevents them from implementing measures that would
seriously undermine the court’s institutional integrity. This sentiment was echoed
by several other lawmakers:
Lawmaker 4: Formally, it’s pretty difficult for the legislature to
change anything at the court. In practice, I do think that some peo-
ple are sometimes considering to do something different about the ap-
pointment process to make it easier to get their own laws through. But
everyone knows that you step on very thin ice with these ideas.
Lawmaker 3: Well, the worst thing that could happen is that a two-
thirds majority starts changing the Basic Law to limit the Federal Con-
stitutional Court’s jurisdiction. That would be kind of unconstitutional
constitutional law. But that’s very far off and has so far never happened.
Although, I do think that the court operates in a tense environment and
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they do recognize the criticism. You know, the justices come from a
certain social milieu and they know very well how the delegates in the
Bundestag think about the jurisprudence. But I think that those who
don’t spare with their criticism tend to underestimate the justices. Some
of the delegates may try to give a certain impression and in one way or
another get the court to decide differently next time, but I don’t think
that’s actually very effective.
To summarize, the perceptions reported in this section suggest that justices know
that decisions challenging the acts of lawmakers come with risks of backlash against
the court. One of the justice’s statements implies that the GFCC takes care not to
place onerous constraints on lawmakers when the latter’s ‘patience’ with the court
has depleted. While the court is not immune to criticism and aware that lawmakers
can theoretically curb its jurisdiction, both lawmakers and justices of the GFCC
nonetheless know that court-curbing measures that would ultimately threaten the
effective functioning of the court are essentially off the table in light of the diffuse
public support the court has acquired since it took up its work in 1951.
4.3.2 Perceptions of non-compliance
The second feature highlighted by the theoretical model shaping courts’ decision-
making in systems of limited government concerns lawmakers’ treatment of consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Existing scholarship has argued that courts know that (at
least some of) their decisions are at risk of non-compliance by lawmakers in the leg-
islative and executive branches, constituting a driving force behind courts’ exercise
of self-restraint (see Carrubba and Zorn, 2010; Hall, 2014; Vanberg, 2005, see also
Larsson and Naurin, 2016, for a similar argument regarding the decision-making of
international courts). Are justices at the GFCC aware that lawmakers may evade
compliance with their decisions? How much of a role does it play in their decision-
making? While admitting that lawmakers occasionally delay the implementation of
decisions, one justice noted that non-compliance is not a pressing issue for the court:
Justice 1: I think implementation usually works pretty well, I would
definitely say so. Once in a while there are problems with the deadlines
the court gives the legislature regarding the implementation of a judge-
ment when a law is considered incompatible with the constitution but
not void. It happens that the legislature misses these deadlines by sev-
eral months, especially on politically sensitive issues. But generally that
all runs smoothly, the state authorities definitely respect each other.
Perspectives on constitutional confrontation 115
Another justice rebuffed expectations commonly held in existing scholarship (and
the thesis’s theoretical model) that the prospects of non-compliance play a part in
the court’s decision-making:
Justice 2: I don’t think that speculations on whether or not the leg-
islature would suspend something play a role. Of course you know in an
abstract sense whether something would be controversial, and there are
things you can do about the consequences of a judgement. You know, the
court can declare something as unconstitutional with immediate effect
and strike it without replacement until the legislature passes a new law.
Or you say something is unconstitutional and then give the legislature
some time to fix it. But whether you pick one of these options over the
other has nothing to do with whether the legislature would want to im-
plement a decision or not. It’s simply a question of what would be worse
from a standpoint of constitutional law. Just think of the inheritance tax
law. That law entailed preferential treatment for certain beneficiaries.
Sure, the court could have struck it with immediate effect and without
replacement. But then no one would pay any inheritance tax at all and
that’s definitely the more problematic result.
Whilst these statements do not suggest that the possibility of lawmakers’ non-
compliance play a prominent role in the decision-making at the GFCC, it is worth
pointing out that these views do not necessarily align with perceptions of justices at
the GFCC reported in existing scholarship. Vanberg (2005) interviewed a number
of justices at the GFCC, asking them whether the potential for defiance by the
executive branch is something that enters into the deliberations of the court. In
these interviews, several justices highlighted that the court lacks the power to enforce
its rulings and provided examples of non-compliance:
I don’t think there is much of a threat to the institutional frame-
work. That’s been settled in a manner that is satisfactory for everyone.
Another question is how the court can maintain its position and get
respect from the legislature and the other courts. That is something
that is tricky. ... Sometimes the legislature just doesn’t act on the deci-
sions, and the court has no troops to enforce them (Justice of the GFCC,
quoted in Vanberg, 2005, 120).
You know, the court has issued many decisions that were never com-
plied with, for example about the treatment of civil servant pensions.
And there really isn’t anything the court can do about that. If no one
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else takes an interest in it, that’s just the way it is going to be. And of
course the court has to be worried about that, that a tradition of ignor-
ing the court isn’t established. ... The civil servant [taxation] decision is
now more than fifteen years old and clearly should have been complied
with by now (Justice of the GFCC quoted in Vanberg, 2005, 122).
Interestingly, in the course of my own interviews, a former law clerk also picked
up on the example of the GFCC’s review of inheritance tax legislation to illustrate
that the court avoids issuing specific constraints when lawmakers appear ready to
evade faithful compliance:
Clerk 1: I mean, the legislature is never really enthusiastic about
implementing the decisions. And when you know that there is a strong
political group in government you find ways to work around this. Let’s
take the inheritance tax reform as an example, it was always clear that
the wealth of a significant share of German citizens is dependent on
inheritance. And the Federal Constitutional Court was quite generous
in this case, we knew that very strict provisions on who could get what
weren’t in the interest of the CDU/CSU. Then it’s better to give some
leeway to the legislature, you don’t want to go for a very detailed ruling.
Justices’ interest in finding out how the legislative and executive branches would
think of certain decisions also came up in one of my interviews with a journalist,
who regularly covers proceedings at the GFCC. Asked in an interview conducted on
July 12, 2017, whether justices at the GFCC care about lawmakers’ responses to
their jurisprudence, the journalist noted:
Journalist 1: Once in a while during the oral arguments, you can see
that justices ask the government representative very specific questions
about possible solutions to an issue, a bit like ‘well, I could think of these
kinds of solutions, one, two, three, what would you think of that?’ [...] I
do think the justices are specifically looking for objections to their own
opinions, you know, I think to keep their own opinions in check.
Related to justices’ interest in gauging lawmakers’ opinions of their decisions, a
former law clerk noted that justices are generally uncertain about whether or not
lawmakers would comply with their jurisprudence. Yet, the law clerk also noted
that the formal communications issued by the executive branch in the course of
the court’s review of a federal law, usually through representatives of the relevant
federal ministry, in rare cases provide an insight into whether governing majorities
would actually welcome a decision striking a federal law:
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Clerk 3: The justices certainly think about the consequences of their
decisions, but in the end you don’t really know what the legislature
will do with them. I mean, the official statements government provides
during the proceedings at the court contain some information. Also, well
not very often, but sometimes it happens that the government doesn’t
really defend a law in court, just think of the successive right of adoption.
[...] So yeah, what the legislature would do with the decisions matters,
but I also wouldn’t say that the justices always think about ‘well, how
can we write this judgement in a way that the legislature will actually
implement it’.
While illustrating justices’ uncertainty about lawmakers’ willingness to faith-
fully implement their decisions, this statement also implies that a prospect of non-
compliance is not always a decisive factor in the court’s decision-making. Overall,
the statements reported above suggest that the GFCC generally issues its decisions
against the backdrop of non-compliance, yet also imply that concerns about law-
makers’ unfaithful implementation of their jurisprudence are rarely a driving factor
in justices’ decision-making. The theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 makes no
claim about the frequency of lawmakers’ non-compliance with courts’ jurisprudence
but shows how courts—out of all the cases they need to decide—identify which
of their decision are at high risk of lawmakers’ non-compliance. The qualitative
evidence presented in the following section speaks to this point.
4.3.3 The echoes of politics at the court
The promise (and usefulness) of the theoretical model in Chapter 2 is that it provides
an insight into when courts take the prospects of non-compliance seriously: Courts
pay attention to the risks lawmakers take when adopting policies to evaluate whether
there is a credible risk of lawmakers evading compliance with jurisprudence censoring
their actions. This argument rests on two closely related assumptions. First, justices
know what happened in the legislature when lawmakers decided on the acts the court
eventually reviews. Second, justices recognize that lawmakers risk paying the costs
for pursuing policies at odds with the court’s constitutional jurisprudence. In this
chapter’s final section, I consider perceptions of justices and law clerks at the GFCC
that speak to these assumptions.
I asked justices and law clerks whether they are generally aware of the parlia-
mentary debates—and possible controversies—related to the federal laws the GFCC
reviews. Two of the justices I interviewed noted that the materials from the leg-
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islative process that produced the laws they review play a prominent role in their
interpretation of the constitutionality of an act:
Justice 2: Understanding the motives of the legislature is one of the
methods of interpretation we can employ when we interpret the consti-
tutional compatibility of a law. That’s in a way a historic method of
interpretation, where you want to find out, what did the legislature ac-
tually want to achieve with a law? If there is a clear cut case that a
legislature actually didn’t want a specific interpretation of a law, then
you can make that part of your decision and try to save the law. Basi-
cally, we find an interpretation that is conforming to the constitution by
assuming that the legislature actually wanted to create something that
is constitutional. And that’s why engaging with the material from the
legislature is a standard task in our work.
Justice 1: First, you need to know that when you become a justice,
you stay a politically interested human being, right? We also have con-
tacts to Berlin, of course not in conversations about specific cases, that
would be unprofessional, but we know the general mood in Berlin. We
also get the statements in the course of the proceedings at the court,
when a case concerns a federal law then—by law—we have to get state-
ments from the Ministry for Internal Affairs and the Justice Ministry,
the Chancellery and sometimes also the ministries for social affairs. [...]
And in the end, we also have our own research, we always have a close
look at all the documentation from the legislature.
One of the justices added that it is the documents detailing the legislative process
in the Bundestag that allow justices to identify whether a law attracted controversy
in the legislature:
Justice 2: I guess your question was targeted at the adoption of a
law, whether it was controversial or not. I wouldn’t rule out that, in the
back of your head, you sometimes remember that it was a contentious
episode, maybe from the press coverage. But even if there is a, well, back-
of-the-head awareness, that doesn’t really play a role. What matters are
the statements the parties provide at the court and our research. We
do have a close look at the parliamentary documentation, we are always
researching them, regardless of whether they are being cited in the text of
the judgement or not. Like the reasoning for the law, committee sessions,
any public hearings, all of that. And we evaluate this documentation
with a view to the legal questions that play a role in our cases.
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I also asked lawmakers in my interviews whether they believe that justices have
an eye on the legislative proceedings, particularly when the Bundestag debates con-
stitutionally controversial acts. Several lawmakers asserted that justices have a very
clear sense of what happens in the legislature:
Lawmaker 3: Yes, I think they are definitely informed. You see, in a
lot of these cases the court holds oral arguments and if you follow these,
you can see that the justices cite from the debates, interventions that
were made, sometimes they also reference the press coverage, and so on.
And I mean, these discourses not only reflect political opinions, occasion-
ally these revolve around facts. I had the impression that the Federal
Constitutional Court takes a very close look at how people argued in
favour and against something.
Lawmaker 1: The Federal Constitutional Court is a highly, highly
qualified court with very high expectations and justices from different
walks of life. You need to remember, some of the justices had a career
in politics, so they know what’s going on outside of the court. Also,
the Federal Constitutional Court regularly invites statements from the
politicians and then they need to report and explain, what did we try
do with this particular law. That actually happens quite often. [...] I’m
sure the way the justices see things is different from the way we see these,
but they are definitely not living under a rock.
This evidence from my interviews suggests that justices at the GFCC are well
informed about the legislative proceedings that produced the acts they eventually
review. The more critical aspect for the evaluation of my theoretical model, how-
ever, is to get an impression of what justices make of it when the documentation of
such legislative proceedings shows that lawmakers had dismissed widespread consti-
tutional concerns about their policy choices. I did not ask justices about whether
they interpret lawmakers’ willingness to provoke confrontation with the GFCC as a
credible non-compliance threat. Instead, I asked justices (and law clerks) about the
reasons of why lawmakers at times seem to be prepared to risk confrontation with
the court, ignoring widespread concerns about the constitutionality of their policies.
One of the justices offered a reply similar to the one of the lawmaker’s views heard
earlier, noting that lawmakers in the legislature are generally interested in pushing
the limits of their legislative powers:
Justice 1: I think first and foremost, the delegates in the Bundestag
are interested in claiming competences, the prerogative to create legisla-
tion, you know whether they have the competence to become active in
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a particular field. Just think of the act on the care allowance. That act
was pushed by Bavaria and they are not usually known for an interest
in federalising legislative powers. And then I think politicians are inter-
ested in putting these competences to use to support their policy goals.
I guess it happens that they sometimes say, well let’s just try this. But
I find it hard to make a statement about their motives, why they take
these risks.
In another interview, a justice spoke more directly to the role of lawmakers’ risk-
taking in the face of the GFCC’s exercise of constitutional review and its implications
for policy-making in systems of limited government. In the course of the interview,
I referenced a statement one of the law clerks had made in a previous conversation,
voicing frustration about the frequent criticism that the court acts as a substitute
for the legislature:
Clerk 2: I think the accusation that the Federal Constitutional Court
interferes too frequently with the business of the legislature comes too
quickly. [...] You know, if the delegates in the Bundestag would read the
court’s decision a bit more carefully then they’d know what’s possible
and what’s not.
I mentioned this sentiment to the justice and asked whether the legislature could
avoid provoking confrontation with the court if lawmakers simply read the jurispru-
dence more carefully. The justice rebuffed this sentiment:
Justice 2: No, I don’t see it that way. I mean, the ministries carefully
assess the laws with a view to constitutional jurisprudence. Of course
there are laws where someone says ‘wait, I have concerns that this is in-
compatible with the jurisprudence of the constitutional court’, but in the
end it’s the ones who say, well, let’s see if that’s actually the case, where
the politicians say ‘we think there are plausible reasons to interpret the
jurisprudence in this or that way’, or maybe the relevant circumstances
have changed in a certain way, so that the court’s jurisprudence is not
applicable to this specific case. And I think that is very important. A
court can make mistakes, for example by issuing jurisprudence that is too
broad in its scope, applying to cases it didn’t even think of when it devel-
oped the jurisprudence. I would find nothing worse than if decisions by
the Federal Constitutional Court would be interpreted in an even more
rigid fashion than the text of the constitution, and if there would be no
opportunities for the court to differentiate its own jurisprudence, to row
back. I think that’s pretty important.
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Similar to a sentiment voiced by another justice above, the justice then referred
to the detrimental consequences of lawmakers’ (hypothetical) strict ‘auto-limitation’
in the face of the court’s constitutional review:
Justice 2: There are certainly issues, where it’s reasonable to bring
them up and discuss them again at the Federal Constitutional Court.
And I don’t think that’s some kind of disobedience by the legislature.
It’s certainly better than if lawmakers would treat indications that the
court would decide in a certain way as absolute and then say, well, we’re
not going to change anything here. My point is, the court’s jurisprudence
must not petrify, but it does if no one ever takes a risk of getting a bloody
nose at the court. I think it’s important that the legislature has the
courage—based on sound reasoning and an in principle loyal standpoint
vis-a`-vis the court, its jurisprudence and the constitution—to bring up
certain issues again at the court.
Much of the language used while presenting the theoretical model in Chapter 2
implies that the relationship between the legislative and executive branches on the
one hand and the court on the other is characterized by conflict. Both sides risk
costs (directly or indirectly) at the hands of each other when their interests on policy
diverge. However, after all the model’s core argument shows how lawmakers and
courts in fact avoid bruising conflict, by highlighting the signalling role of lawmakers’
risk-taking for the development of policy in systems of limited government. The
justice’s statement speaks to this point. While risking ‘a bloody nose’, lawmakers’
choice to pursue policies at odds with existing jurisprudence provides the court with
an opportunity to correct existing case law that places constraints on the legislative
and executive branches the latter (no longer) appear willing to accept.
The justice’s statement does not mention or allow for any conclusions on whether
lawmakers’ risk-taking at times induces the GFCC to amend its jurisprudence
against its own will, a key implication of the theoretical model. Nonetheless, the
statement highlights that lawmakers’ ‘courage’ to risk the fallout from confrontation
with the court is an important element in ensuring that constitutional jurisprudence
evolves and does not disengage with contemporary convictions in society. Hence,
it offers an alternative normative perspective on lawmakers’ choice to flout consti-
tutional jurisprudence, contrasting normative concerns that lawmakers’ disregard
for the court’s jurisprudence ultimately undermines the protection of constitutional
rights. I revisit this discussion in the concluding chapter to this thesis.
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4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided qualitative evidence from interviews with lawmakers in
Germany’s legislative and executive branches as well as justices and law clerks at
the GFCC. Not all of these actors’ reported perceptions fit seamlessly with the as-
sumptions underlying the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 and the empirical
implications I derived from the model (e.g. evidence concerning the assumption that
lawmakers risk paying a particularly high price for dismissing their allies constitu-
tional concerns appears mixed, while the interviewed justices downplayed the role
the prospects of lawmakers’ non-compliance play in the court’s decision-making).
However, overall the evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that the relevant
actors’ perspectives on the inter-branch dynamics in Germany’s system of limited
government closely map up to the fundamental assumptions of the theoretical model.
Lawmakers anticipate the GFCC’s constitutional review and—in light of the
costs that come with confrontation with the court—face incentives to ‘auto-limit’
their policy choices. Nonetheless, several lawmakers were ready to admit that the
shadow of constitutional review does not always deter the legislature from flout-
ing constitutional jurisprudence, alluding to the option of non-compliance with the
constraints the court’s decisions place on lawmakers. Justices, on the other hand,
recognize the potential for (albeit subdued) backlash against the GFCC when chal-
lenging governing majorities over their policies, and at least acknowledge the risk of
lawmakers evading faithful implementation with their jurisprudence.
The qualitative evidence presented in this chapter does not provide a ‘smoking
gun’ that would support the theoretical model’s core argument that courts respond
with deference to lawmakers’ costly signalling of a non-compliance threat. How-
ever, it nonetheless provides some evidence suggesting that justices are aware of the
risks lawmakers take when they pursue policies at odds with the GFCC’s jurispru-
dence and recognize the role these choices play in the evolution of constitutional
jurisprudence in Germany.
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4.5 Appendix
In the following, I list the questions I asked in my interviews with lawmakers as well
as law clerks and justices at the GFCC. All interviews were held in German. The
original questionnaires in German are available on request.
Lawmaker questionnaire
1. Some of the existing literature in political science assumes that legislatures
anticipate future decisions of constitutional courts and amend legislative drafts
to avoid conflict with these courts. What do you think, to what extent can
legislatures anticipate the direction of future constitutional jurisprudence?
2. It does not always seem to be the case that the legislature shies away from
risking the violation of constitutional norms, the 2008 Federal Criminal Po-
lice Office Act is a relatively recent example. Here, not only members of the
parliamentary opposition argued that the act is incompatible with the consti-
tution, several members of the governing factions thought the same. Why is it
that once in a while majorities in the Bundestag vote in favour of laws despite
widespread constitutional concerns?
3. What role does the public’s opinion on the Federal Constitutional Court as
well as the federal government and the party factions in the legislature play,
when lawmakers take constitutional risks?
4. The 2008 Federal Criminal Police Office Act was a difficult episode for the SPD.
Proponents of the act had to defend it against the objections of members of
their own party. What are the risks lawmakers take when they champion laws
that are considered unconstitutional by members of their own party?
5. Do you think the justices at the Federal Constitutional Court follow the leg-
islative process, particularly for laws that are constitutionally controversial?
6. The Federal Constitutional Court is often accused of placing constraint on
the legislature’s leeway that are too restrictive. What are the options for
lawmakers to respond to overly restrictive jurisprudence?
7. Some of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decisions invalidating laws come
with dissenting opinions by some of the justices. What role do these dissenting
opinions play for lawmakers?
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8. Did you get the impression that the federal government and the Bundestag
faithfully complied with the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision on the
2008 Federal Criminal Police Office Act?
Court questionnaire
1. In the context of my research, I read the transcripts of debates in the Bun-
destag on laws that were eventually reviewed by the Federal Constitutional
Court. Here, I found that members of the Bundestag often highlight that leg-
islative drafts conflict with the court’s jurisprudence, and once in a while it is
members of the governing factions in the Bundestag, who voice these concerns.
What do you think, why are governing factions sometimes prepared to dismiss
widespread constitutional concerns when adopting legislation?
2. The kind of laws that attracted constitutional concerns by members of the
Bundestag often actually end up at the Federal Constitutional Court. To
what extent are justices familiar with the political debate that happened in
the Bundestag on a law the court then has to review?
3. The Federal Constitutional Court’s review of federal law is characterized by
a certain tension. On the hand, the court needs to ensure that constitutional
rights are protected, on the other hand it needs to leave enough space for the
legislature to create effective policy. What role—if any—does the political
debate on a law play for justices to determine how far the court can go when
placing constraints on lawmakers’ leeway?
4. The Federal Constitutional Court is often criticised for being overly restric-
tive in its jurisprudence and placing too many constraints on lawmakers. I
remember a guest editorial written by Norbert Lammert for the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, where he called on the Federal Constitutional Court to
exercise more self-restraint. To what extent are justices able to anticipate
whether a decision would be met with backlash from lawmakers?
5. Recent scholarship in political science suggests that constitutional courts an-
ticipate backlash against their decisions and at times postpone unpopular de-
cisions in the hope of facing a politically more friendly environment in the
future. To what can justices at the Federal Constitutional Court delay their
decisions, particularly when reviewing federal laws?
Perspectives on constitutional confrontation 125
6. The Federal Constitutional Court enjoys a very high standing among the Ger-
man public. Political scientists generally assume that courts’ high public sup-
port allows them to issue decisions unpopular among governing majorities
without having to fear serious consequences, for instance restrictions on their
own jurisdiction. Did you get the impression that this is actually the case for
the Federal Constitutional Court?
7. The Federal Constitutional Court’s decisions carry the force of law. Nonethe-
less, about twenty years ago an article was published in the Su¨ddeutsche
Zeitung titled ‘If it does not sit well, it is ignored’. The article claimed that
majorities in the Bundestag fail to faithfully implement politically unwanted
or simply fiscally expensive court decisions. What do you think, are lawmakers
in the Bundestag and the federal government always implementing the court’s
jurisprudence?
8. The majority of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decisions are passed unani-
mously. However, once in a while justices decide to write a dissenting opinion.
Based on your experience, what role do these dissenting opinions play for
lawmakers?
Chapter 5
The 2008 Federal Criminal Police
Office Act
The theoretical model presented in this thesis implies that the shadow of consti-
tutional review does not always deter lawmakers from pursuing policies evidently
conflicting with constitutional jurisprudence and thus at a high risk of being cen-
sored by a court. When it seems politically costly to be at the receiving end of
a court’s veto, lawmakers’ choice to push for policy at odds with the constitution
regardless sends a credible signal that lawmakers are prepared to evade compliance
with unwelcome jurisprudence. Ultimately, courts lack the ‘power of the purse and
sword’ and cannot coerce legislatures and government officials into compliance with
their jurisprudence (Hamilton, 1961; Carrubba and Zorn, 2010; Vanberg, 2005). The
model predicts that courts facing incentives to avoid judgements that are eventually
not enforced are more likely to show deference to lawmakers in the elected branches
when the latter had sent costly signals of a non-compliance threat.
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 shows how courts and lawmakers
respond to the conditions of their political environment, and predicts how these
actors behave at the various stages of their interaction in systems of limited gov-
ernment. In this thesis, I have so far presented empirical evidence from a statistical
analysis of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (GFCC) review of federal
laws between 1983 and 2017 as well as interviews with former members of the court
and the elected branches in Germany, which appears consistent with the expecta-
tions and predictions of the theoretical model. The statistical analysis of Chapter 3
centred on the court’s decisions in constitutional review cases over the past decades,
while the qualitative evidence in Chapter 4 provided a glimpse into the subjective
perceptions of the actors whose behaviour the theoretical model seeks to capture.
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Complementing the analysis of the GFCC’s decisions on the constitutionality
of federal laws over more than three decades and relevant actors’ perceptions, this
chapter zeroes in on the choices lawmakers and the GFCC made concerning an
individual law, the 2008 Federal Criminal Police Office Act (in German, the Bun-
deskriminalamtgesetz, in the following BKAG). In this chapter, I show that the
model can explain the choices lawmakers and the court made at the various stages
of their interaction concerning the BKAG. The case of the BKAG and the GFCC’s
corresponding decision on the act’s constitutional (in-)compatibility in 1 BvR 966/09
of April 20, 2016, are particularly interesting, as the choices lawmakers and the court
made on the BKAG appear puzzling in light of existing scholarship.1
Evidence presented below shows that experts heard in the Bundestag’s com-
mittee hearings as well as lawmakers from both opposition and governing factions
highlighted that the act would fail to meet the requirements of recent constitu-
tional jurisprudence the GFCC had re-asserted in its case law just months prior to
the BKAG’s adoption. Existing scholarship expects lawmakers to ‘auto-limit’ their
policy choices when a court’s constitutional veto looms (see Stone, 1992; Rogers
and Vanberg, 2007; Landfried, 1992), yet lawmakers instead pushed ahead with the
BKAG. The GFCC, on the other hand, issued a rather unusual decision in 1 BvR
966/09. The BKAG had authorised the Federal Criminal Police Office to covertly
collect personal data in the context of the protection of the state and public against
threats from international terrorism. The act allowed law enforcement to inter-
fere with individuals’ fundamental rights of the inviolability of their home, secrecy
of telecommunication, as well as the fundamental right to the confidentiality and
integrity of information technology systems (see preamble in 1 BvR 966/09 ).
While the GFCC declared several provisions of the act as unconstitutional, it
also consolidated existing jurisprudence regarding law enforcement’s use of surveil-
lance data for purposes other than those determining the original data collection.
Specifically, the court chose to “revoke former requirements” for law enforcement’s
use of data for new purposes, which had been developed by the court’s jurisprudence
in 1 BvR 2226/94 of July 14, 1999, and in 1 BvR 2378/98 of March 3, 2004 (see
paragraph 292 of 1 BvR 966/09 ). In other words, the GFCC chose to—at least
partially—overrule its previous, relatively recent, jurisprudence on this issue. Exist-
ing scholarship highlights that courts tend to avoid overruling legal precedents they
had specified in their recent case law. Zink et al. (2009, 911) argue that “[r]ather
than adjudicating disputes on a case-by-case basis, the Court invokes precedent in
part to demonstrate its use of fair and neutral decision-making procedures, whereby
1A full list of all decisions mentioned in this chapter along with the links to the full text of
these decisions (where available in English) is provided in the appendix to this chapter.
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similar cases are consistently treated according to similar legal principles, thus bol-
stering the public’s acceptance of judicial outcomes and its confidence in the Court
itself” (see also Hansford and Spriggs, 2006).
The chapter demonstrates the usefulness of the theoretical model by offering an
explanation for the otherwise puzzling decision the GFCC issued in 1 BvR 966/09,
highlighting a factor contributing to the GFCC’s choice to overrule its recent ju-
risprudence. The grand-coalition government of the CDU/CSU and SPD pushed
the BKAG through parliament despite constitutional objections voiced by several
members of the SPD, who referenced constitutional limits to state surveillance the
GFCC had reasserted in its case-law just months before the BKAG’s adoption. Ac-
cording to the model, this choice signalled government’s willingness to evade com-
pliance with a judgement that would censor their policy-making. Again facing a
grand-coalition when issuing their decision on the BKAG in April 2016, justices at
the GFCC had an incentive to show self-restraint in their jurisprudence and ease
some of the constitutional constraints on lawmakers.
To illustrate this argument, I draw on documentation provided by the GFCC
on its case law (i.e. the text of the court’s judgements and accompanying press
releases), media coverage of the 2008 BKAG (during legislative proceedings in the
Bundestag and following the GFCC’s ruling), evidence from my interviews with
former members of the GFCC and German lawmakers, as well as documentation
provided by the Bundestag on legislative proceedings involving the BKAG.
The chapter begins with a closer look at the GFCC’s decision in 1 BvR 966/09
and discusses in more detail why this judgement can be considered as unusual for
the court. The chapter’s second part then traces the political debate surrounding
the adoption of the BKAG, paying close attention to the constitutional controversy
that unfolded in the Bundestag, and links it to the GFCC’s judgement concern-
ing the BKAG. Another reason that makes the GFCC’s decision in 1 BvR 966/09
interesting for the illustration of the theoretical model’s main argument is that
the court—despite showing signs of self-restraint—still struck several parts of the
BKAG. According to the theoretical model we should then see two things hap-
pening. First, the reputation of proponents of the act should come under fire for
championing a law despite having been told that it would conflict with constitu-
tional norms. Second, given the court decided to strike parts of the act despite
an (at least according to the theoretical model) credible non-compliance threat, we
have reason to expect that lawmakers actually evaded compliance with the court’s
decision in 1 BvR 966/09. The third and fourth part of this chapter consider these
two empirical implications of the theoretical model before the chapter’s final part
offers concluding remarks.
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5.1 Balancing protection by and against the state
The BKAG formally passed parliament on December 25, 2008, and entered into force
on January 1, 2009. Weeks later, a group of plaintiffs including the editor of the
German newspaper ZEIT, a former Federal Minister for Internal Affairs as well as
the director of the Berlin Regional Association of German Lawyers had filed consti-
tutional complaints directed against two sets of provisions of the act. The first set of
complaints concerned provisions granting various investigative powers to the Federal
Criminal Police Office (in German, the Bundeskriminalamt, in the following BKA).
These included (1) the covert recording of non-public speech and images, the appli-
cation of tracking devices, and the use of police informants pursuant to paragraph
20g sec. 1 to 3 BKAG, (2) the power to carry out visual and acoustic surveillance
of private homes pursuant to paragraph 20h BKAG, (3) the power to access infor-
mation technology systems (so-called ‘online searches’) pursuant to paragraph 20k
BKAG, and (4) the power to monitor and collect on-going telecommunications data
pursuant to paragraph 20l and 20m BKAG (see preamble in 1 BvR 966/09 ).
The second set of challenged provisions related to the BKA’s further use of the
data obtained in the course of its investigations. These provisions comprised (1)
the use of data by the BKA itself, specifically concerning the use of data beyond
the original incident and beyond the reason justifying the original data collection
pursuant to paragraph 20v sec. 4 BKAG, (2) the transfer of surveillance data to other
domestic public authorities pursuant to paragraph 20v sec. 5 BKAG, and (3) the
transfer of surveillance data to authorities in third countries pursuant to paragraph
14 sec. 1 and sec. 7 BKAG (see preamble in 1 BvR 966/09 ). When considering the
constitutional compatibility of an act pursued by a public authority, the GFCC first
establishes the constitutional principles the challenged act needs to meet. These
principles are derived from Germany’s constitution and substantiated in the court’s
case law. The court then considers whether or not the challenged act meets the
principles applicable in a specific case (see for example Landfried, 1995; Kommers,
1994). In the following, I briefly discuss the benchmarks the GFCC considered in 1
BvR 966/09 and its evaluation of the constitutionality of both sets of the BKAG’s
challenged provisions in light of these (for more comprehensive evaluations of the
GFCC’s decision in 1 BvR 966/09, see Rusteberg, 2017; Darnsta¨dt, 2017).
5.1.1 The BKA’s investigative powers
The GFCC centred its evaluation of the constitutional compatibility of investigative
powers granted to law enforcement through the BKAG on two separate principles:
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(1) the principle of proportionality, noting that “the granting of these powers must
always pursue a legitimate aim and must be suitable, necessary and, in the strict
sense, proportionate to achieving this aim” (see paragraph 93 of 1 BvR 966/09 ),
and (2) the principle of legal clarity and specificity, which aim “to increase the pre-
dictability of interferences for citizens, constitute an effective limit to administrative
powers and enable effective judicial review” (see paragraph 94 of 1 BvR 966/09 ).
The application of the principle of proportionality, in particular, reflects the
fundamental constitutional tension accompanying lawmakers’ attempts to bestow
the BKA with effective powers to protect the public from threats of international
terrorism. The investigative powers granted to law enforcement officials at the BKA
allowed for serious interferences with the privacy of suspects as well as the individuals
who interacted with these suspects. At the same time, the GFCC reiterated in its
decision that the security of the state as well as the safety of the population it is
bound to guarantee “rank equally with other highly valued constitutional rights”
(see paragraph 100 of 1 BvR 966/09 ). In other words, given the BKAG sought to
offer protections against acts of terrorism, lawmakers and the court were tasked to
strike the right balance in protecting the public by and from the state.
Defining the principle of proportionality as well as the principle of legal clarity
and specificity, the GFCC drew closely on its existing jurisprudence (for example
the GFCC’s decision on the sharing of telecommunications data with law enforce-
ment agencies in 1 BvR 330/96 of March 12, 2003, and its decision on the acoustic
surveillance of private homes in 1 BvR 2378/98 of March 3, 2004). It is beyond
the scope of this chapter to consider every detail of the requirements the challenged
provisions of the BKAG had to meet (note that the court substantiated the prin-
ciples in 54 paragraphs in 1 BvR 966/09 ). Yet, overall, the GFCC’s reasoning on
proportionality as well as legal clarity and specificity can be summarized by its as-
sertion that “[t]he more seriously the surveillance measures interfere with privacy
and thwart legitimate expectations of confidentiality, the stricter the requirements
must be” (see paragraph 105 of 1 BvR 966/09 ).
The GFCC found that several aspects of the investigative powers granted to the
BKA did not meet the constitutional requirements it had defined. The court found
that (1) provisions on the use of special means of surveillance outside of homes,
including the application of tracking devices or the use of police informants, were
not sufficiently limited, (2) provisions on the surveillance of private homes, including
data collection via acoustic surveillance, only partially satisfied the requirement of
proportionality, (3) powers granting access to information technology systems did
not come with adequate measures to protect the core area of individuals’ private life,
while (4) the powers allowing surveillance of on-going telecommunications were too
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unspecific and broad (see preamble in 1 BvR 966/09 ). Overall, the GFCC found
that aspects of every challenged investigative power conflicted with the constitution
and ruled them unconstitutional, much in line with its existing jurisprudence.
5.1.2 The BKA’s use of surveillance data
While the GFCC showed little self-restraint and stuck to its existing jurisprudence
when considering the constitutional (in-)compatibility of law enforcement’s inves-
tigative powers granted by the BKAG, the picture changes somewhat when turning
to the BKA’s use of surveillance data. The two principles at the centre of the
GFCC’s evaluation of the constitutionality of the BKA’s further uses of data were
(1) purpose limitation, i.e. the use of data in the same context as the original pur-
pose of the data, and (2) changes in purpose, i.e. the use of data for new purposes
(see paragraph 277 of 1 BvR 966/09 ).
With regard to purpose limitation, the GFCC noted that “[t]he legislature may
permit the use of data extending beyond the original investigation procedure in
the context of the original purpose of this data (further use), provided that the
authority empowered to collect that data uses it within the same field of activity,
for the protection of the same legally protected interests, and the enforcement or
prevention of the same criminal offences, as authorised by the relevant data collection
provision” (see the GFCC’s press release No. 19/2016 of April 20, 2016).
On requirements for changes in the purpose of data, the GFCC wrote that “as
far as data that results from particularly intrusive surveillance and investigative
measures is concerned, such as the data at issue in these proceedings, it is necessary
to determine whether it would be permissible, by constitutional standards, to also
collect the relevant data for the changed purpose with comparably weighty means”
(see paragraph 287 of 1 BvR 966/09 ). Crucially, the court added that while a use of
data for new purposes must serve the protection of legally protected rights or aim to
investigate criminal offences of such a weight that hypothetically re-collecting them
would be justified, it is “ necessary but generally also sufficient that the data—either
as such or in combination with the authority’s additionally available information—
results in a specific evidentiary basis for further investigations” (see paragraph 289
of 1 BvR 966/09 ).
The GFCC explicitly revoked a requirement for changes in the purpose of data
contained in its existing jurisprudence with this statement (see paragraph 292 in 1
BvR 966/09 ): In 1 BvR 2378/98 of March 3, 2004, and 1 BvR 2226/94 of July 14,
1999, the GFCC had established that a change of purpose of data is permissible only
if a temporal proximity threshold regarding the risk situation is met. The GFCC
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kept this requirement in place for data obtained through the surveillance of private
homes or remote searches of information technology systems. However, for data
obtained through less intrusive means, the GFCC eased constraints on lawmakers
willing to allow law enforcement officials to use surveillance data for purposes other
than the one justifying their original collection.
The GFCC still found that several of the BKAG’s provisions did not meet its re-
quirements for purpose limitation and changes in purpose. To summarize, the court
found that (1) provisions relating to the use of data obtained from the surveillance
of private homes and remote searches were disproportionate, (2) provisions on the
use of data for the protection of witnesses or other persons were too unspecific, and
(3) provisions allowing the transfer of data were unconstitutional insofar as they
covered transfers for the general prevention of terrorist offences, irrespective of a
specific evidentiary basis for further investigations (see preamble in 1 BvR 966/09 ).
Nonetheless, lawmakers keen on providing law enforcement with more flexibility in
their use of surveillance data walked away with a significant achievement. The court
may have sent lawmakers back to the drawing board for several provisions originally
contained in the 2008 BKAG, but the constitutional requirements lawmakers then
had to respect for changes in purposes of data had been eased.
Revoking constitutional requirements the court had further substantiated only
four years prior to the Bundestag’s adoption of the 2008 BKAG is unusual for the
GFCC. Existing scholarship suggests that courts make a conscious effort not to break
with precedent all too frequently (see Knight and Epstein, 1996; Rasmusen, 1994).
Spriggs and Hansford (2001, 1092) note that “[t]he overruling of a precedent, despite
its infrequency, is a significant political and legal event, most notably because it
represents a dramatic form of legal change.” Similarly, evidence from my interviews
with former members of the GFCC implies that it is critical for the court to stay
consistent in its case law. In a telephone interview conducted on May 18, 2017, a
former clerk of the GFCC noted:
Clerk 1: To look back at how cases have been decided in the past is
really important, it provides continuity and the court decides its cases
in a consistent fashion. Whenever consistency is lacking, you quickly see
the lower specialised courts issue strange opinions. You know, you can
think of the Federal Constitutional Court as a tank ship, it does not
take a zigzag route, instead things are steered very carefully and slowly.
When something needs correcting, you take a long, slow turn, this does
not happen abruptly.
What makes the GFCC’s decision to revoke previous requirements on law en-
forcement’s use of surveillance data for new purposes even more surprising is that
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two of the court’s Justices published dissenting opinions, in large parts referring to
the GFCC’s approach to changes in purpose of surveillance data. Yet, neither of
these two Justices objected to the decision to revoke existing jurisprudence—instead,
both of them argued that the court should have eased constraints on lawmakers even
further. Regarding the court’s decision to keep the requirement of a temporal prox-
imity threshold in place for data obtained through the surveillance of private homes
and searches of information technology systems, Justice Eichberger wrote:
I cannot back the exception called for by this concept, whereby ev-
ery further use and change in purpose with regard to data from the
surveillance of private homes or remote searches must be justified by
an imminent or a sufficiently specific danger, just as for the initial col-
lection of the data. Even in the context of the surveillance of private
homes, the actual massive interference with privacy takes place when
the investigation accesses the protected area. A further use—even one
with a change in purpose—does indeed perpetuate this interference, but,
even with regard to the surveillance of private homes (and similarly with
remote searches), it does not reach the level of severity of the initial inter-
ference. The further use and change in purpose of intelligence obtained
from surveillance measures must thus be subject to the general rules.
The Senate should have corrected its existing case law accordingly.2
Justice Schluckebier’s dissenting opinion goes a step further and suggests that
for data obtained through the use of certain, less intrusive surveillance methods,
the requirement of a protection of comparably weighty legal interests when hypo-
thetically re-collecting this data should have been revoked as well. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Schluckebier wrote:
The judgement predicates the transfer and use of the data for other
purposes on whether, even after a change in purpose, this data serves to
protect legally protected interests or to uncover criminal offences of such
a weight that this could, by constitutional standards, justify collecting
them again with comparably weighty means (criterion of a hypothetical
re-collection of data). This perspective may be justified with regard to
findings that were obtained through highly intrusive, particularly signif-
icant interferences, which is the case, for example, when measures such
as the surveillance of private homes and remote searches were employed.
2An excerpt (in English) of Justice Eichberger’s dissenting opinion on 1 BvR 966/09 is avail-
able at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2016/
04/rs20160420_1bvr096609en.html.
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However, with regard to other interferences, which result in so-called
coincidental findings, this can, in my opinion, lead to hardly tolerable
results since it requires the rule-of-law order to accept the occurrence of
crimes and damage to legally protected interests. On condition that such
coincidental findings were obtained through a lawful and constitutional
interference, my view is that it is an unacceptable consequence that a
state under the rule of law is forced to deliberately ‘look away’.3
Justice Eichberger and Justice Schluckebier’s dissenting opinions indicate that
the court was under pressure to ease the constitutional constraints on lawmakers
trying to provide law enforcement with effective tools to respond to tangible security
threats. For most of its judgement in 1 BvR 966/09, the GFCC stuck to its exist-
ing jurisprudence and it invalidated a series of provisions contained in the BKAG
for their constitution incompatibility. However, the GFCC’s decision to revoke re-
quirements for changes in purpose of surveillance data suggests that the court—at
least to some extent—gave in to this pressure. Why did the GFCC feel the need to
self-restrain and revoke parts of its own, relatively recent, jurisprudence? Why did
two justices feel the need to go on record and state that they would have liked to
see the GFCC provide lawmakers with even more room to breathe?
In the next section, I will take a closer look at the political debate surrounding the
adoption of the BKAG in December 2008. I show that prior to the act’s adoption
several members of the Bundestag, including members of the governing coalition
caucus, had voiced their concerns that government’s plans for the BKAG would
conflict with constitutional norms. The theoretical model that I presented in this
thesis states that lawmakers’ choice to ignore the constitutional objections voiced
by their own political allies signalled a credible non-compliance threat to the GFCC.
Hence, the model highlights a factor contributing to the GFCC’s decision to show
self-restraint in its judgement on the 2008 BKAG.
5.2 The BKAG in the Bundestag
In light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center
in New York and the U.S. Department of Defense headquarters in Virginia, the
bombings of commuter trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004, as well as coordinated
bombings of London’s public transport system on July 7, 2005, lawmakers in many
3An excerpt (in English) of Justice Schluckebier’s dissenting opinion on 1 BvR 966/09 is avail-
able at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2016/
04/rs20160420_1bvr096609en.html.
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Western democracies, including Germany, sought to equip law enforcement agencies
with (further) means to combat the security threat from international terrorism.
In June 2008, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition cabinet of the CDU/CSU
and SPD submitted a draft version of the BKAG to parliament. Survey data from
the German Politbarometer suggests that, at least at the time, the German public
did not consider terrorist security threats to rank among the most pressing issues in
Germany: Less than 1% of the nearly 30,000 surveyed respondents listed terrorism
or terrorist attacks as the most important issue facing Germany in 2008, far behind
concerns about unemployment (40.7% in East Germany, 27.4% in West Germany),
living expenses (10.4% in East Germany, 12.2% in West Germany), and the state of
the economy (4.3% in East Germany, 5.5% in West Germany, see Forschungsruppe
Wahlen, 2008a, and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2008b). Nonetheless, the following
sections show that the government’s plans to mandate a federal law enforcement
agency, the BKA, not only with the prosecution but also the prevention of acts of
terrorism eventually caught the public eye.
5.2.1 Committee proceedings
The contents of the BKAG’s draft were first debated in the Bundestag’s designated
leading Committee for Internal Affairs. The committee scheduled a hearing on the
draft act in September 2008, inviting statements from representatives of the BKA
and state law enforcement agencies as well as academic experts on constitutional
law, the Federal Data Protection Commissioner and civil rights campaigners. The
hearing was covered by several media outlets, reporting that opinions on the consti-
tutionality of several provisions of the planned BKAG were divided.4 The newspaper
ZEIT reported from the hearing that law enforcement officials considered the en-
visioned competences for the BKA as “absolutely necessary” in light of a growing
threat of terrorist attacks, while a majority of academic experts argued that the
plans failed to respect the constitutionally protected core area of private life.5
Much of the criticism was directed at the BKAG’s provisions allowing law en-
forcement officials at the BKA to remotely access information technology systems,
4See Heise Online (original in German), September 15, 2008. Fu¨r
und Wider im Bundestag zur geplanten Novelle des BKA-Gesetzes, ac-
cessed April 30, 2019. https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/
Fuer-und-Wider-im-Bundestag-zur-geplanten-Novelle-des-BKA-Gesetzes-205693.
html; netzpolitik.org (original in German), September 15, 2008. BKA-
Gesetz mit Online-Durchsuchung soll noch in diesem Jahr verabschiedet
werden, accessed April 30, 2019. https://netzpolitik.org/2008/
bka-gesetz-mit-online-durchsuchung-soll-noch-in-diesem-jahr-verabschiedet-werden/.
5ZEIT (original in German), September 15, 2008. Teilweise verfassungswidrig, accessed April
30, 2019. https://www.zeit.de/online/2008/38/bka-gesetz-anhoerung.
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a measure coined as ‘online searches’. In his statement, Hansjo¨rg Geiger, law pro-
fessor at the Goethe University Frankfurt and former director of Germany’s foreign
intelligence service, noted that “[t]he draft act does not respect the balance between
freedom and security, which had been repeatedly demanded by the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, and which needs to observed even in the face of the most heinous
attacks on the liberal, democratic and constitutional state order as well as human
life.”6 Geiger added that “[e]ven though parts of the draft act’s text are clearly
leaning on the wording of recent Federal Constitutional Court decisions, this does
not necessarily mean that the act respects the ‘spirit of the constitution’ that can
be deduced from these decisions.”7
Geiger referred to the GFCC’s ruling in 1 BvR 370/07 concerning a state law
of North-Rhine Westphalia, the Act on the Protection of the Constitution in North
Rhine-Westphalia of December 20, 2006. The act originally allowed certain law
enforcement agents of North-Rhine Westphalia to carry out investigative measures
involving the secret monitoring of suspects’ online activities and to secretly access
information technology systems. On February 27, 2008, less than four months be-
fore the federal government submitted its draft of the BKAG, the GFCC had ruled
that the act’s provision allowing law enforcement “access to information technology
systems (‘online searches’) violates the general right of personality in its particular
manifestation as a fundamental right to the guarantee of the confidentiality and
integrity of information technology systems”, adding that “[t]he provision in par-
ticular does not meet the requirements of the principle of proportionality” (see the
GFCC’s press release No. 22/2008 of February 27, 2008).
Following weeks of deliberations, several committee members echoed the senti-
ment that the federal government’s plans for the BKAG paid lip service to con-
stitutional constraints on law enforcement’s use of intrusive investigative powers in
the fight against terrorism, yet in practice ignored the spirit of the court’s recent
jurisprudence. In the committee’s recommended resolution submitted to the Bun-
destag’s plenary session in November 2008, representatives of the opposition parties,
the FDP, the Green party and Die Linke, announced that their factions would vote
against the BKAG in the Bundestag, with committee members of the FDP arguing
6Translated from German, excerpt from statement delivered by Prof Dr Hansjo¨rg Geiger on the
draft Act on Prevention by the Federal Criminal Police Office of Threats from International Ter-
rorism at the German Bundestag’s Committee for Internal Affairs, September 15, 2008, Innenauss-
chuss: A-Drs 16(4)460 H, http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2009/0626/ausschuesse/
a04/anhoerungen/Anhoerung15/Stellungnahmen_SV/Stellungnahme_08.pdf.
7Translated from German, excerpt from statement delivered by Prof Dr Hansjo¨rg Geiger on the
draft Act on Prevention by the Federal Criminal Police Office of Threats from International Ter-
rorism at the German Bundestag’s Committee for Internal Affairs, September 15, 2008, Innenauss-
chuss: A-Drs 16(4)460 H, http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2009/0626/ausschuesse/
a04/anhoerungen/Anhoerung15/Stellungnahmen_SV/Stellungnahme_08.pdf.
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that “it is not enough to quote the Federal Constitutional Court verbatim, when
the semantic content of its decisions is not actually taken into account.”8
To see representatives of opposition parties voicing concerns that the BKAG’s
draft proposed by the governing factions failed to respect constitutional constraints
seems hardly surprising. After all, evidence presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4
suggests that this is a fairly common phenomenon characteristic of legislative pro-
ceedings in the Bundestag. Even government’s dismissal of constitutional concerns
raised by some academic experts at committee hearings does not seem too unusual.
Notably, not all academic experts invited to the Committee on Internal Affairs’
hearing considered the BKAG’s provisions as unconstitutional.9 Diverging opinions
among experts were to be expected given that the core issue governing lawmakers
sought to address with the BKAG (i.e. law enforcement’s prevention of terrorist
attacks) pitted two constitutionally protected norms—the state’s responsibility to
protect life and limb of its citizens and the individual’s freedom from state interfer-
ence with the core area of private life—against each other.
5.2.2 Constitutional controversy at plenary debates
What makes the Bundestag’s legislative proceedings on the BKAG and government’s
persistence in its pursuit of the act unusual is the fact that several members of the
governing coalition caucus echoed lawmakers of the opposition and shared their
constitutional concerns.
In the course of the Bundestag’s final ordinary plenary debate on the BKAG,
ten members of the SPD’s parliamentary faction, including former Federal Minis-
ter of Justice Herta Da¨ubler-Gmelin and Jo¨rg Tauss, then-member of the parlia-
mentary faction’s executive board, issued a statement explaining that they would
vote against the BKAG. Drawing on the GFCC’s decision of February 27, 2008, on
North-Rhine Westphalia’s Constitution Protection Act, they argued that law en-
forcement’s “secret access to computers and other information technology systems
not only produces data related to a specific threat, but also provides deep insights
into individuals’ ‘digital personal privacy’ and their communications”, adding that
“it is practically unavoidable that investigations would routinely violate individuals’
8Translated from German, excerpt from the recommended resolution and report of the Com-
mittee for the Interior on the Act on Prevention by the Federal Criminal Police Office of
Threats from International Terrorism, German Bundestag, 10 November 2008, BT-16/10822,
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/108/1610822.pdf.
9See Stern (original in German), September 15, 2008. Staatsrechtler geben Okay fu¨r
BKA-Gesetz, accessed April 30, 2019. https://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/
expertenanhoerung-im-bundestag-staatsrechtler-geben-okay-fuer-bka-gesetz-3760034.
html
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constitutionally protected core area of private life.”10
While the group claimed that the empowerment of law enforcement to remotely
access information technology systems “should be questioned in principle alone”,
they also lamented that the BKAG’s provisions to protect individuals’ core area of
private life through a data protection officer employed by the BKA were insufficient,
that the BKAG did not specify whether or how law enforcement agents would ensure
that the ‘correct’ computer was targeted by a remote search, and that the govern-
ment’s plans failed to show that such intrusive measures were indispensable in light
of the existing means available to law enforcement.11 Despite twenty members of
the SPD’s parliamentary faction joining the FDP, the Green party and Die Linke
in voting against the act, with a further six SPD members abstaining, a sufficient
number of CDU/CSU and SPD lawmakers supported the BKAG’s draft, and the
Bundestag adopted the act at its third reading on November 12, 2008.12
Nonetheless, the constitutional controversy surrounding the BKAG did not end
with the vote in the Bundestag. Since the act’s provisions touched upon state com-
petences, the BKAG required the consent of parliament’s upper chamber, the Bun-
desrat, comprising representatives of Germany’s sixteen federal states. Several SPD-
controlled state governments decided to withdraw their support for the BKAG. Karl
Peter Bruch, the SPD’s State Minister for Internal Affairs of Rhineland-Palatine,
voiced concerns “that it would be the Federal Criminal Police Office itself, which
would assess what constitutes an individual’s core area of private life”, while Gisela
Aue of the SPD and Senator of Berlin noted that “the covert access to information
technology systems envisioned by the act implies further severe interferences with
fundamental rights.”13 The decision of several SPD-led state governments to with-
hold their support for the BKAG meant that the act failed to garner enough votes
to pass the Bundesrat.
Following state governments’ rejection of the BKAG, the federal government
called for a conciliation committee comprising a selection of representatives from
10Translated from German, excerpt from the second reading of the Act on Prevention by the Fed-
eral Criminal Police Office of Threats from International Terrorism, German Bundestag, November
12, 2008, 2. Beratung: BT-PlPr 16/186, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16186.
pdf.
11Translated from German, excerpt from the second reading of the Act on Prevention by the Fed-
eral Criminal Police Office of Threats from International Terrorism, German Bundestag, November
12, 2008, 2. Beratung: BT-PlPr 16/186, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16186.
pdf.
12See roll call vote count at the third reading of the Act on Prevention by the Federal Criminal
Police Office of Threats from International Terrorism, German Bundestag, November 12, 2008, 3.
Beratung: BT-PlPr 16/186, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16186.pdf.
13Translated from German, excerpt from the Bundesrat’s second reading of the Act on Prevention
by the Federal Criminal Police Office of Threats from International Terrorism, November 28, 2008,
2. Durchgang: BR-PlPr 851, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/brp/851.pdf.
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both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat to hammer out a compromise that would
see the BKAG across the finish line. The conciliation committee made several sub-
stantial amendments to the BKAG’s draft version. First, law enforcement’s remote
access to telecommunications systems now generally required a judge’s authorisa-
tion. Second, whether investigations would violate an individual’s core area of pri-
vate life would be assessed by a data protection officer employed by the BKA at the
‘direction’ of a judge.14
While these compromises were enough to get a sufficient number of state govern-
ments on board to shuttle the BKAG through the Bundesrat, some SPD lawmakers
in the Bundestag reiterated concerns that the act failed to respect constitutional
norms. At the Bundestag’s hearing of the conciliation committee’s compromise on
December 18, 2008, SPD members Jo¨rg Tauss and Monika Griefahn issued a state-
ment, arguing:
The BKA’s new powers include the secret access to information tech-
nology systems, or so-called online searches. The Federal Constitutional
Court established strict requirements for intrusions into individuals’ dig-
ital privacy in its decision on the Constitution Protection Act of North-
Rhine Westphalia, requirements that this draft act—even after the agree-
ment found in the conciliation committee—fails to consider.15
Despite these persisting constitutional objections, the Bundestag adopted the
BKAG on December 25, 2008 and the act entered into force on January 1, 2009.
The previous sections have shown that at every stage of the Bundestag’s legisla-
tive proceedings, concerns about the act’s constitutional compatibility had been
voiced. The federal government addressed some of these concerns and amended the
BKAG’s draft in the course of legislative proceedings, inter alia adding measures
allowing some degree of judicial oversight over law enforcement’s use of highly in-
trusive investigation measures. However, some of the fundamental constitutional
objections rooted in the GFCC’s recent case law against law enforcement’s use of
covert searches of information technology systems, which had been voiced by mem-
bers of the governing coalition caucus, were ultimately ignored.
14Spiegel ONLINE, December 17, 2008. Vermittlungsausschuss: Einigung bei BKA-
Gesetz, accessed May 2, 2019. https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
vermittlungsausschuss-einigung-bei-bka-gesetz-a-597062.html.
15Translated from German, excerpt from the reading on the conciliation committee’s recom-
mended resolution of the Act on Prevention by the Federal Criminal Police Office of Threats
from International Terrorism, German Bundestag, December 18, 2008, Abstimmung u¨ber Vermit-
tlungsvorschlag: BT-PlPr 16/196, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf.
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5.2.3 Linking objections to the court’s demands
The earlier sections’ discussion of the GFCC’s decision in 1 BvR 966/09 on the
BKAG suggests that the constitutional concerns voiced by some members of the
SPD were well-founded. Recall that the GFCC eventually ruled that several of the
act’s provisions conflicted with constitutional norms, including provisions concerning
the use of remote, covert searches of information technology systems. Specifically,
in its press release accompanying its decision in 1 BvR 966/09, the court singled out
the BKAG’s provision aimed at ensuring that those searches would not violate the
protection of individuals’ core area of private life (see the GFCC’s press release No.
19/2016 of April 20, 2016):
Sufficient protection of the core area of private life is lacking with re-
gard to access to information technology systems (paragraph 20k BKAG).
In this case, the body tasked with viewing the collected data is not suf-
ficiently independent. It is necessary that the control essentially be car-
ried out by external persons not charged with security tasks. While the
recourse to personnel from the Federal Criminal Police Office for the pur-
pose of involving staff with investigation-specific or technical expertise
is not ruled out, the actual carrying out and decision-making respon-
sibility must lie in the hands of persons independent from the Federal
Criminal Police Office. By attributing the task of screening mainly to
employees of the Federal Criminal Police Office, however, paragraph 20k
sec. 7 sentences 3 and 4 BKAG falls short of these requirements.
The GFCC’s demand that external persons had to effectively control decisions
over law enforcement’s use of online searches means the court hardly showed self-
restraint when considering the issue at the centre of persistent constitutional objec-
tions voiced by members of the governing coalition caucus.
A strict reading of the empirical implications of the theoretical model presented
in Chapter 2 would lead us to expect that the court faced incentives to show defer-
ence to lawmakers on this issue, instead. After all, the federal government’s dismissal
of their political allies’ constitutional concerns would suggest that lawmakers in gov-
ernment were prepared to take high political risks in their pursuit of constitutionally
controversial policies, signalling a credible non-compliance threat to the court.
While the GFCC did not seem to respond with deference on issues at the heart
of the constitutional controversy in the Bundestag, the discussion of the GFCC’s
decision in 1 BvR 966/09 above shows that the court was indeed more lenient in its
constitutional requirements concerning law enforcement’s further uses of surveillance
data. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter does not allow for a definitive
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conclusion that the GFCC chose to revoke its existing jurisprudence concerning
requirements on the further use of surveillance data in response to a credible non-
compliance threat. However, evidence from a telephone interview with a former law
clerk at the GFCC conducted on May 20, 2017, suggests that lawmakers’ choice to
disregard the GFCC’s jurisprudence was not lost on the court. Asked how the GFCC
can assess how lawmakers would respond to its jurisprudence, the clerk noted:
Clerk 2: We also take a look at the laws the federal and state leg-
islatures recently passed. For example, on issues like data protection or
covert surveillance through law enforcement, it became quite clear that
the concept of protecting the core area of private life simply hadn’t been
properly applied by the legislature. So what do you in these situations?
One option is to simplify the jurisprudence and to work with simple
statements. The simpler the language, the easier it is for others to fol-
low it. A second option is to openly address it. There is jurisprudence
that hasn’t been properly implemented by the legislature, you acknowl-
edge that, consolidate and scale back. It’s sign of goodwill and then you
hope that the legislature complies with the new jurisprudence.
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 highlights a factor behind the
GFCC’s decision to ease some of the constitutional constraints lawmakers had to
consider in their attempts to equip law enforcement with effective tools to combat
a tangible terrorist threat. By ignoring several warning signs that provisions in-
cluded in the BKAG were at odds with the GFCC’s recent decisions, lawmakers in
government made it clear that they were prepared to evade compliance with the
requirements the court had established in its jurisprudence.
Arguably, the GFCC did not respond to this signal with outright deference but
made concessions to lawmakers, striking several of the BKAG’s provisions that would
entail violations of individuals’ core area of private life, while simultaneously easing
constraints on law enforcement’s further use of surveillance data.
In the remainder of this chapter, I consider two further empirical implications
of the theoretical model. Since the GFCC struck the BKAG’s provisions that had
been at the centre of constitutional concerns voiced by members of the governing
coalition caucus, we should expect lawmakers to bear the political costs for insisting
on these provisions. In addition, given the court invalidated several of the BKAG’s
provisions despite a credible non-compliance threat, it appears worthwhile to assess
how lawmakers actually responded to the GFCC’s decision in 1 BvR 966/09.
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5.3 The costs of provoking confrontation
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 states that lawmakers who support
a policy despite anticipating that it would transgress constitutional norms pay a
price for their choice once a court actually strikes the policy as unconstitutional.
In the following, I present evidence from news media coverage and debates in the
Bundestag in the aftermath of the GFCC’s ruling in 1 BvR 966/09 to illustrate
that the reputation of those who had championed the BKAG indeed came under
fire following the court’s ruling.
The GFCC’s decision on the BKAG’s constitutional incompatibility was cov-
ered by every major German newspaper and media network.16 While most reports
centred on the text of the GFCC’s ruling and its implications for law enforcement of-
ficials tasked with preventing terrorist attacks, some of the coverage took aim at the
constitutional controversy that had accompanied the BKAG’s adoption in the first
place. The day after the GFCC’s ruling, the nationwide network Deutschlandfunk
broadcast an interview with the deputy chair of the SPD’s parliamentary faction,
Eva Ho¨gl.17 The following exchange from the interview illustrates that journalists
were well-aware that lawmakers of grand-coalition had missed opportunities to avoid
confrontation with the GFCC over the BKAG:
Interviewer: It is clear that the law needs correcting. The legis-
lature now has two years to do so. And your party, the SPD, was also
responsible for the law. Basically, you suffered a defeat yesterday as well.
Eva Ho¨gl (SPD): Yes that is exactly right, and you need to handle
these situations with self-confidence, it’s the job of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court to keep an eye on what the legislature is doing. And yes,
the law was adopted with the votes of the SPD. We were part of the
grand-coalition. Some of the criticism directed at parts of the law came
from members of the SPD. So we feel that our concerns were validated
by the Federal Constitutional Court. [...]
16See for example Spiegel ONLINE (original in German), April 20, 2018. Polizisten murren u¨ber
Verfassungsgericht, accessed May 3, 2019. https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
bundesverfassungsgericht-karlsruhe-bremst-bka-gesetz-a-1088298.html; Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (original in German), April 20, 2018. BKA-Befugnisse zur Terrorabwehr
zum Teil verfassungswidrig, accessed May 3, 2019. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/
inland/bundesverfassungsgericht-bka-befugnisse-zur-terrorabwehr.html; tagesschau.de
(original in German), April 20, 2018. Verfassungsgericht urteilt u¨ber BKA-Gesetz, accessed May
3, 2019. https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bka-gesetz-109.html.
17Deutschlandfunk (original in German), April 21. Bundesverfassungsgericht hat
Grundrechte gesta¨rkt, accessed May 3, 2019. https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/
bka-gesetz-bundesverfassungsgericht-hat-grundrechte.694.de.html.
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Interviewer: I’d like to come back to my previous point. Critics now
ask, why is it that time and again the Federal Constitutional Court has
to explain to government and legislature what’s allowed and what’s not?
Eva Ho¨gl (SPD): Well, that is the normal balance between the dif-
ferent branches in our democracy. [...] I don’t see a problem with the
Federal Constitutional Court taking a look at one of our laws, giving us,
the legislature, advice.
Interviewer: But, Miss Ho¨gl, every law is reviewed by in-house legal
counsel, at least in the Bundestag. It is remarkable that the legislature
and court can arrive at so fundamentally different conclusions.
Eva Ho¨gl (SPD): Look, lawyers have different opinions. You know
how the saying goes, two lawyers, twenty-five different opinions. In the
end it’s always a question of interpretation.18
The lawmaker’s latter statement offers an alternative perspective on the gov-
erning faction’s decision to dismiss constitutional concerns regarding the BKAG in
2008 and push the act through the Bundestag: Even legal experts often disagree
over the constitutional compatibility of policy and lawmakers of the governing coali-
tion believed that their plans for the BKAG would live up to the requirements of
the GFCC’s jurisprudence yet simply misjudged. However, this sentiment was not
shared by commentators in other media outlets. Wolfgang Janisch, correspondent
of the Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (one of Germany’s most prominent and widely read
newspapers) at the GFCC, commented on the court’s ruling in 1 BvR 966/09 :
The play that we’ve seen in the Federal Constitutional Court’s court-
room this Wednesday has been performed, with some exceptions, for
more than a decade. The legislature picks up the pace in combating ter-
rorism, civil rights activists litigate, justices at the constitutional court
pick the law apart and call for ‘privacy rights’ and ‘proportionality’. You
could almost get used to this ritual if it wasn’t actually a defiant strat-
egy: Government and governing coalition factions create paragraphs,
even though they anticipate that they are unconstitutional, and then
18Deutschlandfunk (original in German), April 21. Bundesverfassungsgericht hat
Grundrechte gesta¨rkt, accessed May 3, 2019. https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/
bka-gesetz-bundesverfassungsgericht-hat-grundrechte.694.de.html.
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see what’s left after the court reviewed them. This sarcastic conclusion
was evident again this Wednesday in some of the responses of the federal
government. In fact: The Federal Criminal Police Office Act of 2009, the
centre-piece of the so-called fight against terror, is an act created clearly
beyond the boundaries of the Basic Law. Everyone who had read the
court’s earlier decisions would have known that.19
These examples illustrate that even though the GFCC issued its decision on the
BKAG more than seven years after the act’s adoption, journalists recalled that law-
makers in the elected branches took an arguably calculated gamble and had passed
an act they knew would transgress constitutional norms. Having their commitment
to the principles of the constitution and the GFCC’s jurisprudence openly ques-
tioned in the media is unlikely to help lawmakers’ reputation among the electorate,
particularly in light of the GFCC’s comfortable public support (see Gibson et al.,
1998; Vanberg, 2005). Vanberg (1998, 305) argues “that in democratic systems,
citizens are likely to care not only about policy, but also process, that is, they ex-
pect politicians and parties to ‘play by the rules’.” Lawmakers of the CDU/CSU
and SPD’s grand-coalition had been warned that their plans for the BKAG would
violate the constitution, but took their chances and were called out for it once the
GFCC actually struck several provisions of the law.
Several members of the opposition factions in the Bundestag seized the oppor-
tunity of the GFCC striking parts of the BKAG and argued that the governing
coalitions had wilfully passed a law at odds with the constitution in 2008. On
February 17, 2017, the Bundestag held its first reading of the Act on the Amend-
ment of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act, the CDU/CSU and SPD’s response
to the GFCC’s ruling in 1 BvR 966/09.20 Members of the opposition rang the debate
in with scathing attacks on the grand-coalition:
Ulla Jelpke (Die Linke): Minister, I believe you should have men-
tioned that about a year ago you received a ruling by the Federal Consti-
tutional Court, which confirmed that significant parts of the old BKAG
were unconstitutional and instructed you to find remedies for these trans-
gression in a new law. I believe that this was a humiliating defeat for
the government, which in the name of ‘combating terrorism’ wilfully
19Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung (original in German), April 20, 2018. Wer durch das BKA-Urteil nun
besser vor U¨berwachung geschu¨tzt ist, accessed May 3, 2019. https://www.sueddeutsche.de/
politik/anti-terror-gesetze-wer-durch-das-bka-urteil-nun-besser-1.2957910.
20See first reading of the Act on the Amendment of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act,
German Bundestag, February 17, 2017, 1. Beratung: BT-PlPr 18/219, http://dipbt.bundestag.
de/dip21/btp/18/18219.pdf.
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accepted a breach of the constitution.21
Konstantin von Notz (Greens): But in 2008, as well as today, the
grand-coalition chose to downplay our law enforcement agencies, only
to wildly reallocate their competences—against the widespread consti-
tutional concerns from law enforcement experts, but also from the op-
position, academia and civil society. As had been expected, the law was
challenged in Karlsruhe, and Karlsruhe invalidated exactly those parts
as incompatible with the constitution and void, which we had criticised.
That was a proper hammering, Mr. de Maizie`re.22
Existing scholarship argues that lawmakers face electoral costs when their non-
compliance with court’s constitutional jurisprudence is uncovered, highlighting the
role of the media and the political opposition for communicating lawmakers’ failure
to comply to the public (see Vanberg, 2005; Staton, 2010; Krehbiel, 2016, see also
Whittington 2003). Admittedly, it is difficult to gauge to what extent the CDU/CSU
and SPD’s reputation among the electorate suffered following the GFCC’s ruling
in 1 BvR 966/09. Nonetheless, this section provided evidence from news media
coverage and debates in the Bundestag in the aftermath of the GFCC’s ruling on
the BKAG, showing that governing lawmakers’ non-compliance with the court’s
jurisprudence was publicised in the media and the legislature. In other words, fol-
lowing the GFCC’s ruling in 1 BvR 966/09, the conditions for lawmakers’ electoral
reputation costs to take effect were in place.
5.4 The response in the Bundestag
Much of this chapter covered how lawmakers of the CDU/CSU and SPD’s grand-
coalition faced down constitutional objections voiced from within the governing
coalition caucus and supported the BKAG despite clear warning signs that the law
was at odds with the constitution. According to the theoretical model presented
in this thesis, lawmakers’ choice to pass a law despite anticipating that it would
conflict with the GFCC’s jurisprudence (and the risks this choice entailed) made
it clear that lawmakers were unwilling to see their policy-making curtailed by the
court. In other words, lawmakers had signalled a credible threat of non-compliance.
21Translated from German, excerpt from the first reading of the Act on the Amendment of the
Federal Criminal Police Office Act, German Bundestag, February 17, 2017, 1. Beratung: BT-PlPr
18/219, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18219.pdf.
22Translated from German, excerpt from the first reading of the Act on the Amendment of the
Federal Criminal Police Office Act, German Bundestag, February 17, 2017, 1. Beratung: BT-PlPr
18/219, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18219.pdf.
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Reviewing the BKAG, the GFCC indeed eased constitutional constraints on law-
makers and revoked requirements it had established in its previous decisions. But
the court did note fully cede the field to lawmakers and struck several provisions of
the BKAG. Lawmakers of the grand-coalition again controlled government office at
the time the GFCC issued its ruling on the BKAG in 1 BvR 966/09. How did they
respond to the court’s ruling?
As briefly indicated above, about a year after the GFCC’s ruling, the parliamen-
tary factions of the CDU/CSU and SPD submitted a new draft of the BKAG to the
Bundestag, the Act on the Amendment of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act.
In their explanatory statement submitted along the new draft act, the governing
coalitions referenced the GFCC’s requirements for law enforcement’s further use of
surveillance data, stating:
The Federal Constitutional Court delivered a judgement concerning
law enforcement’s data protection that consolidates existing jurispru-
dence concerning covert investigative measures, systematises this ju-
risprudence in overarching principles, further develops constitutional re-
quirements regarding limitations in purpose and changes in purpose of
data, and for the first time issues statements regarding the transfer of
data to state agencies in third countries. In particular, the judgement
states that the requirements for further uses and transfer of data are
linked to the principles of purpose limitation and changes in purpose,
and that the proportionality requirements concerning changes in purpose
are to be assessed in light of the criterion of a hypothetical re-collection
of data. The principles of purpose limitation and changes in purpose are
also applicable to the transfer of data to state agencies in third coun-
tries. The Federal Criminal Police Office’s existing IT-infrastructure,
particularly its information network INPOL, is not suited to match the
standards of the Federal Constitutional Court’s judgement of April 20,
2016, and therefore requires a fundamental re-structuring.23
In other words, rather than amending the BKAG by addressing the GFCC’s
demands regarding law enforcement’s further uses of surveillance data one-by-one,
the governing coalition instead opted for a comprehensive overhaul of how German
law enforcement agencies would administer their data inventories. In June 2017,
Matthias Ba¨cker, law professor at Johannes-Gutenberg-University Mainz, wrote a
commentary on the amended BKAG on Verfassungsblog, a journalistic and academic
23Translated from German, excerpt from the explanatory statement on the draft of the Act on the
Amendment of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act, German Bundestag, February 14, 2018, BT-
Drs 18/11163 (Gesetzentwurf), http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/111/1811163.pdf.
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debate forum on German constitutional law and politics supported by the WZB
Berlin Social Science Center. Ba¨cker noted that the amended BKAG was nothing
short of a ‘revolution’ in the way law enforcement agencies at the federal and state
level would administer, store and share their data, allowing the different agencies to
link up their data inventories to facilitate the identification of patterns in criminal or
terrorist activities.24 Given that decisions about access rights to the now centralised
data inventory would rest with the BKA, Ba¨cker added that “[t]he law therefore
lacks clarity on fundamental issues: It is possible that the administration of law
enforcement’s information systems would be by and large at the discretion of the
BKA; this would be incompatible with our constitutional rights.”25
In my interviews with former members of the elected branches, I asked lawmakers
about the options available to the government and legislature when responding to
the GFCC’s jurisprudence. In a telephone interview conducted on April 4, 2019,
one lawmaker specifically referred to the governing coalition’s decision to pursue an
overhaul of law enforcement’s administration of its databases:
Lawmaker 3: Usually the court doesn’t declare legislative texts as
void but gives the legislatures instructions, which then have to be im-
plemented by a certain date. And that creates work for the legislative
branch. I can tell you, there is certainly little desire on behalf of the
government to swiftly get to work on some of these decisions. Often,
you then wait as long as you can and see just how little you can do to
still match the court’s requirements. With the Federal Criminal Police
Office Act, you could see a different kind of strategy. Here, the legisla-
ture chose a fundamentally different legal construct in the act, and then
people were able to say ‘well, the Federal Constitutional Court didn’t
say anything on this new construct’.
Despite the governing coalition’s change in course, restructuring how law enforce-
ment officials would handle surveillance data rather than addressing the GFCC’s re-
quirements for further uses of such data head on, concerns emerged that the court’s
jurisprudence was once again acknowledged yet not faithfully implemented. In the
Committee for Internal Affair’s recommendation to the Bundestag’s plenary session
concerning the BKAG’s new draft, representatives of Die Linke wrote:
24Verfassungsblog (original in German), June 8, 2017. Der Umsturz
kommt zu fru¨h: Anmerkungen zur polizeilichen Informationsordnung nach dem
neuen BKA-Gesetz, accessed May 9, 2019. https://verfassungsblog.de/
der-umsturz-kommt-zu-frueh-anmerkungen-zur-polizeilichen-informationsordnung.
25Verfassungsblog (original in German), June 8, 2017. Der Umsturz
kommt zu fru¨h: Anmerkungen zur polizeilichen Informationsordnung nach dem
neuen BKA-Gesetz, accessed May 9, 2019. https://verfassungsblog.de/
der-umsturz-kommt-zu-frueh-anmerkungen-zur-polizeilichen-informationsordnung.
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Almost all of the experts confirmed in the committee’s hearing that
the coalition factions simply copy-pasted passages from the Federal Con-
stitutional Court’s judgement of April 20, 2016, without making their
own considerations or making an effort to tailor certain terms to police
or regulatory law.26
These concerns were echoed in the Bundestag’s plenary session at the final read-
ing of the BKAG’s draft. Irene Mihalic of the Green party noted:
Irene Mihalic (Greens): The new linking up of data is essentially
the same as a re-collection of data. That’s why this is indeed impor-
tant. To be honest, I don’t understand why you are willing to take the
constitutional risks that come with this approach. The only thing you
will achieve with this is continued litigation in Karlsruhe. Instead, you
should tackle the known issues in the context of the existing systems.
[...] The Federal Constitutional Court objected to several competences
in the previous BKAG and defined strict boundaries for our decision-
making. Your draft act consistently scrapes these guardrails. What the
Federal Constitutional Court considered as barely compatible with the
constitution, you then copy-pasted into the act. But copy-and-paste is
not only poor in style for a legislature, it also fails to recognise your
mandate to ensure proportionality in a broader sense.27
Notably, this time members of the SPD’s parliamentary faction did not share the
constitutional concerns of their colleagues on the opposition benches. The amended
BKAG shuttled through the Bundestag and Bundesrat without further constitu-
tional controversy and entered into force on May 25, 2018. Nonetheless, once again
concerns had been raised that lawmakers of the CDU/CSU and SPD had paid lip
service to the GFCC’s decision in 1 BvR 966/09 but effectively evaded compliance
with the judgement by opting for an overhaul of law enforcement’s data adminis-
tration system, something the court’s judgement did not call for. Matthias Ba¨cker
concluded his commentary on the amended BKAG by stating:
Perhaps, practitioners in law enforcement will find a way to organise
the BKA’s administration of data in an useful manner, in ways not
26Translated from German, excerpt from the recommended resolution and report of the Com-
mittee for Internal Affairs on the Act on the Amendment of the Federal Criminal Police Office Act,
German Bundestag, April 25, 2017, BT-Drs 18/12141, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/
18/121/1812141.pdf.
27Translated from German, excerpt from the second reading of the Act on the Amendment of
the Federal Criminal Police Office Act, German Bundestag, April 27, 2017, 2. Beratung: BT-PlPr
18/231, http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/18/18231.pdf.
The 2008 Federal Criminal Police Office Act 149
envisioned by the act. Otherwise, we can expect that the new provisions
will either lead to dysfunctional results or will be brought down with
reference to constitutional rights.28
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter provided an analytic narrative of the theoretical model’s main argu-
ment through a case study on the GFCC’s decision on the Federal Criminal Police
Office Act (BKAG). Citing from the GFCC’s case law, the Bundestag’s legislative
proceedings, media coverage on the BKAG and interviews with former members of
the GFCC and lawmakers, this chapter showed that the theoretical model provides
a useful lens to analyse the interactions between courts and lawmakers, and can
explain otherwise surprising patterns in judicial decision-making.
Shortly after submitting their draft of the BKAG, lawmakers of the CDU/CSU
and SPD faced concerns that the act was at odds with the GFCC’s jurisprudence
concerning law enforcement’s data protection duties and their respect for privacy
rights. The grand-coalition’s decision to push the BKAG through parliament despite
these concerns signalled their willingness to evade compliance with a subsequent
judgement that would constrain their decision-making on security policy, especially
given that some of these concerns had been voiced by members of the governing coali-
tion caucus. In line with the theoretical model’s expectations, the GFCC offered
concessions to lawmakers in its ruling on the BKAG by taking the rare step of re-
voking constitutional requirements contained in its existing jurisprudence. Since the
GFCC simultaneously struck several provisions of the BKAG, the reputation of those
who had supported the act despite widespread constitutional concerns nonetheless
came under fire. Again in line with expectations of the theoretical model, there
are also indications that lawmakers made good on their non-compliance threat and
opted for a response to the GFCC’s ruling that would allow them to evade faithful
compliance with the court’s jurisprudence.
This chapter’s case study also highlighted two facets of the interactions between
lawmakers and courts the statistical analysis of Chapter 3 could not capture. First,
the discussion of the GFCC’s ruling in 1 BvR 966/09 shows that it is useful to look
beyond the dichotomous outcome of an individual case—for instance, did the court
strike a provision or not—and to pay close attention to the reasoning in the text of
28Verfassungsblog (original in German), June 8, 2017. Der Umsturz
kommt zu fru¨h: Anmerkungen zur polizeilichen Informationsordnung nach dem
neuen BKA-Gesetz, accessed May 9, 2019. https://verfassungsblog.de/
der-umsturz-kommt-zu-frueh-anmerkungen-zur-polizeilichen-informationsordnung.
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the court’s decision. Clark and Lauderdale (2010, 871) note that “decisions are often
most important because of the qualitative changes in law that they effect, rather
than because of the decision they provide on the case facing the Court” (see also
Tiller and Cross, 2006). The GFCC invalidated several provisions of the BKAG, yet
to conclude that the court hence did not self-restrain its decision-making would miss
the fact that the court simultaneously eased constitutional constraints on lawmakers.
Second, for the sake of parsimony, the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2
captures a single interaction between lawmakers and a court, yet its mechanism rests
on the assumption that both lawmakers and the court are forward-looking actors,
anticipating how the other would react to their own decisions. This chapter’s case
study highlights the dynamic nature of the interaction between lawmakers of the
elected branches and the GFCC in Germany’s system of limited government. The
chapter shows that in order to explain how a court decided in a particular case, it
is useful to evaluate how lawmakers had responded to the court’s previous, similar
decisions and what this information might tell the court about lawmakers’ behaviour
in the future.
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press releases (where available in English) cited in this chapter.
Case law
German Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the First Senate of 14 July 1999 –
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2005 – 1 BvR 2378/98, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20050420_1bvr237898.html.
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html.
German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgement of the First Senate of 20 April
2016 – 1 BvR 966/09, http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20160420_1bvr096609en.html.
Press releases
German Federal Constitutional Court: Constitutional complaints against the
investigative powers of the Federal Criminal Police Office for fighting international
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In most constitutional democracies, courts commanding the authority to deploy their
constitutional veto and strike the acts of the legislative and executive branches play
a significant part in politics. We expect courts to mark the constitutional limits to
policy-making in their jurisprudence and call lawmakers back to the drawing board
when their policies transgress the boundaries of the constitution. The importance of
the role the judiciary fulfils in systems of limited government is reflected in the ever-
growing volumes of scholarship seeking to uncover the drivers of courts’ decision-
making (see Bailey and Maltzman, 2011; Epstein and Knight, 1998; Epstein et al.,
2013; Staton and Vanberg, 2008; Cross and Nelson, 2001; Rogers, 2001).
A little more than a decade ago, some lamented that “comparative political
scientists have traditionally devoted surprisingly little attention to studying courts”
(Vanberg, 2005, 168), a sentiment that would appear wholly unwarranted today. The
judiciary occupies a prominent spot in the minds of scholars interested in identifying
the factors that shape the laws that govern our societies (see Clark, 2010; Hall, 2011;
Hirschl, 2009; Ginsburg, 2003; Kelemen, 2011). Whereas much of the early litera-
ture on courts’ influence in politics and the determinants of their decision-making
had focused on the U.S. Supreme Court (see for example Dahl, 1957; Caldeira and
Gibson, 1992; Handberg and Hill Jr., 1980; Segal, 1984; Segal and Cover, 1989; Mon-
dak, 1992), scholars’ interests have since diversified beyond the American experience
(see Stone Sweet, 2007; Brouard and Ho¨nnige, 2017; Hanretty, 2012; Dyevre, 2011;
Trochev, 2004; Volcansek, 2000).
Inter alia, scholars of judicial politics have shed light on the role courts play
in Asia’s emerging democracies (Ginsburg, 2003), the South African Constitutional
Court’s struggles to translate its legitimacy into acquiescence with unpopular rulings
(Gibson and Caldeira, 2003), the Argentine Supreme Court’s navigation of tense
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relationships with autocratic and democratic rulers in the executive branch (Helmke,
2005), and the Mexican Supreme Court’s interactions with the media to defuse the
threats of non-compliance with its jurisprudence (Staton, 2010). Some scholars have
turned their attention from the domestic arena to international courts, particularly
the Court of Justice of the European Union, showing that many of the determinants
shaping the decision-making of national courts are at work at the international level
as well (see Naurin and Dederke, 2018; Alter, 2014; Carrubba et al., 2008; Carrubba,
2005; Larsson and Naurin, 2016)
Collectively, this literature has contributed to our understanding of how courts
influence politics in systems of limited government. Existing scholarship suggests
that once courts are able to rely on comfortable reservoirs of diffuse support among
their constituents, courts can place exogenous constraints on the actions of lawmak-
ers in the legislative and executive branches, often without actively intervening in
the political process (see Carrubba, 2009; Rogers and Vanberg, 2007; Stone, 1992).
However, even courts enjoying high levels of institutional legitimacy are themselves
not free from constraints in their review of lawmakers’ actions. Lawmakers frus-
trated by courts obstructing the pursuit of their preferred policies face an incentive
to clip away at courts’ jurisdiction and gradually undermine their institutional in-
tegrity, an incentive that is not lost on courts (Clark, 2010; Zilis and Mark, 2018).
In addition, just as much as the shadow of constitutional review leaves its mark
on lawmakers’ choices during the legislative process, scholars have shown that the
prospects of lawmakers’ non-compliance with courts’ jurisprudence affects the lat-
ter’s decision-making (see Vanberg, 2005; Hall, 2014; Carrubba and Zorn, 2010).
In this thesis, I presented a theoretical model that highlights how courts’ com-
pliance dilemma and the external constraints on their exercise of constitutional
review identified in the existing literature help us explain an otherwise puzzling
phenomenon: Even courts boasting levels of public support that should induce the
legislative and executive branches to shy away from confrontation with the judiciary
cannot always prevent lawmakers from pursuing policies evidently at odds with
courts’ jurisprudence. Existing scholarship argues that lawmakers facing courts
popular among the electorate also face incentives to spare themselves the costs of
having their policies censored by courts and ‘auto-limit’ their choices to policies
that match the requirements of courts’ jurisprudence (see Vanberg, 1998; Stone,
1992; Landfried, 1992; Rogers and Vanberg, 2007). Why then would lawmakers risk
paying the costs of confrontation with courts capable of striking their policies?
Offering an explanation for this puzzle, this thesis opened up a new perspective
on how the constraints on courts’ exercise of constitutional review reflect in the
behaviour of lawmakers, and how the mutual interdependence among the judiciary
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and the elected branches translates into jurisprudence establishing the constitu-
tional guardrails for lawmakers’ policy-making. This thesis makes a simple claim,
that nonetheless has wider implications for the definition of the constitutional lim-
its to policy in systems of limited government: Lawmakers’ choices in the shadow
of constitutional review signal to courts how lawmakers would respond to future
jurisprudence limiting their leeway to create policy.
6.1 Looking forward, looking backward
Like many prominent contributions by scholars of judicial politics, the theoretical
approach employed in this thesis perceives courts and lawmakers as strategic actors
(see for example Epstein and Knight, 1998; Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992; Stephen-
son, 2003; Clark, 2009; Rogers, 2001; Vanberg, 2005, see also Tsebelis 2002). In
systems of limited government, courts and lawmakers recognize that the realization
of their preferences depends not only on their own choices but on the preferences of
others and the actions they expect them to take (Epstein and Knight, 1998, 12).
This thesis follows in the footsteps of this strand of scholarship. The theoretical
model presented in Chapter 2 assumes that courts and lawmakers are forward-
looking, anticipating the actions of their counterparts, which are then reflected in
their own choices. Some of the model’s equilibria replicate existing scholarship’s
expectations about the inter-branch dynamics in systems of limited government,
including lawmakers’ ‘auto-limitation’ in the shadow of constitutional review (see
Stone Sweet, 2007; Landfried, 1992; Rogers and Vanberg, 2007; Vanberg, 1998).
However, beyond the phenomenon of ‘auto-limitation’, the thesis uncovers an addi-
tional effect of lawmakers’ anticipated costs from constitutional review, which has
so far received little attention in the existing literature.
The thesis highlights that both courts and lawmakers anticipate each others’
responses to their own actions by turning to the past. Lawmakers draw on rules
courts established in previous decisions to identify policy choices at risk of a judi-
cial veto. Courts, on the other hand, consider the political risks lawmakers took
when they adopted policies flouting jurisprudence to assess the likelihood of non-
compliance with their decisions. By looking at lawmakers’ past behaviour, courts
update their beliefs about lawmakers’ future choices: Lawmakers prepared to bear
the costs of confrontation with courts are more likely to be the kinds of lawmakers
prepared to evade compliance with courts’ decisions censoring their policies. Courts
keen to avoid issuing decisions that are ultimately not enforced then are more likely
to respond with self-restraint when lawmakers had risked a costly confrontation.
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The innovation of the theoretical model presented in this thesis lies within the
link it establishes between lawmakers’ willingness to bear the costs that come with
a judicial veto and their willingness to evade compliance with courts’ jurisprudence.
For the sake of parsimony, the model abstracts from reality and captures only a
snapshot of lawmakers and courts’ repeated interactions. Nonetheless, despite lim-
iting its attention to a single encounter, the model still shows that lawmakers and
courts’ choices are shaped by each other’s past behaviour and the anticipation that
their paths will cross again in the future. Some lawmakers avoid transgressing con-
stitutional norms substantiated in existing jurisprudence to preempt courts’ censure
in the future. Yet, other lawmakers—as one of the interviewed justices put it—
show the courage of risking a ‘bloody nose’ at the court and call existing constitu-
tional rules into question in their policy choices. The model makes a simple claim:
When tied to costs, lawmakers’ past non-compliance with jurisprudence foreshad-
ows lawmakers future non-compliance. Courts’ face incentives to avoid insisting on
jurisprudence that is eventually not enforced, and it is lawmakers bearing the risks
that come with adopting policies at odds with courts’ previous judgements who thus
provide an impetus for the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence.
6.2 Empirical findings
In this thesis, I brought three different types of empirical evidence from the German
Federal Constitutional Court’s (GFCC) exercise of constitutional review to bear
on the empirical implications of the theoretical model. In Chapter 3, a statistical
analysis of the GFCC’s review of federal law between 1983 and 2017 showed that
the court is less likely to invalidate a challenged law when members of the governing
coalition in the Bundestag had previously objected the law as unconstitutional just
prior to its adoption.
The theoretical model provides an explanation for this otherwise counter-intuitive
finding. Dismissing constitutional concerns voiced during the legislative process can
come back to bite lawmakers. Existing scholarship suggests that lawmakers evading
compliance with courts’ jurisprudence risk paying a price at the ballot box, although
non-compliance is generally difficult to observe for the electorate (Vanberg, 2001;
Staton, 2006; Krehbiel, 2016). We can assume that lawmakers’ flouting of advice
that their policy choices conflict with jurisprudence—particularly advice from their
own political allies—followed by a court’s censure is an easily observable instance
of non-compliance: It is the court itself, which highlights that lawmakers failed to
respect the boundaries of the constitution.
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The statistical analysis provides evidence consistent with the core claim of the
theoretical model. Lawmakers risking a costly confrontation signal a credible non-
compliance threat and induce courts to exercise self-restraint. To conduct this anal-
ysis, I identified every federal law reviewed by the GFCC between 1983 and 2017
(both by the court’s Chambers and Senates) and read every corresponding final par-
liamentary debate to code whether members of the Bundestag had objected laws as
unconstitutional. The data, including links to the documentation of each legislative
proceeding on laws reviewed by the GFCC, will be made available for replication
and future research.
The statistical analysis is complemented by qualitative evidence from interviews
with lawmakers in the German federal government and the Bundestag, as well as
former justices and law clerks of the GFCC. The subjective perceptions of these
actors on the inter-branch dynamics in Germany reported in Chapter 4 are by-
and-large consistent with assumption and empirical implications of the theoretical
model. Lawmakers anticipate constitutional review of their policy choices—albeit
lacking certainty about the court’s future decisions—and reportedly avoid adopting
policies at odds with the GFCC’s jurisprudence.
However, when pressed on recent examples of governing majorities dismissing
widespread constitutional concerns, some of the interviewed lawmakers acknowl-
edged that the GFCC’s judgements are not the last act, and asserted their preroga-
tive to create policy. Justices at the GFCC, on the other hand, follow the political
discourse surrounding the acts they review and know that some of their decisions
may spark (albeit subdued) backlash and are at risk of non-compliance. Crucially,
one of the interviewed justices highlighted the role lawmakers’ risk-taking in the
shadow of constitutional review plays in the evolution of the court’s jurisprudence.
Finally, Chapter 5 provided evidence from a case study of the GFCC’s review of
the 2008 Federal Criminal Police Office Act (BKAG), demonstrating the usefulness
of the theoretical model for explaining the GFCC’s unusual decision in the case.
The case study provides an analytic narrative of the theoretical model’s core claim
at work. Lawmakers of the CDU/CSU and SPD’s governing coalition dismissed
concerns voiced by members of their own caucus that the BKAG conflicted with the
constitutional limits to state surveillance the GFCC re-asserted just months before
the Bundestag’s vote on the act. In its subsequent review of the BKAG, the GFCC
struck several of the act’s provisions, yet simultaneously revoked parts of its existing
jurisprudence and eased constraints on law enforcement’s use of surveillance data for
the protection against terrorist threats. The case study shows that the theoretical
model provides a useful lens to explain the choices of lawmakers and the court at
the various stages of their interaction concerning the BKAG.
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6.3 Links to existing scholarship
The lessons we can draw from the theoretical and empirical analysis presented in
this thesis speak to some of the views held in the existing literature on inter-branch
dynamics in systems of limited government. Existing scholarship suggests that law-
makers pursue certain policies despite knowing that courts will eventually censor
them to delegate the resolution of contested political issues to courts and hence
shift any blame for unpopular decisions on to the judiciary (see Salzberger, 1993;
Graber, 1993; Whittington, 2005).
The implications of the theoretical model in this thesis further differentiate this
argument. Lawmakers know that key decisions shaping the effects of their policies
are eventually taken by courts. In reality, the decisions courts reach in constitutional
review cases are far more complex than the dichotomous choice of striking and
upholding policy accorded to courts in the formal model of Chapter 2, and the legal
rules courts establish in their jurisprudence play a critical role for lawmakers’ future
policy-making (an observation highlighted by the case study in Chapter 5, see also
Clark and Lauderdale, 2010).
By risking the political fallout from being censored by a court, lawmakers signal
where their willingness to accept rules that impose strict limits on their leeway to
create policy ends. In other words, lawmakers know that not every provision con-
tained in their legislation will survive constitutional review and acknowledge that
courts’ jurisprudence marks the constitutional limits to their policies. Yet, lawmak-
ers’ provocation of for them costly confrontation with courts projects a credible risk
of non-compliance and hence provides them with leverage over the legal rules courts
establish in their jurisprudence.
Further, studies addressing the link between the support legislative acts enjoy
in the legislature and courts’ propensity to challenge governing majorities over the
constitutionality of these acts have yielded mixed empirical results (see for example
Bailey and Maltzman, 2011; Segal et al., 2011; Harvey and Friedman, 2009). These
studies draw on scholarship showing that courts’ decisions are driven by justices’
ideological preferences (see Segal and Spaeth, 1993, 2002), and often rely on an esti-
mation of the ideological distance between the median justice and median lawmaker
as well as current lawmakers’ estimated support for an act reviewed by the court
(see Hall and Ura, 2015; Segal et al., 2011, see also Poole 1998).
A potential drawback of such approaches is that, beyond ideology, acts evidently
at odds with constitutional norms may be less likely to garner support among law-
makers in the legislature, hence accounting for patterns of courts being more likely
to strike acts enjoying little backing in the legislature and vice versa. The theoret-
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ical and empirical approach employed in this thesis moves lawmakers’ perceptions
of the constitutional compatibility of the policies they debate to the centre of our
attention. It shows that it is the political risks lawmakers at the levers of political
power are prepared to take in their pursuit of policy that signal the quality of their
support for an act eventually reviewed by a court and leave a mark on the latter’s
decision-making. When lawmakers in government push policy through the legisla-
ture amid widespread constitutional concerns and against the protest of their own
political allies, lawmakers risk paying a high political cost should a court indeed
strike their policy, yet therefore signal a credible non-compliance threat.
Finally, the theoretical model highlights the types of political environments in
which we should expect lawmakers’ costly signalling of a non-compliance threat
to shape courts’ decision-making: when courts enjoying comfortable reservoirs of
institutional legitimacy face lawmakers with a grip on government office firm enough
that would allow them to respond to courts’ decisions on their own policies. At first
sight, these conditions may lead us to expect frequent, bruising clashes between the
elected branches and courts, with neither side facing sufficient incentives to back
down from confrontation. Yet, the core argument put forward in this thesis shows
that lawmakers signalling of a non-compliance threat helps courts to avert a tense
stand-off with the elected branches and to know when to show self-restraint to avoid
issuing decisions that are ultimately not enforced.
6.4 Beyond Germany
The evaluation of the theoretical model’s empirical implications centred on the case
of Germany, given that the GFCC has consistently enjoyed high levels of approval
among the public yet has also faced governing majorities controlling government for
several consecutive terms. While much of the quantitative and qualitative evidence
from the German case presented in this thesis appears consistent with the expec-
tations of the theoretical model, it appears worthwhile to study whether effects of
lawmakers’ costly signalling are discernible in environments with similarly influen-
tial courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s review of Congressional acts and the
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) decisions in preliminary reference
procedures and infringement proceedings.
The U.S. Supreme Court has enjoyed similar levels of diffuse support as the
GFCC, albeit experiencing more variation in levels of support over time (see Gib-
son and Nelson, 2016; Caldeira and Gibson, 1992; Durr et al., 2000). However,
existing scholarship documents that the court’s institutional legitimacy could not
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stop officials in Congress and the executive branch from occasionally flouting its
jurisprudence (see for example Fisher, 1993; Hall, 2011; Carrubba and Zorn, 2010).
Future research may analyse whether politically costly instances of public officials’
non-compliance on a particular issue (e.g. where non-compliance misaligns with
dominant state or nationwide public opinion) reflects in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
subsequent jurisprudence.
Further, existing scholarship has highlighted that governments in the European
Union’s member states and the CJEU vie over the path of European integration,
with member states often failing to comply with European law (see Alter, 1998;
Zu¨rn and Joerges, 2005; Bo¨rzel et al., 2010). In line with the theoretical insights
discussed in this thesis, we may expect the CJEU to become more likely to avoid
antagonising governments in member states in its interpretation of European law
following periods of member states’ governments opting for politically costly non-
compliance with supranational rules.
6.5 Normative implications
In the final section of this thesis, I turn my attention to a normative question that
has so far taken the backseat against the positive theoretical discussion and empirical
evaluation: Should lawmakers’ influence over the legal rules courts establish in their
jurisprudence worry us?
Scholars’ analysis of the drivers of courts’ decision-making has been accompanied
by a normative debate concerning the influence courts wield over politics and the
constraints they place on lawmakers in the elected branches. Some see courts as
fundamentally ‘countermajoritarian’ institutions, with justices acting as lawmakers
in robes, who ‘thwart the will’ of the representatives of the people (Bickel, 1986;
Friedman, 1998, 2002; Waldron, 2006). Scholars subscribing to these views of courts
have cautioned against a judicialization of politics and government through courts
(Tate, 1995; Stone Sweet, 2000; Hirschl, 2009).
At the other end of the debate, scholars have argued that influential courts
capable of obstructing the actions of the elected branches are an essential feature of
constitutional democracies. Courts ensure that the constitutional rights of minorities
are protected against the ‘tyranny’ of political majorities (see Kaufman, 1980; Riker
and Weingast, 1988), and should stand tall when their decisions precipitate outrage
among dominant segments of society (Sunstein, 2007).
The findings of this thesis may cause concern among those considering courts as
necessary institutions to keep the politically powerful in check. Here, the logic that
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lawmakers in government are capable of pushing the constitutional limits defined
in courts’ jurisprudence after facing down widespread constitutional concerns would
appear particularly alarming. Results of the formal analysis in Chapter 2 suggest
that lawmakers consistently pushing the boundaries of the constitution ultimately
succeed in undermining a court’s protection of constitutional rights.
However, the empirical evidence presented in this thesis mitigates these concerns.
The data I collected for the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 suggests that (at least in
Germany) instances of lawmakers taking high political risks when pushing constitu-
tional limits and hence inducing the court to show deference to the elected branches
are relatively rare events. Further, the partial-pooling equilibrium harbouring the
theoretical model’s core claim shows that courts are more likely to respond with self-
restraint to lawmakers costly signalling only under a certain set of circumstances:
when courts are not at risk of suffering high costs from court-curbing and when
lawmakers have a strong grip on government office. Provided the latter condition is
not in place, courts face no incentive to show self-restraint in their decision-making.
Hence, rather than highlighting how lawmakers can undermine constitutional rights,
the thesis shows how electorally accountable lawmakers enjoying consecutive spells
in office and powerful courts enjoying comfortable reservoirs of public support resolve
their differences over policy, while avoiding frequent, bruising conflict.
The thesis shows that courts’ jurisprudence defining the constitutional guardrails
to lawmakers’ policy-making is not rigid, with new judgements continually piling on
further constraints on the actions of the elected branches. Instead, constitutional
jurisprudence evolves over time, with legal rules varying the constraints lawmakers
have to adhere to in their policy-making. Crucially, the thesis shows that it is
not just justices serving on the highest benches who have a hand in writing these
rules. By questioning the rules justices defined in their jurisprudence and provoking
constitutional review, lawmakers set the premise for the evolution of jurisprudence
and indirectly influence its direction.
This dynamic should not be viewed as an unwelcome, unintended anomaly in
systems of limited government. Instead, it is born out of the institutional design of
systems of checks and balances. To ensure the functioning of systems of checks and
balances, ‘ambition must be made to counteract ambition’ (Madison, 1961), and this
logic applies to courts as well. In other words, lawmakers’ signalling of a political
constraint on courts’ exercise of constitutional review is an observable implication
of a system of limited government at work.
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